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THESIS SUMMARY 
 
Empirical studies show that the use of derivative instruments has been increasing during the last decade, 
making it an important part of the firm’s overall risk management profile. Financial theory suggests that 
risk management decisions only matter when markets are imperfect. The standard view is that firms will 
benefit from hedging, because hedging reduces the variability of the costs of financial distress, agency 
costs, and the expected tax liabilities. This thesis attempts to provide evidence on these hypotheses. This 
study investigates the determinants of corporate hedging by using a comprehensive dataset of US and UK 
non-financial firms. The two countries are of particular research interest since they have almost similar 
legal system for the conduct of business and their market-based financial systems and equity markets are 
well developed with good investor protection. The study focuses on the decision of whether or not non-
financial firms from both countries benefit from corporate hedging during the period 2002-2011. 
 
The study is motivated by the idea of whether or not the hedging policies of non-financial firms depend 
on the financial characteristics of those firms and the strength of their corporate governance. Indeed, our 
empirical results show that corporate hedging decision is closely associated with firms’ financial 
characteristics and the strength of their corporate governance. In particular, firms are more like to engage 
in hedging if they have high expected tax liabilities, high expected cost of financial distress, and high 
expected agency costs. Firms choose to hedge to reduce the variability of cash flows in order to protect 
growth opportunities. More interestingly, US firms provide stronger evidence in support of for corporate 
hedging when the overinvestment problem exists, while UK firms provide stronger evidence for the 
underinvestment problem. Hedgers tended to be high-rated firms and larger firms which have a cost 
advantage in hedging due to economies of scale. This finding provides an explanation of why the small 
firms, which have more volatile cash flows, higher costs of bankruptcy, more growth opportunities, tend 
not to engage in hedging. We believe that this is very informative as it suggests the costs of hedging and 
market price dynamics alter the optimal hedging policies of those firms. Hedging is more costly for small 
firms; so they have different hedging policies and respond differently to hedging. 
 
We also find that the board structure influence hedging decisions and a large board tend to be negatively 
associated with corporate hedging. The tendency to hedge increases as the number of non-executives 
grows. In addition, firms with strong corporate governance tend to hedge to reduce the variability of cash 
flows and the costs of financial distress. These results have theoretical and practical implications. 
 
Keywords: risk management determinants; corporate hedging; derivatives; corporate governance; 
logistic regression  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 and the adoption of the floating exchange 
rate regime in major developed countries, both interest rates and foreign exchange rates have become 
much more volatile. Under the floating rate system, the foreign exchange rates (FX) of nations are allowed 
to float against each other. With such a floating rate system, firms with international operations are 
substantially subjected to the effects of FX rate and interest rate changes. In addition, the advent of 
economic and financial globalisation has amplified market volatility; news gets transmitted more quickly 
across countries. Multinational firms are substantially affected by changes in foreign exchange rate, 
interest rate and commodity prices. The price changes alter the expected values of foreign denominated 
assets or liabilities and the competitive position of firms. Of course, purely domestic firms are also be 
affected by the FX rate and interest rate changes through their effects on the cost of traded inputs/outputs 
and on the competition from imported products (Jorion, 1991). These underlying asset price risks have 
become an economic problem for corporate financial management.  
 
The risk management decision of a company affects the value and future prospect of the firm. Indeed, 
Stulz (1996, pp.23-24) pointed out: 
 The primary goal of risk management is to eliminate the probability of costly lower-tail outcomes-
those that would cause financial distress or make a company unable to carry out its investment strategy.  
Hedging the exposure to financial risks is one of the key tools in corporate risk management. By hedging, 
firms can reduce the risks caused by fluctuations in the FX rate and/or interest rates. Risk management 
ensures the stability in future profits and liquidity of firms.  
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In response to the effects of the FX rate and interest rate movements, multinational firms have employed 
large numbers of external (e.g., forward and option contracts) and internal (e.g., leads and lags) techniques 
to manage and hedge these risks. The International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) survey (2009) 
indicates that more than 90% of the world’s largest firms use derivatives to hedge their exposure to risk 
even if risk management using derivatives can also lead to financial loss1. 
 
There is a considerable amount of literature that explores the apparent conflict between the theory and 
current practice of risk management. Theoretically, if capital markets are perfect, then the hedging 
activities of firms should not affect the value of firms. With market imperfection, financial theories 
provide several theoretical explanations and positive rationales of corporate hedging. However, even 
though there is some evidence in support of theoretical predictions, the empirical evidence remains 
controversial and mixed. The divergence between theory and practice leads to a lack of clarity on the 
theoretical explanations or motives for the corporate hedging strategies of firms2. In addition, the majority 
of empirical studies that focus on the hedging practice focus on samples of firms from one country and 
provide limited cross-country evidence of corporate hedging determinants within the same period. It is 
unclear whether the contradiction on the empirical evidence is due to the cross-country differences or the 
changes of exposure management practices that occur over time. To date, very few (if any) empirical 
studies have examined and compared the determinants of hedging between countries with the use of large 
datasets covering several years. So far, the understanding of corporate hedging behaviour of firms and 
correspondence between theory and practice remain incomplete. 
 
                                                          
1 For example: Airline companies (e.g. Cathay Pacific) have huge losses in fuel hedging, and German firm Metallgesellschaft AG 
(Stulz, 2013) and Brazilian firm Aracruz (Barreto, 2008) lost over billions of dollar following the use of hedging instruments. In 
contrast Laker Airways adopted a non-hedge strategy and incurred losses of US$400 million. 
2 For example, the empirical evidence for the taxation hypothesis for hedging is overall weak. Aretz and Bartram (2010) argue 
that this may due to the reality that the tax incentive to hedge are too small compared to other hedging factors. The results 
from this work show that the expected tax liabilities explain a large portion of variation in US hedgers. Therefore, the argument 
that the tax incentives to hedge are relatively small cannot completely explain the weak results regarding tax variables. 
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This thesis therefore investigates the financial and non-financial characteristics that appear to predict the 
corporate hedging motives of US and UK firms. A two-country study also enables us to identify 
differences in corporate hedging policy which can reflect differences in institutional arrangements. We 
employed logistic regressions to analyse the data for listed US and UK firms covering the ten year period, 
2002 to 2011. These two countries have been chosen because both countries have common law legal 
systems, market-based financial systems, and well-developed equity markets with good investor 
protection. This similarities in the operational environments of these firms ease concerns over single 
country studies. Apart from the period of the financial crisis, both the US and UK firms enjoy a good 
period of financial market stability. Both countries also have strong investor protection. Our evidence for 
the US and the UK is generally consistent with theoretical predictions. Firms with greater growth 
opportunities have greater incentives to hedge to reduce the volatility of cash flows. They also hedge in 
response to the tax incentives, the increased agency costs, and the costs of financial distress. Prior 
literature (e.g. Nance et al., 1993; Joseph and Hewins, 1997; Judge, 2006) which tests the relation between 
leverage and hedging provides some supports for the financial distress hypothesis as predicted by Smith 
and Stulz (1985). Furthermore, Purnanandam (2008) extends the theoretical prediction and finds a non-
monotonic relation between leverage and hedging during the 1996-1997 period for US firms. This thesis 
adds to the hedging literature by testing the non-monotonic relation with a much broader sample. We find 
that extremely high leverage and extremely long debt maturity do not support the non-monotonic relation 
between hedging and leverage. Our evidence suggests that when hedging is costly, the dynamics 
associated with the costs of hedging alters the optimal hedging policies firms. Furthermore, the prior 
literature poses an empirical puzzle for the effects of firm size on hedging. While some researchers predict 
that smaller firms would hedge more than large firms because smaller firms are riskier, empirical studies 
focused on US firms (e.g. Graham and Rogers, 2002; Dionne and Triki, 2013) suggest a positive relation 
between the size of firm and the likelihood of hedging. Our empirical results show that large firms hedge 
more than small firms - confirming the prior results for a broad cross-section of US firms. Our finding 
that credit rating is positively related with hedging for US firms provides a plausible explanation the 
puzzle. 
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There are however, significant country differences in the practice of corporate hedging and the factors 
that incentivise firms. Some of these differences are driven by the differences in bankruptcy codes, 
corporate governance, and other institutional differences. For example, though the results from both 
countries suggest a positive relation between firm size and hedging, our results show that the corporate 
hedging policy is more sensitive to economies of scale amongst US firms compared with UK firms. 
Additionally, it appears that US firms exhibit stronger motivation of hedging in response to the 
overinvestment problem, while UK firms exhibit stronger motivation in response to underinvestment 
costs. The fact that our sample covers the risk management policies of US and UK firms over a long 
period allows our analysis to capture the effect of macroeconomic change on a firm’s hedging decision. 
Indeed, we find that the economic downturns and a financial crisis significantly influence the likelihood 
of hedging. Firms are more likely to hedge their exposures in response to the increasing financing costs 
and the volatility of cash flows. 
 
The study also examines the joint effect of financial characteristics and corporate governance on corporate 
hedging policies. The results show that the board structure influences hedging decisions and the size of 
the board of directors tends to be negatively associated with hedging. The interaction between the board 
size and the CEO-Chairman duality dummy variable is significantly negative, suggesting that a powerful 
CEO-Chairman and a large board reduces the incentives to engage in hedging. The probability of hedging 
shrinks with outsiders influence and grows with manager influence over the board. In addition, corporate 
governance variables and financial characteristics have important consequences for corporate hedging. 
Firms with strong governance hedge to reduce the variability of cash flows and the costs of financial 
distress. Compared with prior empirical work which provides hedging insight on firm value and its 
relation with financial distress and/or agency costs perspective, our empirical results provide new 
evidence from tax and cash flow perspectives. The interaction effect of corporate governance with 
investment intensity and managerial incentives varies across different types of hedging strategies and 
14 
 
across countries. Overall, our findings underscore the importance of incorporating industry-specific and 
country-level factors in cross-country studies. 
 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 critically reviews and discusses existing literature on this 
topic with theory and empirical results. On the basis of the literature review, Chapter 2 also develops the 
hypotheses tested in our research. Chapter 3 describes the data source and sample, and discusses 
methodology employed. After that, Chapter 4 provides preliminary descriptive statistics, bivariate non-
parametric tests, and a brief summary of empirical findings of the corporate hedging in the US and the 
UK. Chapter 5 presents the results of logistic regression analysis with the US sample, followed by the 
analysis for the UK sample in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 employs factor analysis approach to investigate 
financial characteristics and corporate governance mechanism on corporate hedging. Our conclusions are 
presented in Chapter 8, which also contains a comparison of our results with other studies and a discussion 
of the implications and contributions of the research. 
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CHAPTER 2           
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a critical review of both the existing theoretical and empirical works associated with 
the determinants of corporate hedging. The aim of this assessment is to identify the areas which are open 
to research and the specific hypotheses that can be tested. There are two major sets of the arguments for 
and against corporate hedging. One set of arguments relies on perfect markets and determines that firms 
should not hedge on behalf of investors. The other set of argument predicts the gains to firms that hedge 
when markets are imperfect. The empirical evidence in support of hedging is ambiguous. This chapter 
starts with a detailed and comprehensive overview and analysis for the corporate hedging under perfect 
market conditions. We next consider the theoretical framework for corporate hedging and the related 
empirical results. We then establish the areas for our research. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 discusses the theories that argues against 
corporate hedging when markets are perfect. Section 2.3 then presents the theories for corporate hedging 
when markets are imperfect, the associated empirical results, and the corresponding hypotheses. Section 
2.4 discuss the country level factors which may affect corporate hedging policy in the difference countries. 
Section 2.5 reviews the relation between firm competition and risk management. The chapter ends with 
a conclusion. 
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2.2 Perfect Market and Corporate Hedging 
 
When firms Hedge their exposures to risk, the pay using derivatives is for capital markets to bear the 
source of risk. In perfect markets, finance theory implies that corporate hedging cannot create value to 
shareholders. This is because investors will be exposed to the same or lower costs as firms if they 
(investors) bear the corporate risk directly.  The following subsections provide extensive review and 
discussion about the major arguments based on perfect market assumptions, showing why perfect market 
theory may not work and that taking the risk within the firm may be inefficient. 
 
 
2.2.1 Home-made hedging 
 
A common re-interpretation of Modigliani & Miller’s (1958) theorem implies that, in perfect markets, 
the value of a firm is unaffected by its hedging decision. Under this framework, external shareholders can 
obtain home-made hedging, consistent with the home-made leverage idea, making corporate hedging 
redundant. However, in imperfect markets, corporate hedging becomes relevant through its impacts on 
taxes, investment decisions and transaction costs, amongst others considerations. Furthermore, under the 
home-made hedging concept, there are certain practical considerations that largely limit investors’ ability 
to hedge the firm’s exposure. For example, individual investors are unable to hedge at the same costs as 
the firm as the transaction costs of hedging will be higher. The large size of derivatives is also too large 
to hedge the individual investor’s exposure. Even if investors can afford these contracts, they lack 
immediate information about corporate exposures in order to implement their hedging strategies. 
Investors can also achieve other home-made hedges including metals, natural resources and real estate. 
In practice, however, since investor’s cash flow and tolerance for risk are relatively low, the use of this 
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kind of home-made hedging is very limited. As such, home-made hedging seems impractical from the 
individual investor’s perspective3. 
 
Since home-made hedging is not an efficient substitute to all investors, corporate hedging by firms could 
be justifiably alternative approach. Bodnar et al. (1995) find that firms tend to be less concerned about 
the cost of derivatives, meaning that firms have perhaps a competitive advantage relative to external 
investors in hedging corporate exposure. However, Solomon (1999) finds that institutional investors 
hedge their portfolio interests in firms even if those investee firms themselves hedge corporate exposure.  
 
 
2.2.2 Parity conditions 
 
Under the parity conditions, the future bi-lateral FX rate is determined separately by the interest rate and 
the inflation differential of the two countries. The four parity relations, i.e. interest rate parity (IRP), 
purchasing power parity (PPP), international fisher effect (IFE), and expectation hypothesis, predict the 
conditions under which the next period’s FX is determined.  
 
If the four parity conditions hold, then there is no reason to hedge since the value of the firm will be 
constant. However, the relationships may not always hold in the short term due to transaction costs, 
information asymmetric and government intervention, amongst other factors. Marston (1997) and Bekaert 
et al. (2007) find evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the IRP, PPP, IFE, and IRP relations holds. 
In contrast, Chinn and Meredith (2004) provide evidence to show that IRP holds. Other researchers find 
                                                          
3 Despite this restriction of minimum contract size requirement of derivatives, we recognise that the institutional investors 
would not have the restrictions imposed by contract size or transaction costs if indeed, they wish to hedge their exposures in 
their investee firms. 
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mixed results (see Fama, 1975; Robinson and Warburton, 1980; Popper, 1993; Fletcher and Taylor, 1994; 
O’Connel, 1998; Bekaert and Hodrick, 2001; Tweneboah, 2010). Some of the explanations associated 
with the failure of the parity relations to hold include model specification, transaction costs, information 
asymmetry, risk aversion and government intervention, amongst others (see e.g. Baillie and Bollerslev, 
2000; Baillie and Kilic, 2006; Sarno et al., 2006). 
 
2.2.3 Unbiased Forward Exchange Rate Hypothesis 
 
The forward rate as a predictor of the realised spot rate is considered to be one form of the expectations 
hypothesis. The Unbiased Forward Exchange Rate Hypothesis (UFRH) suggests that the forward rate at 
time period t is an unbiased predictor of the next period’s (t+1) realised spot exchange rate. The UFRH 
suggests that forward contracts are appropriately priced, and nothing will be gained from hedging.  
 
Whilst there are several model specifications for this prediction, the empirical validity of this hypothesis 
has been shown to be weak. Several empirical results reject the theoretical prediction (Baillie and 
Bollerslev, 1989; Crowder, 1994; Tauchen, 2001; Maynard, 2003). Usually, the forward 
premium/discount tends to be negative in empirical work. Several of the explanations for the existence of 
the negative forward premium puzzle include: (i) failure of the rational expectations hypothesis and/or 
risk aversion (Taylor, 1995); (ii) invalid or poor model specification and econometric implementation 
(Maynard and Phillips, 2001; Liu and Maynard, 2005 ); (iii) the actual existence of a FX risk premium 
that drives a wedge between the actual FX rate changes and the expected FX rate changes; (iv) political 
risk and risk preferences (Moore and Roche, 2010); and, (v) incomplete information processing by agents 
(Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2006). As far as the UFRH is concerned, corporate hedging is a reasonable 
choice for firms that want to protect their exposure to foreign exchange rate risk whether or not UFRH 
holds. 
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2.2.4 Hedging and the market price of risk 
 
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and 
Mossin (1966), the essential factor in pricing an asset is systematic risk. If the market risk is not systematic, 
it can be diversified away by investors at no cost such that there would not be any gain to firm that hedges 
diversifiable risk. Therefore, if the securities of two firms have the same beta in the same capital market, 
then no matter what the firms’ hedging policies are, both firms should have the same expected of return. 
The volatility of profit or cash flows due to the change on market prices (e.g. FX, commodity price) 
should not change firm’s value as the stock price should already have incorporate the effects of market 
price changes into stock returns. If the market risk is systematic and is priced, then any increase in the 
return due to hedging would only rise to a (proportionate) increase of the firm’s risk. That is, the change 
in returns would move along the Security Market Line (SML) and firms would gain nothing from hedging.  
 
Empirical works provide evidence that firms can only gain from hedging if financial markets are 
imperfect. Jorion (1990) indicates that under floating exchanges, FX rate changes are a major risk factor 
for multinational firms; much more so than interest rate and inflation rate change. Dumas and Solnik 
(1995) and Francis et al. (2008) find significant foreign-exchange risk premium on the expected rate of 
return. Furthermore, Joseph et al. (2015), using the three-factor CAPM to estimate FX rate and interest 
rate exposure and find that most firms are exposed to theses exposures at short to long return horizons. 
These empirical evidence suggests that hedging is beneficial in imperfect markets. 
 
The arbitrage pricing theory (APT) states that the expected return of financial asset can be modelled as a 
linear function of macroeconomic factors. Under this framework, if, for example, FX rate is one of those 
factors, hedging policy can affect expected stock returns. Jorion (1991) finds weak empirical evidence to 
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support the argument that the FX rate risk is priced in the U.S. stock market. Other empirical studies (see 
Dumas and Solnik, 1995; Chow et al, 1997; Choi et al., 1998; and Francis et al., 2008) support the APT 
argument for stocks located in other countries. So the time period of the study as well as the estimation 
method may give rise to differences in those results. Allayannis and Weston (2001) suggest that on 
average, there is significant evidence of a positive relationship between the use of currency derivatives 
and the market value of non-financial firms. Carter et al. (2006) find additional supportive evidence that 
the hedging premium in the US airline industry can be as large as 10%. Overall the empirical findings 
regarding the pricing of the FX rate risk in the stock market is mixed. However, it would appear that 
corporate hedging policy matters under imperfect market conditions. 
 
2.2.5 The value of firm 
 
Under CAPM or APT, hedging or not hedging should not affect the firm’s value. However, empirical 
results tend to show that the use of derivatives may, although not always, impact on the market value of 
firms. Guay and Kothari (2003) find that most US firms have low cash flow and market value sensitivity 
to risk management actions. Jin and Jorion (2006) find similar results for firms in the oil and gas industry. 
In contrast, Graham and Roger (2002) indicate that on average firms that increase debt capacity and also 
hedge experience an increases in value of 1.1 percent. Furthermore, the average volatility of the stock 
returns for firms that use derivatives is lower than for non-hedgers; market beta of hedgers is also 6% 
lower than the beta of non-hedgers (Bartram et al., 2011). Pérez-González and Yun (2013) also show that 
the use of weather derivatives leads to higher market valuations.  
 
Solomon and Joseph (2000) argue that one possible reason for the overall mixed empirical evidence on 
the pricing of the foreign exchange rate risk premium is the misspecification of the model. Most of these 
studies use either the classic CAPM or APT. There is often no consistency in the use of the same model 
specifications, thereby leading to different conclusions. The mixed empirical findings do not necessarily 
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mean that corporate hedging in not beneficial, since the use of asset pricing models which by their nature 
are associated with perfect markets may not be useful in validating the benefits of corporate hedging when 
markets are imperfect. For example, Cornaggia (2013) examines the relation between hedging and 
productivity and shows that hedging could affect firm value by relaxing financial constraints, improving 
productivity, and adding value to investors who are unable to diversify nonsystematic risks. Therefore, 
risk management matters in practice and firms and investors can still benefit from corporate hedging. 
 
 
2.2.6 Portfolio diversification and home bias 
 
Markowitz (1952) shows that, for a given expected return, investors can minimise risk by diversification. 
Since prices of different assets do not necessarily move together, investors can diversify unsystematic 
risk by holding investment portfolio with negative correlated securities. Fama (1976) empirically supports 
this view. 
 
Extending the modern portfolio theory to an international setting, assuming complete freedom of 
international capital movements, international diversification will enhance portfolio diversification. Levy 
and Sarnat (1970) as well as Lassard (1973) show how stock returns from various countries are less 
correlated than stock returns within national countries thereby making internationally diversified 
portfolios more efficient compared to domestically diversified portfolio. Indeed, investors can reduce the 
risk of their portfolios by diversifying securities portfolio internationally (see also Solnik, 1974; Ang and 
Bekaert, 2002). Internationally diversified portfolios will always generate a higher return that is 
accompanied with a lower risk than a domestic portfolio (Fatemi, 1984).  
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This evidence also suggests that the individual investors should diversify internationally, possibly to 
bypass the restrictions placed on the use of derivatives (see section 2.1.2). However, this argument is only 
valid if the volatility of FX rate changes does not increase the volatility of the stock returns. Eun and 
Resnick (1988) show that this is not the case for US investors since FX rate volatility enhances the 
volatility of international portfolios by up to 50 percent. In addition, investors may not exploit the full 
benefits of international diversification. Thomas et al. (2004) show that US investors held only 14 percent 
of their equity portfolio in foreign stock, despite the US stock market comprises of 54 percent of world 
market capitalisation. This is a very small improvement on the earlier study of Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) 
which indicates that US investors held 6 percent of their portfolios in foreign stocks. Several explanations 
have been put forward for the presence of this home-asset bias. These include information asymmetry, 
failure of PPP to hold, the FX risk, political risk, differential taxation and other dead-weight costs (see 
Adler and Dumas, 1983; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Glassman and Reddick, 1996). Preference for the 
geographical proximity of investments (Coval and Moskowitz, 2002) and over-optimistic expectations of 
home stock performance (French and Poterba, 1991) are also other explanations for home-asset bias. 
Strong and Xu (2003) as well as Lütje and Menkhoff (2007) show that the home bias problem exists for 
fund managers in major developed economies. 
 
In addition, bi-lateral FX rate movements are highly correlated, thereby causing the FX risk to be largely 
non-diversifiable. Ziobrowski and Ziobrowski (1995) find that multiple acquisitions of international 
securities in the same foreign country do not significantly improve the efficiency of international portfolio 
when exchange rates are very volatile. Since fluctuating exchange rates make foreign investment more 
risky, fluctuation of exchange rate diminishes the benefits from international diversification (Eun and 
Resnick, 1988). 
 
Since holding international portfolio may not efficiently reduce the FX risk, hedging is therefore an 
alternative strategy that enables investors to substantially increase the gains from international 
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diversification. Firms will actively engage in hedging if corporate hedging policies can affect their cost 
of capital. 
 
 
2.2.7 Clientele Effects Argument 
 
Under the clientele effects argument, shareholders can reverse the hedging decisions of firms if 
shareholders consider them to be inappropriate. In this case, investors can choose to invest in the securities 
of firms whose risk management policy is consistent with their level of risk aversion. For the clientele 
effects argument to work, firms need to disclose their hedging policies such that investors are able to 
decide whether they are in agreement with such a policy. Nevertheless, risk management is an everyday 
activity for many firms (Solomon and Joseph. 2000). This does not mean that the hedging policies of 
firms are applied consistently over time. Information of the exposure of firms is not published to investors 
on a daily basis. Even so, investors will receive information on corporate hedging policy after the fact. 
Bodnar et al. (1995) show that less than half of the firms that hold derivatives regularly report their 
derivatives activities and only 7% of the firms report it on monthly (regularly) basis. The lack of 
disclosure may cause unexpected risks for investors. DeMarzo and Duffie’s (1995) theoretical framework 
suggests that the disclosure of the hedging activities of firms provides information about earnings to 
investors and as such signals the managerial ability and project quality of managers. 
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2.3 Theories and Evidence in Support of Corporate Hedging 
 
The above section has discussed why perfect market theory may not work and taking the risk within the 
firm may be inefficient. The financial literature based on imperfect market puts forward several arguments 
to explain why firms hedge risks they face. Based on different perspectives, the following subsections 
provide detailed and comprehensive discussion and analysis of the theoretical explanations which argues 
corporate hedging could be more efficient and valuable when the costs of bearing the risk is higher than 
the costs of hedging in capital market. This section also reviews the corresponding empirical evidence in 
the existing literature. 
 
2.3.1 Taxation 
Finance theory has identified that hedging can reduce expected tax payments of firms. Progressive tax 
rates and tax preference items give rise to a convex tax schedule. Since the convexity of the tax schedule 
enlarges the variability of taxable income, the uncertainty of the firm’s expected tax liability also increases. 
For firms that face a convex tax schedule, net income and cash flow will drop significantly when pre-tax 
income is above a certain level. 
 
Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that firms engages in hedging in order to reduce expected tax liability when 
the effective tax schedule is convex. By reducing the variability of taxable income the firm can reduce 
the expected value of tax liabilities. The reduction of expected tax liability will be greater if the effective 
tax schedule becomes more convex (Nance et al., 1993). Furthermore, given the fact that the income tax 
of firm is charge at the firm level, such tax saving from hedging cannot be achieved by investors through 
homemade hedging. However, empirical evidence provides relatively weak support for this hypothesis 
(Nance et al, 1993; Joseph and Hewins, 1997; Huang and Ryan, 2007; Chang et al., 2013; Fabling and 
Grimes, 2015). Graham and Rogers (2002) show that firms hedge in response to the tax benefit on debt, 
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but do not hedge for tax convexity. This may be because not all firms face convex tax schedules and 
actual tax payments are not directly predictable. Graham and Smith (1999) find that only about 50 percent 
of firms face a convex effective tax schedule and the distribution of potential tax savings from corporate 
hedging is skewed. In reality, the tax incentive to hedge may be small compared to other hedging factors 
(Aretz and Bartram, 2010). Even so, the tax incentive to hedge is an important unresolved issue.  
 
More than two decades later, MacKay and Moeller (2007) as well as Frestad (2010) criticise the version 
of the tax hypothesis by Smith and Stulz (1985). They argue that there is a trade-off between the value of 
lowering cash flow volatility and the hedging gains related to cost function nonlinearities. Frestad (2010) 
argues that the increase of tax function convexity can increase the probability of hedging, but will not 
necessarily lead to higher levels of hedging. How a firm responds to higher tax function convexity 
depends on the type of convex cost function. Thus, previous weak evidence for taxation hypothesis may 
be because the proxies used were too simple (Graham and Smith, 1999).4  The provisions such as 
carryforwards and tax credits broaden the range of convexity but flatten the curvature near the kink. If a 
firm is unable to make efficient use of the underlying tax benefits, the benefit of these provisions can be 
reduced.  
 
Therefore we test the following hypothesis: 
H0:1 There is no difference in the expected taxes of hedgers and non-hedgers. The alternative hypothesis 
is that there is significant difference regarding the expected taxes of hedger and non-hedgers. 
 
                                                          
4 Most of previous empirical studies use tax loss carryforwards (Nance et al, 1993; Mian 1996; Graham and Rogers, 2002; 
Bartram et al., 2009; Chang et al., 2013), tax credits (Nance et al, 1993; Bertram et al., 2009; Panaretou, 2014). These proxies 
do not measure the type of convex function a firm faces. The existence of tax preference items are positively associated with 
the likelihood of hedging.  
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2.3.2 The level of debt 
 
With the existence of market imperfection, a firm can manage its debt capacity through corporate hedging. 
The fluctuations of market price impact on the actual cash flow firms can receive from foreign businesses 
and limit the ability of a firm to meet short-term liability promises. Creditors may be concerned about the 
total variability of cash flows where default is likely. Thus, in instances where the total variability is 
important, hedging may add to the firm’s debt capacity.   
 
Furthermore, levered firms pay taxes on their cash flows net of interest payments to the bondholders. The 
M&M theorem implies that the existence of tax, debt tax shield, and debt substitutes (DeAngelo and 
Masulis, 1980) can affect the optimum leverage decision of the firm. The lower the expected bankruptcy 
costs, the higher the expected payoffs are to the firm’s claimholders. If hedging reduces the variability of 
a firm’s future value, hedging will also lower the probability that the firm encounters financial distress 
and bankruptcy costs. Leland (1998) argues that by hedging, firms can increase debt capacity and interest 
payments deductions, and therefore the firm’s value will increases. Graham and Rogers (2002) show that 
by increasing the firm’s debt capacity and tax benefits of debts, hedging also increases the firm’s value 
by 1.1%. Even in the absence of tax benefits of debt, there still is a positive relationship between hedging 
and leverage level (Lin et al., 2008). Campello et al. (2011b) find that hedgers pay lower interest rate 
spread and exhibit lower external financing costs. As such corporate hedging will reduce debt costs in 
relation to the firm’s level of debt. 
 
Thus we test: 
2:0H  There is no difference regarding the level of debt hedger and non-hedgers. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the leverage level for hedgers and non-hedgers are different. 
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2.3.3 Growth and investment opportunity 
 
Under imperfect market conditions, the ability to raise external funds is restricted. In the case of a funding 
shortfall is relative to investment opportunities, raising external capital is costly (Lessard, 1991). For non-
hedgers, the cash flows of the firm will be volatile because of operational, financial and/or investment 
shock (e.g. volatile commodity price, the change of interest rate, and the fluctuation of foreign exchange 
rate). This variability of internal cash flows leads to volatility of available cash flows for planned and 
unplanned investments. For example, if the cash flows generated from domestic market alone are not 
large enough to support the level of research expense of the firm, the variability of foreign income may 
constrain continued research and business operations. Indeed, the firm faces the risk of losing investment 
opportunity because of shortage of funds, thereby losing market share to rivals (Campello, 2003; 
Haushalter et al., 2007; Adam et al., 2007). Campello et al. (2010) also show that during the 2008 financial 
crisis, constrained firms planned deeper cuts in R&D spending. Their investment opportunities were also 
restricted due to the market uncertainties associated with the period. It is unclear whether active corporate 
hedging of the R&D expenditures associated with those investment opportunities provide the desired 
financing protection, as there would have been greater uncertainty with the cash flows arising from those 
opportunities. There is very limited empirical literature that investigates the impact of the 2008 financial 
crisis and growth opportunities factors on corporate hedging policies5. 
 
Finance literature has argued that growth and investment opportunities are key determinants of corporate 
hedging behaviour (Lessard, 1991; Froot et al., 1993). If external finance is more costly than internal 
financing, the firm should hedge to lower the variability of the shadow value of internal cash flows. 
Hedging eases the constraint of growth options and investment opportunities by reducing variability of 
internal cash flows. Therefore, the hypothesis suggests that firms which hedge should have more 
investment opportunities and higher R&D spending. Hedging can reduce the impact of lack of financial 
                                                          
5 Chen and King (2014) examine the hedging activities in the U.S. during the period 1993 through 2008, Treanor et al. (2014a), 
and Treanor et al. (2014b) cover the period 1993-2008, but do not include 2009.  
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control since hedging reduces the variability of internal cash flows. As such, hedging ensures that the 
firm has sufficient available internal funds to take advantage of valuable investment opportunities and 
growth options (Froot et al, 1993). Lin et al. (2008) extend Froot et al.’s (1993) framework by exploring 
the relationship between hedging, financing, and investment decisions. The theoretical predictions of their 
model consistently suggests firms with greater growth opportunities hedge more. Haushalter et al. (2007) 
suggest that hedging the exposure to investment opportunities benefits firms in two ways: first, hedging 
allows firms to execute proposed projects and decrease predation risk by cash-rich rivals; and second 
hedging enables firms to make unplanned investment so that preventing rivals from gaining strategic 
advantages over the firm. 
 
Empirical studies provide mixed results of this hypothesis. Géczy et al. (1997) find that R&D spending 
is significantly related to foreign exchange hedging, however, the association between the book-to-market 
ratios and hedging is insignificant. Growth opportunities, surprisingly, have weak influence on corporate 
hedging policy in German firms (Galum, 2002). Conversely, Clark and Judge (2005) show that firms with 
higher R&D expenses and higher capital expenditure tend to hedge more. Campello et al. (2011b) find 
consistent evidence that corporate hedging can ease the investment restriction of levered firms thereby 
increasing investment opportunities, and that hedgers generally have higher investment spending. Bates 
et al. (2009) find that as firms become increasingly R&D intensive, growth and investment opportunity 
incentives become increasingly important to corporate hedging policies. 
 
The hypothesis suggests that firms that hedge should have more investment opportunity and higher 
research and development spending. Therefore we test: 
 
H0:3 The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the growth opportunities of hedgers and non-
hedgers; The alternative hypothesis is that hedger have more growth opportunities than non-hedgers. 
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Constrained and volatile cash flows not only directly restricts a firm’s investment, but it can affect 
investment decisions indirectly through agency conflicts between different stakeholders of a firm. Next 
subsection will discuss agency costs caused by conflicts of interest in different groups of stakeholders 
resulting in investment distortion. 
 
 
2.3.4 Agency costs and under-investment 
 
Both constrained and volatile cash flows can lead to direct restrictions on the firm’s investment 
opportunities through agency conflicts between different stakeholders of a firm. In the classic of Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) framework, the conflicts of interest between bondholders and shareholders cause 
higher costs for financing and investments. Given the limited liabilities of stockholders, they may shift 
from low-risk investment to high-risk investment, since they will benefit when things go well at the costs 
of bondholders when things go bad. The added profit may only benefit the shareholders, as the 
bondholders require only a fixed return. The increase level of risk does affect the bondholders, since the 
firm increases its chance of defaulting on its debt. As such agency costs exist, the marginal cost of external 
funds increases with the amount of funds that are raised externally. The costs of external financing include 
agency costs, deadweight costs of debt, information asymmetry, underwriting fee, shift of residual rights 
of control, and investment distortion. 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that internal finance has important cost 
advantages over external finance thereby having a higher priority in the ‘financial hierarchy’. According 
to the Pecking Order Theory, hedging internal cash flows can improve the corporate capital structure of 
a firm by reducing the costs of external financing. Froot et al. (1993) show that risk management can 
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increase shareholder value by harmonising financing and investment policies. Indeed, hedging can cut 
the cost of external financing and make the firm’s investment process easier (Campello et al., 2011b). By 
reducing the agency costs associated with debt financing, hedging can increase the value of the firm. 
 
Further conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders can arise. The agency problem can 
lead to underinvestment whereby managers may not always undertake investment projects that generate 
positive net present value (NPV) cash flows. Since bondholders normally have higher priority claims than 
shareholders, the increased probability of such claims arising creates incentives for the firm to underinvest. 
Shareholders can hardly benefit from giving more resources to management. Moreover, because 
managers run the firm as agents on behalf of shareholders, they tend to act in line with shareholders’ 
interests. Therefore, if leverage is high and shareholders have only a small residual claim on a firm’s 
assets, managers will still reject a positive NPV project (Myers, 1977). 
 
Whilst theoretically corporate hedging can help reduce the agency costs due to conflict of interest among 
stakeholders, Judge (2006) find no evidence to support underinvestment costs to hedging in the UK firms. 
Bartram et al. (2009), examining the similar underinvestment measures with global data, find mixed 
support for the underinvestment hypothesis. Aretz and Bartram (2010) point out that the complex relations 
between risk management and other corporate policies and financial characteristics make it difficult to 
empirically test agency theories for corporate hedging. Growth opportunities imply greater incentives to 
hedge in response to severer underinvestment problems, but they are also linked to smaller 
overinvestment problems, reducing the incentives to hedge. Géczy et al. (1997) show that 
underinvestment problem might be a serious problem for levered firms with significant growth options.  
However, the few prior studies that examine the underinvestment hypothesis do so simply from either the 
leverage level perspective or the growth opportunities perspective. Therefore, the mixed evidence may 
be due to the complexity of the relations between hedging and different agency problems and the 
difficulties to estimate such firm-specific parameters using cross-sectional data. This positive rationale 
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for hedging may not be applied to a firm with any degree of leverage or any investment opportunities, 
and therefore may not be empirically significant. Lin and Smith (2007), investigating the interaction 
among hedging, investment and financing decisions, argue that the relations between hedging and other 
financial characteristics differ for firms with different growth opportunities. Some firms with significant 
opportunities increase their investments without increasing leverage, while some others with few 
investment opportunities engage in hedging to increase leverage. Thus, neither leverage nor the growth 
opportunities itself is able to properly capture the underinvestment problem incentives to hedge. The 
interaction effect of leverage and investment opportunities on hedging needs to be considered. To our 
knowledge, such interaction has not been empirically examined in the corporate risk management 
literature. We test the following: 
 
H0:4
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the underinvestment costs of hedgers and non-
hedgers. The alternative hypothesis is that the underinvestment costs are significantly different between 
hedgers and non-hedgers. 
 
 
2.3.5 Free cash flows and overinvestment 
 
Whilst the underinvestment problem can cause managers to reject positive-NPV projects, in some 
situations, managers may even accept negative-NPV projects. Unlike the above hypothesis which focused 
on shareholder-bondholders conflict, the case of over-investment considers shareholder-manager 
conflicts. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1986) suggest that the agency problem can also cause an over-investment problem. 
When investment and sales growth increase managers’ pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards, paying out 
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cash via dividend, for example, decreases the free cash flows available to managers. In the argument of 
underinvestment incentive, the argument actually assumes shareholder protection is perfect. However, 
shareholders may not be able to control investment policy because of information asymmetry. If 
information asymmetry exists and investment decisions are not contractible, managers may seek for 
private benefits from investment (Morrellec and Smith, 2007). Donaldson (1984, p.3) finds that managers 
of large firms seek to maximise “purchasing power available to management for strategic purpose” rather 
than maximise the value of the firm. Thus, managers have incentives to underinvest when the level of 
cash flows is low, but invest more than the optimum level or even in negative-NPV projects, rather than 
paying out cash to shareholders when the level is high (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). 
 
The overinvestment problem is likely to happen if a firm is holding substantial free cash flows but has a 
low market-to-book ratio6. Such a firm, although having lower underinvestment costs, normally faces 
higher costs of overinvestment. Corporate hedging can reduce the costs of over-investment by influencing 
the resources under the manager’s control. Jensen (1986) argues the debt can help prevent such firms 
from overinvestment by reducing the available cash flows for discretionary spending by managers. The 
cash flows pressure from debt payment and other promised payments force mangers to use cash more 
efficiently rather than pursue self-interested low-return investment (ibid). Consistent with Jensen’s (1986) 
argument, Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that overconfident managers overinvest when they have large 
internal funds whilst less confident managers invest less when external financing is needed. As hedging 
improves the debt capacity of firms, it can reduce manager-shareholders conflict by reducing the 
incentives to shift risk and the associated agency cost of debt (Campbell and Kracaw, 1990). Eisdorfer 
(2008) find that the value of debt of financially distressed firms is reduced due to the overinvestment in 
high-volatility periods. As such, corporate hedging can improve leverage conditions of firms by reducing 
                                                          
6 In fact, many U.S. MNCs face a dilemma of how to spend excess cash nowadays, e.g. Microsoft, Exxon and Apple. Bates et al 
(2009) find that the cash holding of U.S. industrial firms doubles from 1980 to 2006. Although the firms holding large amounts 
of cash do not necessarily have over-investment problems, it is still worth discussing in this research due to the increasing trend 
of cash holding. 
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over-investment problems, especially in high-volatility periods (e.g. during a financial crisis and market 
turbulence). 
 
Hedging can also ease managers’ propensity to over-control free cash flows since the volatility of cash 
flow would be reduced. Stulz (1990) argues that the benefit that shareholders receive from investing 
resources to managers is negatively related to the volatility of cash flows. Therefore, corporate hedging 
can increase shareholders’ wealth even if the firm has no debt. Morrellec and Smith (2007) show that the 
cost of overinvestment is important in determining the firm’s hedging policy.  
 
Overall, empirical studies have only provided limited evidence on the overinvestment hypothesis. Many 
of those studies examine the over-investment problem from a debt perspective, while few of them are 
based on free cash flows and corporate hedging consideration. This has been very little to discriminate 
between both types of investment decisions. As agency problems may raise either underinvestment or 
overinvestment costs, identifying the impact of overinvestment on hedging may be able to explain the 
mixed empirical results for the underinvestment argument. 
 
The hypothesis that is tested is: 
H0:5
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in the overinvestment costs for hedgers 
and non-hedgers. The alternative hypothesis is that the overinvestment costs are significantly different 
between hedgers and non-hedgers. 
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2.3.6 Hedging substitutes 
 
Corporate hedging decision of a firm is also affected by its decisions with respect to other financial 
policies (Nance et al., 1993). A firm can manage its risk and costs by restructuring its assets and liabilities 
and/or possessing low leverage (Tufano, 1996). For example, using alternative means such as convertible 
debt could help to control conflicts of interest to reduce agency costs. Instead of using off-balance-sheet 
hedging instruments, a firm can use preferred stock to diminish the variance of net cash flows to reduce 
the probability of financial distress. Other substitutes include cash holding and operational hedging (see 
Bartram et al., 2009). A firm can manage investment predation risk and agency problem by holding more 
cash flows (Bates et al., 2009; Acharya et al., 2007). Haushalter et al. (2007) suggest that a firm may 
either hold large amount of cash or use derivatives, but not both. The hypothesis that is tested is: 
 
H0:6 The null hypothesis assumes that there is no difference in the use of hedging substitutes for hedgers 
and non-hedgers. The alternative hypothesis is that the use of hedging substitutes is different between the 
firms chose to hedge and those did not. 
 
 
2.3.7 Cash flows volatility, liquidity and financial distress 
 
Financial distress is a “low cash-flow state in which the firm incurs losses without being insolvent” 
(Purnanandam, 2008, p.707). Financial distress occurs if a firm has difficulty in meeting its commitments 
due to a shortage of cash flows. Since levered firms may run into such financial difficulties, investors 
worry about the costs of financial distress. As hedging reduces the variability of the firm’s cash flows, it 
also reduces the likelihood that the firm would encounter financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Consequently, hedging decreases the expected costs of financial distress. The probability of a firm 
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encountering financial distress is also directly related to the size of the firm (Nance et al, 1993). Hedging 
becomes more valuable as the firm’s fixed claims rise.  
 
Joseph and Hewins (1997) find only weak evidence for financial distress for a sample of UK firms that 
hedge corporate exposure. Indeed, they find that firms hedge primarily to reduce the impact of FX rate 
fluctuations on operational cash flows. The weak empirical support for the financial distress motive may 
be due to the fact that their study examined that the largest firms in the UK. That is, financial distress as 
a hedging motive may be more important for smaller firms. In contrast, Bodnar et al. (1995) find that 
managing cash flows is the most important objective of a firm’s hedging policies. Purnanandam (2008) 
and Bartram et al. (2009) also find empirical results to support the theoretical prediction. The hypothesis 
that is tested is: 
 
H0:7
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the liquidity and the costs of bankruptcy for 
hedgers and non-hedgers. The alternative hypothesis is that the level of liquidity and the costs of 
bankruptcy are different between hedgers and non-hedgers. 
 
 
2.3.8 Managerial risk aversion and compensation 
 
Risk aversion is also an important motive of corporate hedging. Dufey and Srinivasulu (1983) argue that 
the whole point of corporate hedging is to achieve a level of risk/return with which management feels 
comfortable with. They do not perceive hedging necessarily provides an incentive to obtain excess returns 
from corporate hedging activities. Unlike external shareholders the managers of firms hold all their human 
capital in the firm. This limits their ability to diversify their risk in the firms (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Therefore, by hedging the firm’s exposure managers will also hedge their human capital in the firm. The 
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same principle applies to other stakeholders who hold most of the investment portfolio in the firm. 
Hedging the risk undertaken by the firm enables all risk-averse stakeholders to achieve higher utility. A 
person’s utility is given by 
                            2
2
1
)( ArEU                         (1) 
“A” in Equation (1) is the degree of risk aversion, and 2 is the variance of return (Bodie et al, 2009, 
p.159). For risk-averse investors, managers and other stakeholders A should be positive, which implies 
that larger 2 results in lower total utility, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, reducing the variance of 
return 2 increases the total utility. By hedging the income or future cash flows of the firm is preserved, 
which reduces the variance of return. With the same expected return E(r), a person can still achieve higher 
utility regardless of whether or not those risk factors are not priced in the market.  
 
Corporate hedging reduces the default risk of the firm by preserving the firm’s future income. This makes 
it less risky for managers to accept job offer from firms that hedger. Consequently, managers require 
relatively less compensation and costly contracts when the firm hedges. Moreover, since corporate 
hedging reduces the volatility of a firm’s total income and cash flows, it is more efficient than reducing 
the variance of the firm’s payoffs individually. 
 
If hedging is not allowed and if the variation in managers’ income is high, risk-averse managers will 
require a higher income to accept employment contract from the firm (Stulz, 1984). Similarly, managers 
may over-hedge to protect their interest in the firm thereby reducing the firm’s value. Since managers’ 
service contracts are self-interest transactions, in the case that managers receive a fixed salary and their 
wealth is independent from their compensation7, mangers may not be motivated enough to maximise 
shareholder’s wealth. Shareholders can implement compensation contracts that are linked to the 
                                                          
7 This thesis uses the same definition as given in Stulz (1984): managerial compensation is a manager’s pecuniary income. In 
practice, however, compensation package may incorporate non-pecuniary item. 
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profitability of the firm if they are concerned about excessive hedging (Stulz, 1984). Smith and Stulz 
(1985) argue that managers would have incentives to reduce the variability of cash flows if their 
compensation is a concave function of the firm’s value. They also predict that managers with larger 
amount of share ownership would be more risk averse, because shares provide linear payoffs as a function 
of share prices. Contrarily, those with greater option holdings would be less risk averse, since options 
provide convex payoffs. The global convexity of the option contract may motivate managers to be less 
risk averse. 
 
May (1995) finds evidence to support the view that managers consider personal risk during corporate risk 
management decisions. Tufano (1996) also finds that managerial risk aversion is a major determinant of 
risk management policy. The hypothesis is more recently supported by empirical findings in Dionne and 
Triki (2013). Lievenbrück and Schmid (2014) find that managers in short-term orientation cultures are 
more likely to engage in hedging. Adam et al. (2015) link the empirical evidence of selective hedging 
(Adam and Fernando, 2006) to manager’s view and personality. They find that overconfident managers 
are more active in hedging activities.  
 
Manager’s attitude to risk may have different effect on corporate risk management policies in different 
countries. While UK and US empirical studies provided support for this prediction, Bartram et al. (2009) 
find mixed results for managerial incentive in the global context. Interestingly, Joseph and Hewins (1997) 
find that the view that UK firms hedge FX rate risk to increase managerial comfort was ranked fourth on 
a list of 16 motives for corporate hedging. This finding suggests that managerial risk aversion plays an 
important role in hedging decisions. 
 
In regards to managerial compensation incentive to hedge, Knopf et al. (2002) find positive relationship 
between the sensitivity of managers’ total stock option portfolios to stock price of non-financial firms and 
its corporate hedging. Moreover, Joseph and Hewins (1997) report that hedging reduces uncertainty in 
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compensation to managers and employees whilst Graham and Rogers (2002) show that both the 
characteristics of the firm’s stock and managers option holdings are important in determining cross-
sectional differences in corporate hedging.  
 
An important limitation of Stulz’s (1984) managerial compensation theory is that it relies on the concave 
function for remuneration and that shareholders can appropriately understand risk management policies 
amongst firms. However, managers’ compensation packages are not necessarily concave and 
shareholders often have little information about company’s underlying risks. Indeed, it is argued that 
managerial incentive of hedging depends on whether detailed accounting information about corporate 
hedging transactions available to shareholders (see DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995). Zhang (2009) also 
suggests that the change in disclosure requirements of firms about derivatives use has had an effect on 
firm’s risk management behaviour. Following recent changes in financial reporting standards, more 
detailed information on risk management activities are available from audited financial reports than 
before8. This enables investors, regulators and public to gain a better understanding of a firm’s risk 
management strategies, and thus changes the influence of managerial incentives to hedge. Therefore, it is 
worth examining a sample covers the period since these changes.  
 
The hypothesis we test is: 
H0:8
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference regarding the characteristics of managerial 
compensation plans of hedgers and non-hedgers; The alternative hypothesis is the characteristics of 
managerial compensation plans are significantly different for hedgers and non-hedgers.  
 
                                                          
8 These changes include the approval of SEC regulation Item 305 in 1997, the introduction of FRS 13 and FAS 133 in 1998, FAS 
161 in 2008, the adoption of IAS 32 and IAS 39 in 2005, and the more comprehensive international Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) regime.  
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2.3.9 Firm size 
 
Establishing a risk management structure is costly and requires large amounts of resources. Since most 
of those costs are fixed cost (Glaum, 2002), larger firms rather than smaller firms are more able to afford 
risk management programmes. Mian (1996) and Bartram et al. (2009) find consistent evidence for the 
argument of economies of scale. Some other literature argues that smaller firms also have the motivations 
to hedge more. In addition, small firms usually are more risky than large firms, since the probability of 
small firms encountering financial distress and their expected cost of financial distress are negatively 
related to the firm size effect (Nance et al., 1993). Consistent with this argument, Joseph and Hewins 
(1991) find that in comparison to larger MNCs smaller firms tend to over-protect corporate exposure and 
are more risk averse to foreign transactions and international involvement. Hennessy and Whited (2007) 
also find that smaller firms have higher external financing costs. If raising external funds is much more 
expensive than paying the capital market to bear the volatility of internal cash flows, hedging also creates 
value for smaller firms.  
 
The hypothesis we test is: 
H0:9 The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the size of hedgers and non-hedgers; The 
alternative hypothesis is that the size of hedgers and non-hedgers is different. 
 
 
2.3.10 Ownership structure and corporate governance 
 
The corporate governance frameworks and ownership structures can jointly affect hedging behaviour. 
Managers’ propensity to hedge can be affected by corporate governance environments (Lel, 2006); so too 
would the ownership structure of firms (Tufano, 1996). If the protection is weak, managers tend to use 
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derivatives for their own benefit (Bartram et al., 2009). Firms are more likely to hedge when investors 
require greater transparency and better monitoring (Lel, 2012). Huston and Stevenson (2010) find a 
negative relation between creditors’ right and firms’ exposure and that a good corporate governance 
environment incentivises firms engage in hedging. Allayannis et al. (2012) show consistent evidence for 
the hypothesis that strongly governed firms are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Interestingly, 
Fauver and Naranjo (2010) find that hedging has negative valuation effects on the firms with weaker 
corporate governance and poorer monitoring conditions. These empirical findings suggest that in 
assessing the valuation incentive to corporate hedging, considering ownership and corporate governance 
effects is also important. 
 
Therefore, the hypotheses we test: 
H0:10.1 The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the structure of the board of hedgers and non-
hedgers. The alternative hypothesis is that the board structure is significant different for hedgers and 
non-hedgers. 
 
H0:10.2 The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the strength of governance arrangements of 
hedgers and non-hedgers. The alternative hypothesis is that the strength of corporate governance is 
different for hedgers and non-hedgers. 
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2.4 Country level factors 
 
2.4.1 Financial market and legal system 
 
Country level financial and legal discrepancy can influence the usage of derivatives. It is argued that 
larger economies have larger and more liquid financial markets and this in turn will provide incentives to 
access derivative markets. In particular, for those countries with less liquid derivative market, firms are 
less likely to hedge (Bartram et al., 2009). This argument seems too simplistic as it ignores the relative 
size of firms and their associated degree of global involvement, as well as, the relative size of financial 
markets and regulatory systems nearest the location of such firms. Related evidence of home country bias 
traders (see Abreu et al., 2011) indicates that more experienced and educated investors are more likely to 
access foreign markets relative to less experienced and educated investors. As such, the personal 
backgrounds of managers would affect the level of hedging they undertake. Additionally, Bartram et al. 
(2009) argue that if a country’s legal system is more efficient and contracts are enforced, transaction costs 
of entering complex financial contracts are relatively cheaper, and therefore firms would more likely use 
financial derivatives. Thus, the hedging policy of a firm may also be affected by the financial markets 
and legal environment of a country the firm is located in. 
 
Moreover, the difference of financial market conditions across countries and over time may also influence 
financial policies of firms, especially during market turbulence. Indeed, as credit is tightened and 
derivatives contract costs are higher during economic downturns, the cost of raising external financing 
and hedging are more expensive. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that bank lending fell considerably 
during the 2008 financial crisis due to a drop in the supply side. Campello et al. (2011a) show that credit 
lines are more expensive (and harder to renew) during a financial crisis. Overall, these factors have not 
been discussed much so far. This study will also address the issue of macroeconomic shock on the 
financial market. 
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2.4.2 Cross-country differences that affect corporate hedging and the comparison between the 
US and the UK 
 
The country-level differences which directly and indirectly affect firms’ financial characteristics, such as 
accounting standards, bankruptcy and tax codes, regulations and corporate governance codes, may cause 
firms to place different emphases on the factors of hedging. For example, Hakkarainen et al. (1998) show 
that unlike UK and US firms, Finnish firms places more emphasis on accounting than transaction 
exposure, a focus that is influenced by the tax arrangements in Finland. This means that the tax 
considerations when hedging would be more important for Finnish firms compared to UK or US firms.  
Joseph (2000) suggests that UK firms may prefer internal techniques when hedging translation exposure 
to avoid the adverse impacts of asymmetry in taxation. Later a survey by Mallin et al. (2001) shows that 
the risk and costs of derivative transactions is the main concern for finance directors of UK firms. This is 
different from their US peers, who are more concerned about the accounting treatment and market risks 
(Bodnar et al., 1998). Elshandidy et al. (2015) find that the UK firms tend to place emphasis on systematic 
risks, while the US firms place more emphasis on liquidity risk. Furthermore, Bartram et al. (2009) show 
that UK firms differ from US firms in terms of magnitude and types of hedging. The percentage of using 
of FX derivatives in the UK is higher than the percentage in US, whereas the percentage of using IR and 
commodity price derivatives in the US is higher then the percentage in the UK. Panaretou et al. (2013) 
find that the percentage of the use of derivatives in the UK is higher than the percentage in US. 
 
Non-US firms may take different hedging strategies to control their foreign exchange exposures. Non-
US firms may face greater FX exposures than US firms. For example, when the input factors are 
dominated in US dollars (e.g,. oil), non-US firms face greater FX risk, because the cost of goods sold is 
in US dollars while the sales revenue received are in other currencies. Research conducted by Clark and 
Judge (2003) shows that the liabilities in US dollars and Euro represented nearly 70 percent of the total 
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for the investigated UK firms. Intuitively, non-US firms, particularly those in the utilities and chemical 
indsutry, should have greater propensity to hedge and hedge more actively than US firms. Bodnar and 
Gebhardt (1999) find that German firms are more likely to use derivatives than US firms. Similarly, 
Bartram et al. (2009) shows that the percentage of dervatives users in Australia, Japan and the UK is 
higher than the percentage of derivatives users in the US. In addtion, the hedging strategy varies as to 
whether the firm is a “net importer” or “net exporter” across domestic currency appreciations and 
depreciations (Muller and Verschoor, 2006). Koutmos and Martin (2003) argue that firms respond 
asymmetrically to exchange rate movements. Furthermore, Clark and Mefteh (2011) find that the 
exposures with respect to the US dollar and non-USD currencies are asymmetric and different.  
 
In addition, different financial reporting frameworks also affect corporate hedging activities. It is well 
known that US accounting regulations are rules based whereas, those of the UK are principles based. In 
terms of the attributes and the quantity of risk disclosure, Abraham and Cox (2007) find that UK firms 
cross-listed in the US provide more risk disclosure. Consistently, Doblet et al. (2011) find that US firms 
generally provide more risk disclosure than UK firms, Lins et al. (2011) finds that firms’ risk management 
policy and hedging instruments usage are significantly affected by reporting standards. Also, not 
surprisingly, they find that active hedgers are more likely to be affected by change of reporting standards. 
Therefore the differences on financial reporting standards may also affect firms’ risk management policy.  
 
Prior research shows that the differences on bankruptcy code influence firms’ capital choices. The UK is 
normally considered as creditor-friendly. Davydenko and Franks (2008) point out that, in the UK, secured 
creditors take over the control right in bankruptcy procedures and have wide discretion to sell the 
defaulted firm’s assets. In contrast, US is considered to be more debtor-friendly, since debtors and 
creditors collectively have control rights. The US bankruptcy code affords some rights to equityholders 
in the process of bankruptcy. Since capital structure choice affects corporate hedging policy, accordingly, 
cross-country variations in capital structures can result in different propensity of hedging. Judge (2006) 
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finds that financial distress costs factor has a stronger influence on corporate hedging for UK firms 
compared to US firms. However, strong creditor rights in bankruptcy also lower corporate risk-taking, 
and therefore, reduce high-cash-flow risks projects and leverage level (Acharya et al., 2011a). Acharya 
et al. (2011b) find that firms in the UK were less leveraged than US firms during 1990 to 2002. Therefore, 
one can also expect that UK firms have lower costs of financial distress than US firms. Accordingly, 
creditor-friendly bankruptcy codes do not necessarily induce stronger incentives to hedge. Thus there is 
a puzzle in the literature as to whether the different findings regarding the financial distress hypothesis of 
hedging are due to cross-country differences. 
 
 
2.5 Competition and Hedging 
 
Unlike financial firms, the principal activity of non-financial firms is the production of market goods and 
non-financial services. Intuitively, hedging makes sense to firms engaged in the production of goods and 
services. Such firms also need to maintain their market share through competitive pricing. The literature 
associated with pricing-to-market (see e.g., Kasa, 1992; Knetter, 1989; 1994) suggests that firms will alter 
their product prices in line with FX rate changes in order to retain market share. Such price adjustments 
can also take place in the presences of corporate hedging. 
 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) suggest that the degree to which firms can finance investment with 
internally generated funds is an essential determinant of product-market success. Fluctuation of the FX 
rate can adversely affect costs and internally generated cash flows of a firm, subsequently shifting the 
level of the firm’s net profit, competitive position and market value. As discussed in the previous section, 
the aggregate investment of a firm is influenced by its hedging decision. If firms adjust their output levels 
in response to production costs and investment costs, the equilibrium output price is affected by the total 
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investment of the financially constrained firm (Adam et al., 2007). Conversely, given the total available 
funds, the expected production cost as an input factor for future output function, is interdependent with 
future investment cost. Hence, product market considerations are important determinants of corporate 
hedging behaviour (Haushalter et al., 2007). The literature associated with pricing-to-market (see e.g., 
Kasa, 1992; Knetter, 1989; 1994) suggests that firms will alter their product prices in line with FX rate 
changes in order to retain market share. Such price adjustments can also take place in the presences of 
corporate hedging. 
 
Raith (2003) documents that product market competition and managerial incentives are jointly 
determined as part of industry equilibrium. He shows that given a certain level of competition, a firm with 
cost advantages can more easily attract business from its rival. In addition, greater competition also leads 
to an increase in the volatility of profit and future cash flows uncertainty. As such, firms with greater 
product market competition have a greater incentive to hedge risky positions. 
 
Taking into account the industry structure, Williamson (2001) finds significant exposure to exchange rate 
shocks in the automotive industry. Moreover, there is significant time-variation in exchange rate exposure, 
which is consistent with intra-industrial changes in the competitive environment (Williamson, 2001). 
Since investment and R&D spending can influence a firm’s competitive position, hedging decisions can 
affect the competitive advantage of firms and their market share. Haushalter et al. (2007) show that for 
the firms that have a higher degree of interdependent growth options with rivals, the use of derivatives 
increases. Derivative usage would therefore reduce some of the uncertainty associated such cash flows 
and competition.  
 
However, many previous studies focus on the relation between financial characteristics and corporate 
hedging, while few of them consider from a firm’s economic prospects. While there is extensive literature 
on managing transaction exposure, only limited research considers the intrinsically more important link 
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between a firm’s production and investment decisions with the incidence of foreign exchange risk (Booth 
and Rotenberg, 1990). As such, identifying the impact of industry competition on corporate hedging may 
be able to explain the overall mixed empirical results for corporate hedging behaviour. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Previous studies provide a number of theories regarding the determinants of corporate hedging. Overall, 
only a few of those theories are consistently supported by empirical evidence. This leaves a further set of 
theories to explore in this study. We aim to provide a more rigorous set of tests to confirm their validity. 
For example, tests of the taxation hypothesis often do not employ variables that represent actual tax 
payments and/or their variability or expected tax payments. Such studies do not allow for the possibility 
that tax amounts shown in the financial reports do not represent actual taxes paid over the relevant period. 
Our analysis will employ estimation methods that enable us to capture more closely estimates that capture 
the variability of taxation and expected tax payments. The next chapter identifies the theories that will be 
investigated in this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 3    DATA SOURCES, SAMPLING, 
METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Two discusses the existing literature in relation to corporate hedging. This chapter presents a 
detailed discussion of the data sources and the sampling procedures as well as the definitions of the 
variables under consideration. It also discusses the empirical methodology and justifies the selection of 
countries. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 details the data sources and sampling 
procedures. Section 3.3 discusses the definition of variables and measurements. Section 3.4 discusses the 
empirical methodology. A justification for cross-country comparison study is provided in Section 3.5 and 
a brief summary is included in Section 3.6. 
 
 
3.2 The Samples and Data Sets 
 
The data was collected from two sources: (i) the annual report and financial statements which were 
accessed via the companies’ websites and the US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) EDGAR 
company fillings database; and (ii) Datastream and CRSPSift-Compustat merge database. It is reliable 
and consistent to use information from the companies’ audited financial reports and databases together. 
Firms in the banking, insurance, pension, and brokerage industry were excluded from the sample because 
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they act as intermediaries during hedging or they provide risk management instruments to non-financial 
firms. 
 
The research is interested in the group corporate hedging activities in the US and the UK with centralised 
treasury and thus concentrates on the parent companies rather than subsidiaries. The annual accounting 
data was collected for the entire period from 2002 and 2011. Many previous empirical studies investigate 
the hedging behaviour of large firms. However, as discussed earlier, empirical evidence has shown that 
the size of a firm is highly associated with corporate hedging and other corporate policies. In order to 
increase cross-sectional variations in the firm characteristics, we included some smaller firms to achieve 
a more balanced sample. This initial screening resulted in more than 6000 listed firms in the US and UK. 
From this initial dataset, due to the time-consuming task involved in manually collecting derivative usage, 
foreign debt usage, operational hedging, and other hedging data, we selected 698 listed firms in the 
Fortune 500, S&P 500, and S&P 1500 indices. Similar to previous studies, we exclude the firms in the 
financial services (i.e., SIC 6000-6999). We selected 521 listed firms in the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and 
FTSE All Share indices. The sample was constructed by matching firms which published annual reports 
for the period and the available accounting data for that period on the Datastream or CRSPSift database. 
For the period of time, the full data set comprises of 550 non-financial companies firms in the US and 
452 firms in the UK, all of which are listed on the either New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, or the 
London Stock Exchange. Some firm years are dropped from the sample for assorted reasons, such as 
unlisted in early years of the period or delisting9. This results in the final sample consist of 4025 firm-
year observations for the US and 3064 firm-year observations for the UK. They were grouped into those 
that hedge and those that do not hedge using information/indicators in the notes of their published 
financial reports for the period. Firms which specifically mentioned using financial derivatives such as 
options, forward contracts, swaps and futures to hedge financial exposures (e.g. FX exposure, interest 
rate risk and liquidity risk) or/and foreign currency debt are classified as hedgers. Similarly, firms which 
                                                          
9 If firms are unlisted or delisted, their accounting data is not available in the Datastream or CRSPSift database. 
49 
 
referred that they do not hedge were classified as non-hedgers. Subsequently, two dummy variables were 
created and used to represent hedgers and non-hedgers respectively. The number of observations 
classified as hedgers over the period 2002-2011 for the US and UK are 2932 and 2076 respectively, 
whereas the observations classified as non-hedgers over the period are 1093 and 988 respectively. 
 
The advantage of using financial reports and secondary data is that all data are consistent, precise and 
standardised according to accounting standards. Audited annual reports of these firms are available on 
the Internet (e.g. the companies’ websites). The existing standards of financial reporting require those 
firms to disclose information on hedging policy and financial instruments they used. The group risk 
management policy can be found in management reports or/and in the Notes of the Financial Statement 
section. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Variable Definitions and Measures  
 
3.3.1 Dependent variable 
 
The tests are undertaken statistically by testing for differences amongst firms that hedge and those that 
do not. The majority of variables in this research have been commonly used in past empirical papers (e.g. 
Nance et al., 1993; Géczy et al., 1997; Judge, 2006; Panaretou, 2014) to measure hedging activity with a 
hedging dummy, making the empirical results consistent and comparable. 
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Our dependent variable is a binary dummy variable. Firms are classified into groups of ‘hedge’ and ‘not 
hedge’. To search the reports we undertook manual searches. Firms which specifically mention in their 
annual reports to using financial derivatives such as options, forward contracts, swaps and futures to 
hedge financial exposures (e.g. FX exposure, interest rate risk and liquidity risk) or/and foreign currency 
debt for hedging purpose are classified as hedgers. Similarly, firms which refer that they do not hedge are 
classified as non-hedgers. Then two dummy variables are created and used to represent hedgers and non-
hedgers respectively. The dependent variable is coded as a “1” for hedger, and “0” for those firms that do 
not hedge. 
 
 
3.2.2 Determinants of corporate hedging 
 
According to Smith and Stulz (1985), if firms face a convex tax schedule, either because of increasing 
marginal tax rates or the presence of tax preference items, they will hedge in order to reduce the expected 
tax liabilities. Previous studies have used dummy variable of tax loss carry forwards (e.g. Mian, 1996; 
Nance et al., 1993) and tax credits (Panaretou, 2014; Bartram et al., 2009) to measure tax progressivity. 
The existence of tax preference items are positively associated with the likelihood of hedging. However, 
Graham and Smith (1999) point out that the use of these dummy variables to capture tax incentives is too 
simple. This is because the provisions such as carryforwards and tax credits broaden the range of 
convexity but flatten the curvature near the kink. If a firm is unable to make efficient use of the underlying 
tax benefits, the benefit of these provisions can be reduced. Therefore, this study follows the standard 
approach of using dummy variables but also uses a direct measure of taxable income to capture tax 
incentives.  
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The variables that have been used to test the hypothesis are the marginal tax rate (MTR), effective tax rate 
(TXR), a dummy variable of net operating loss carryforwards (NOL), and investment tax credits (ITC)  to 
exam the hypothesis of taxation. The marginal tax rate is obtained from Graham’s database of simulated 
corporate marginal tax rates10. Net operating loss carryforwards and investment credits are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT of item 52 and item 51 respectively. The data of marginal tax rate, net operating loss 
carryforwards and investment tax credits is not available for UK firms. Therefore, we have used effective 
tax rate with the UK sample. We expected a positive relation between hedging and the variables 
measuring tax incentives to hedge. 
 
Hedging eases the constraint of growth option and investment opportunity by reducing the variability of 
internal cash flows. Therefore, the research used the total expenditure on research and development of a 
firm to market value of that firm (RDMV), research and development expenditure to total assets (RDTA), 
and the Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ)11 to measure growth option and investment opportunity sets. All the three 
variables are expected to be positively related to hedgers. 
 
When firms are highly leveraged and the firm value is low, shareholders may still reject valuable projects 
if the benefits of taking these projects accrue to bondholders (Myers, 1977). The agency hypothesis on 
hedging suggests that risk management can increase shareholder value by harmonising financing and 
investment policies (Froot et al., 1993). In addition, Myers argues that a firm can control the problem by 
shortening the maturity of its debt. Based on this argument, the research used the total debts to total assets 
ratio (LEVTA), debt maturity (DEBTMATU) and the dummy variable of high Tobin’s Q (HIQ) as 
indicators of the underinvestment problem. The dummy variable HIQ is coded as a “1” if the value of 
Tobin’s Q falls into the top one-third of the sample, and “0” otherwise. The underinvestment problem is 
more pronounced when a firm has a higher leverage level in its capital structure; firms with higher 
                                                          
10 This study uses the before-interest-expense simulated rate. 
11 Tobin (1969) suggest that the rate of investment is a function of Q.   
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leverage are more likely to hedge (Nance et al., 1993). Therefore, we also included an interaction term 
HIQ× LEVETA in the tests to capture the underinvestment problem incentives to hedge when a firm has 
valuable investment opportunities. We expected a positive relation between hedging and the variables 
measuring the costs of underinvestment.  
 
This study followed Froot et al.’s (1993) framework, which assumes that hedging has no significant 
impact on the expected level of internal wealth of a firm. The optimal hedge ratio can be negative when 
investment opportunities are extremely sensitive to the risk variables. More realistically, since the supply-
side barriers lead to higher costs of using derivative financial instruments, it is impossible for low-rated 
firms to take large positions in derivatives because of the lower credit risks involved. In that case it may 
make sense for a firm to actually keep its exposure unhedged, so as to have sufficient cash flows when 
large positive NPV investments are required (Froot et al., 1993). To substantiate this inference, we 
interacted TOBINQ with low rating dummy variable (LR) to examine whether the effect of investment 
incentive on hedging substantially differs across credit ratings. The interaction term is expected to be 
negatively related to hedging decisions. 
 
The variables that have been employed to measure over-investment are the free cash flows over total 
assets (FCF), capital expenditures to total assets (CAPEXTA), capital expenditures to property, plant and 
equipment (CAPEXPPP), and the dummy variable of low Tobin’s Q (LOQ) as indicators of 
overinvestment problem. Similar with the dummy variable HIQ, LOQ is coded as a “1” if the value of 
Tobin’s Q falls into the lower one-third of the sample, and “0” otherwise. We included an interaction 
term LOQ× FCF in the tests to capture the overinvestment problem incentives to hedge when a firm has 
low quality investment opportunities. Because the debt can help prevent such firms from overinvestment 
by reducing the available cash flows for discretionary spending by manager (Jensen, 1986), we created 
an interaction term LOQ× LEVETA to examine the hypothesis. We expected a positive relation between 
hedging and the variables measuring the costs of overinvestment. 
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The variables that have been employed in the study to measure financial distress are interest coverage 
ratio (INCOV) and current ratio (CURR). The bankruptcy measure is Altman’s Z-score (Z-Score). We 
expected a negative relation between hedging and the variables measuring liquidity, but a positive relation 
between the hedging decision and Altman’s Z-score.  
The size of a firm is measured by the natural logarithm of market value (LogMV), total assets (LogTA), 
and pre-tax income (LogPTI). The efficiency is measured by the return on assets (ROA). We do not offer 
any expectations about the sign of these variables measuring size. 
 
Corporate hedging behaviour is also affected by its decisions with respect to other financial policies 
(Nance et al., 1993). A firm could manage its risk and costs by restructuring its assets and liabilities and/or 
possessing low leverage (Tufano, 1996). The hedging substitute variables that have been used are the 
cash to assets ratio (CASH), the dividend yield (DY), and the amount of convertible debt held to the total 
debts in a firm (CONVERDEBT). Issuing convertible debts and altering dividend payout policies could 
help to control conflicts of interest to reduce agency costs and to reduce the probability of financial 
distress. Firm may hold large amount of cash, instead of using derivatives, to protect its growth 
opportunities and investments (Haushalter et al., 2007). Therefore, we expected a positive relation 
between hedging and the variable measuring dividend payout, but a negative relation between hedging 
and the use of convertible debt and cash holdings. However, as pointed out by Opler et al. (1999), the 
relationship between cash holdings and hedging can be confounded by endogeneity. Most of the variables 
that are empirically associated with high levels of cash holding are also the variables associated with low 
debt. Thus, this study created a high leverage dummy variable, HI_LEV, which equals to “1” if the value 
of total debts is above the medium. Its interaction with cash holdings variable, HI_LEV×CASH, captures 
the effect of cash holdings on corporate hedging policies, amongst those firms with higher leverage level 
and therefore higher hedging needs. 
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The board structure variables that have been employed to test H0:10.1 are the size of the board of directors 
(BoardSize) and the non-executive directors to total number of directors on the board (NED). The 
corporate governance variables consist of the dummy variable of separating Chairman and CEO position 
(SEPARATION), dummy variable of whether CEO compensation of a firm link to total shareholder return 
(LINKTSR), dummy variable of whether a firm’s shareholders have the right to vote on the remuneration 
of executives (VOP), computed corporate governance index (CGI), proportion of non-executives in the 
audit committee (ADCI), proportion of non-executives in the compensation committee (CPCI), and 
proportion of non-executives in the nomination committee (NMCI). The corporate governance index (CGI) 
is computed as the sum of NED, SEPARATION, VOP and the dummy variables of presence of audit 
committee, compensation committee and nomination committee. Board structure of a firm and how well 
the firm is controlled affect the way a company is directed and preserves interests of different stakeholders. 
Corporate governance practice can ease the impact of manager’s personality and subjective propensity 
on hedging decision. Therefore, we expected a negative relation between BoardSize and hedging. We 
expected a positive relation between the variables measuring the strength of corporate governance and 
hedging. 
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Table 3-1 Description of Proxy Variable 
What we want to measure Variable Variable Definition Expected 
Sign 
Expected tax liabilities TXR The effective tax rate. The variable is calculated by dividing the total tax 
expense of a firm by its pre-tax income  
+ 
Tax convexity NOL Dummy variable of net operating loss carryforwards + 
Tax convexity ITC Investment tax credits + 
The tax benefit on debt 
when firms hedge 
MTR The before-financing simulated marginal tax rate used in Graham et al. 
(1998) 
+ 
Growth and investment 
opportunities 
RDMV Total R&D expenditures divided by market value + 
RDTA Total R&D expenditures divided by total assets + 
 TOBINQ Market value of assets over book value of assets; it indicates  + 
Costs of underinvestment 
problems 
LEVTA Total debts divided by total assets + 
DEBTMATU The average debt maturity of a firm using the model reported in Eisdorfer 
(2008): Debt maturity = (0.5×Book value of short-term debts + 5×Book 
value of long-term debts) / Total debts 
+ 
 HIQ The dummy variable is set equal to one if the value of Tobin’s Q falls into 
the top third of all Qs in the sample, and zero otherwise. It indicates if a 
firm has profitable investment opportunities  
+ 
Costs of overinvestment 
problems 
FCF The free cash flows divided by Total assets + 
CAPEXTA Capital expenditures divided by Total assets + 
CAPEXPPP Capital expenditures divided by the total property, plant and equipment + 
 LOQ The dummy variable is set equal to one if the value of Tobin’s Q falls into 
the lower third of all Tobin’s Qs in the sample, and zero otherwise. 
+ 
Manager’s risk aversion and 
risk taking 
STKComp The total stock-based compensation divided by the market value + 
STKOPT The total stock option compensation expense divided by the market value + 
 EXEComp The total senior executives compensations divided by the market value + 
Costs of financial distress INCOV Interest coverage ratio: EBIT / Interest expense - 
CURR Current ratio: Current assets / Current liabilities - 
Bankruptcy Z-Score The Altman’s Z-score model (Altman 1968) for predicting bankruptcies is: 
Z-score = 1.2×(working capital/Total assets) + 0.6×(Market value of 
equity/Total liabilities) + 0.999×(Sales/Total assets) 
- 
Size LogMV The natural logarithm of market value ? 
 LogTA The natural logarithm of total assets ? 
 LogPTI The natural logarithm of pre-tax income ? 
FX exposure INTLOP International operating income divided by the total operating income + 
Profitability ROA The return on assets = Net income/Total assets + 
Sensitivity of stock price BETA The systemic risk of a firm for the fiscal year (obtained from Compustat) + 
 PRIVOL A measure of a stock’s average annual price movement to a high and low 
from a mean price for each year. from Datastream) 
? 
Low credit ratings LR The dummy variable is set equal to one if the S&P Long-term domestic 
issuer credit rating of a firm is lower than BBB  B 
- 
Hedging substitutes CASH Cash divided by total assets - 
 DY Dividend yield + 
 CONVERDEBT The total amount of convertible debts held divided by debts - 
Strength of corporate 
governance 
BoardSize The number of directors in the board - 
NED The number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of 
directors in the board 
+ 
 SEPERATION The dummy variable is set equal to one if the position of CEO and the 
Chairman of the board are separated, and zero otherwise. 
+ 
 CGI The corporate governance index + 
Economic downturns and 
market turbulence 
Year2002 The year dummy variable is set equal to one if the annual data is for the 
year 2002, and zero otherwise 
+ 
 Year2003 The year dummy variable is set equal to one if the annual data is for the 
year 2003, and zero otherwise 
+ 
 Year2007 The year dummy variable is set equal to one if the annual data is for the 
year 2007, and zero otherwise 
? 
 FCRISIS Dummy variable of 2008 financial crisis. It equals to one if the annual data 
is for the year 2008 or year 2009, and zero otherwise. 
? 
    
(Continued) 
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Table 3-1 (Continued)    
Industry CONSTD The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the 
construction industry (SIC 1520-1799) in the US 
? 
 TRANSD The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the 
transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services 
industry (SIC 4000-4971) in the US 
- 
 MANUFD The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the 
manufacturing industry (SIC 2011-3999) in the US 
? 
 RETAILD The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the retail trade 
industry (SIC 5211-5999) in the US 
? 
 OIL The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the oil&gas 
industry (ICB 100) in the UK 
? 
 MATERL The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the basic 
materials industry (ICB 1000) in the UK 
? 
 INDUS The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the industrials 
industry (ICB 2000) in the UK 
? 
 CONSUMG The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the consumer 
goods industry (ICB 3000) in the UK 
? 
 CONSUMS The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the consumer 
services industry (ICB 5000) in the UK 
? 
 TELECOM The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the 
telecommunications industry (ICB 6000) in the UK 
? 
 UTILIT The dummy variable is set equal to one if a firm is in the utilities 
industry (ICB 7000) in the UK 
- 
 
  
57 
 
3.4 Research Methodology 
 
Because of the nature of the research, the quantitative approach has been used to analyse data. A number 
of theoretical hypotheses, which are measured by refined proxies to hedge, are tested. The dataset is then 
analysed and interpreted. Measurements are employed on the basis of hypotheses for the determinants of 
corporate hedging. The subjectivity of qualitative approach may weaken findings from qualitative 
research when researchers try to generalise conclusion based upon a single case or small sample. 
Therefore, the quantitative approach is more suitable to conduct the research in terms of the reliability 
and validity of findings.  
 
Some prior empirical studies investigate corporate hedging behaviour and derivative usage by utilising 
questionnaire surveys instead of secondary data from databases. In terms of this method, however, a 
relatively low response rate is the most serious limitations for research in this area 12 , which can 
significantly affect sample size. The low response rate could also raise the issue of respondent bias. For 
those firms which do not hedge their exposure, their managers may have less motivation to complete the 
questionnaire. Moreover, conducting a survey is time consuming and it is difficult to control the quality 
of questionnaires. In particular, because of a lack of prompting or supervision, questionnaires may be 
partially answered, creating a problem of missing data for the variables that are created (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). Respondents may have different interpretation and criteria on the attitude-related questions, 
making the actual results inconsistent and less reliable. Following recent changes on accounting treatment 
and improvement on the derivatives instrument disclosure, we have been able to collect detailed 
information on corporate hedging activities from audited financial reports. On account of the limitations 
                                                          
12 Nance et al (1993) had a response rate of 31.6%, Dolde (1995) had a response rate of 51.3%, Joseph and Hewins (1997) had 
a response rate of 51.9%, Pramborg (2005) had a response rate of 26%, and Clark and Judge (2006) had a response rate of 
42.2%; Bodnar et al (1995; 1998), doing 3 series survey in 1994,1995 and 1998, had response rate which dropped from 26.5% 
to 20.7% 
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of a survey-based study and the advantage of audited data, this research has utilised desk-based research 
method. 
 
The research employs econometric techniques and models, including descriptive statistics analysis, 
nonparametric test (Mann-Whitney test and Kruskal-Wallis test), factor analysis, and logistic regression 
to analyse chosen data through SPSS. These econometric techniques and models give estimations on 
different prospects.  
 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics describe the main characteristics of the data sets, including the size, mean, standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis of dependent and explanatory variables. Descriptive statistics provides 
a general picture of the individual variable, determining the suitability or otherwise of multivariate 
statistical tests.  
 
3.4.2 Non-parametric tests 
 
The study utilised Mann-Whitney approach to test the null hypotheses that hedgers and non-hedgers have 
equal mean ranks of the financial characteristics. In the studies dealing with corporate risk management, 
the sample could be biased to the extent that sampled firms are relatively large corporations while firm 
size itself is an explanatory factor to hedging. To test for sample selection bias, the research conducted 
Kruskal-Wallis statistic to compare the coefficients of all variables in terms of their size (total assets). 
Kruskal-Wallis test is very similar to the Mann-Whitney test method, but it permits more than two groups. 
It tested the null hypothesis that the mean ranks of the variables for hedgers and non-hedgers are 
significantly different.  
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3.4.3 Specification and multivariate tests 
 
Logistic regression analysis is used to test the relation between the likelihood of hedging and firm-and 
industry-level factors. In the standard OSL model, the variables are continuous with several observations 
for both the dependent and the explanatory variables. The logistic regression applies in the cases where 
the dependent variable is binary or dichotomous (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2013). In this case, our 
dependent variable is binary, as firms are classified into groups of ‘hedge’ and ‘not hedge’. The dependent 
variable is coded as a “1” for hedger, and “0” otherwise for those firms do not hedge. Results from logistic 
regression present the probability of hedging to the determinants of corporate hedging.  
 
The model specification is presented below: 
 
),,,,,|1Pr( 14321 nn XXXXXXY   )( 11443322110 nnnn XXXXXXF   
)......( 1101
1
nn XXe
 
  , where 0  is the constant parameter, the right-hand side explanatory 
variables Xs are the proxy measures of firm characteristics based on hypotheses, and n  is the parameter 
of the nth independent variable. 
 
The parameters of the logistic regression are estimated based on the maximum log likelihood method. In 
this study, the p-value of variables which is less than 0.1 in logistic model is recognised as statistically 
significant. That is, if the p-value of a variable is less than 0.1, the variable is recognised as a significant 
determinant of corporate hedging decision and we will see if the sign of coefficient   of that variable is 
consistent with theoretical prediction. 
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3.4.4 Factor analysis 
 
The traditional paradigm of using logit test can be criticised. As discussed in the studies conducted by 
Géczy et al. (1997) and Aretz and Bartram (2010), the endogeneity of variables measuring potential 
incentives for hedging is one of the empirical challenges and potential shortcomings, which may limit the 
conclusions drawn from existing hedging evidence. Some of the independent variables measuring 
different corporate policies and characteristics, such as leverage, investment opportunities, dividend, cash 
holdings, and management compensations are, amongst themselves, highly correlated. This can be made 
simultaneously with the decision of hedging. The presence of high correlation among the variables can 
adversely impact on the empirical results, which in turn can lead to unreliable inferences. However, most 
empirical studies on corporate risk management fail to account for the endogeneity and the simultaneity. 
In addition, studies using other techniques such as simultaneous equations models also face significant 
identification problems (Aretz and Bartram, 2010).  
 
Though we recognise that it is almost impossible to eliminate all the endogeneity problems, it is essential 
to minimise the problems when empirically examine the determinants of corporate hedging. To address 
these problems, in this study, we have used factor analysis approach to identify the independent 
dimensions of the data. In particular, factor analysis has been used as a data reduction tool, which “derives 
a set of uncorrelated variables for further analysis when the use of highly inter-correlated variables may 
yield misleading results in regression analysis” (Kim and Mueller, 1978, p.6). In other words, factor 
analysis aims to identify a number of groups and the underlying factors to represent variables with similar 
characteristics. As a results, a smaller set of latent variables represent correlated variables and would be 
relatively independent of one another. The procedure was estimated using the maximum likelihood and 
the variables were rotated using the varimax method. 
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3.5 Justification for Cross-country Comparison 
 
Existing literature has focused on samples of firms from one country and provides limited evidence on 
cross country comparison of corporate hedging determinants within the same period. Notable exceptions 
are Bodnar and Gebhardt’s (1999) study  which includes a comparative suvey amongst US and German 
non-financial firms, a recent study from Bartram et al. (2009) on derivative usage in 50 countries 
including the US, and Lel’s (2012) study on cross-country currency hedging and corporate governance. 
The evidence of cross-country differences suggest that our understanding of corporate hedging behaviour 
remains incomplete. Yet it is unclear whether the contradiction on the empirical evidence is due to the 
cross-country differences or the changes that have occurred over time. This study explores the relationship 
between financial characteristics and corporate hedging for firms in the US and UK over a longer period. 
The two countries are chosen because there are important similarities that make the comparison 
meaningful. Amongst other things, both the US and the UK are often described as Anglo-Saxon countries 
and have almost similar legal system for the conduct of business, market-based financial systems, and 
well-developed equity markets with good investor protection. The study therefore eases the concern over 
the contrary results across countries are because US enjoys a large and stable financial market with strong 
investor protection. In addition, they show the most advanced regulation on risk disclosure, allowing for 
distinct access to detailed information on risk management activities from audited financial reports.  The 
study provide a more direct and effective comparison of cross-country corporate hedging behaviour. The 
results here provide a broad confirmation of theoretical and prior empirical literature on the determinants 
of hedging. The remaining sections summarise the findings by the hypotheses of hedging. 
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3.6 Summary 
 
This chapter describes the data sources and sampling procedures. It also provide a detailed discussion of 
definitions of the variables under consideration. This chapter also discusses the empirical methodology 
used in the empirical analysis. In addition, it provides justification for the selection of countries. 
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CHAPTER 4                           
SUMMARY of US and UK EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4-1 presents the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used in this study over the period 
2002 to 2011. Panel A of Table 4-1 shows the statistics for the US firms, and Panel B shows the statistics 
for the UK firm. The means of natural logarithm of market value (LogMV) and logarithm of total assets 
(LogTA) for the hedgers are higher than non-hedgers. In addition, the mean of LogMV for US firms is 
larger than the mean for the UK firms. Consistently, the means of TOBINQ for US hedgers (1.814) and 
non-hedgers (2.297) are also higher than then means for the UK hedgers and non-hedgers (0.637 and 
1.000 respectively). By contrast, the mean of LogTA and the fixed assets ratio (FATA) for the UK firms 
are higher than the means for the US firms. The means of leverage ratio (LEVTA) for the US hedgers and 
non-hedgers  (0.275 and 0.176 respectively)are higher than the means for the UK hedgers (0.234) and 
non-hedgers (0.128). This suggests that US firms in our sample generally are more leveraged than UK 
firms, which is not surprising. It is noticeable that the stock prices of US firms appear to generally be 
more volatile than UK firms. In addition, it appears that the mean of the price volatility for US hedgers 
(28.091) is lower than the mean for US non-hedgers (34.279), whereas the situation for the UK hedgers 
and UK non-hedgers are just the reverse (mean of price volatility is 5.582 and 3.476 respectively). As 
regards the corporate governance measures, the mean value for the size of US firms’ board of directors is 
higher than the mean value for the UK firms, suggesting that US firms generally have large board than 
the UK firms. US firms also appear to have higher proportion of non-executive directors sitting on the 
board. By contrast, the mean of SEPARATION, the dummy variable for whether a firm separate the 
responsibility of Chairman and CEO, is much larger for the UK sample (0.878 for hedgers and 0.809 for 
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non-hedgers) than the US sample ( mean = 0.320 and 0.390 respectively). It suggests a difference on the 
leadership structure in the major US firms and UK firms. The variables for all groups of firms tend to 
exhibit skewness and kurtosis. This suggests that the observations that are obtained for the particular 
explanatory variables are not normally distributed. Parametric statistical approach may generate results 
that are inefficiently estimated. As such, we use the non-parametric tests to test the hypotheses.  
 
 
Table 4-1 Summary Statistics of US and UK Hedgers and Non-Hedgers 
Panel A: US firms 
 Hedgers Non-hedgers 
Variables N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
LogMV 2926 9.1043 1.4324 -0.0502 0.2393 1085 7.8388 1.2756 -0.1595 0.5166 
LogTA 2930 9.2972 1.2577 -0.0037 0.6500 1093 7.6324 1.3567 -0.0157 0.2429 
LogPTI 2622 6.7207 1.4679 -0.1114 0.2819 936 1.9717 0.9908 -0.8803 -0.0998 
FATA 2930 0.5381 0.2556 -0.6964 -0.2328 1093 0.5159 0.2193 -0.3153 -0.3288 
RDMV 2916 0.0302 0.2121 33.7979 1400.0030 1085 0.0159 0.0390 3.9502 19.2971 
RDTA 2932 0.1956 0.0384 5.1763 55.4820 1093 0.0278 0.0657 4.7798 41.9210 
CASH 2932 0.0777 0.0772 2.0966 8.2487 1093 0.1324 0.1253 1.4684 2.5344 
LTDTA 2929 0.2368 0.1636 1.6281 7.1170 1080 0.1556 0.1671 1.3576 2.2736 
DEBTMATU 2932 4.2037 1.0781 -2.3603 5.6895 1076 3.3912 1.9586 -0.8814 -0.9596 
LEVTA 2932 0.2745 0.1753 1.3006 4.9837 1093 0.1755 0.1798 1.4551 3.8957 
Z-Score 2929 3.5417 3.8571 10.2074 176.4495 1081 5.9835 7.3945 5.1712 45.2898 
INCOV 2906 14.8938 22.9170 2.7003 6.7438 1068 31.7862 38.7572 0.9845 -0.7655 
CURR 2872 1.6236 1.0126 4.8925 45.9850 1072 2.5633 2.3307 6.3311 81.3803 
FCF 2930 0.0664 0.0710 -0.8889 16.6573 1093 0.0582 0.1062 -2.8571 26.1160 
TOBINQ 2930 1.8137 1.0398 3.9251 28.1229 1093 2.2968 1.4886 2.4657 10.8471 
CAPEXTA 2930 0.0506 0.0516 5.0612 44.5801 1093 0.0543 0.0510 2.0199 5.3531 
CAPEXPPP 2924 0.0987 0.0726 4.1956 30.3271 1093 0.1187 0.0826 1.7543 5.2848 
SPRATING 2932 11.0100 4.6770 -0.7694 0.0669 1093 5.6400 5.2000 0.5052 -1.2004 
MTR 2932 0.3234 0.0739 -2.6461 6.1400 1093 0.3026 0.0948 -1.9390 2.5510 
NOL 2932 0.4200 0.4940 0.3037 -1.9091 1093 0.3900 0.4890 0.4370 -1.8124 
ITC 2932 7.5335 42.9499 8.1579 80.9719 1093 1.5579 24.7492 19.8251 417.4006 
DY 2932 1.4929 1.7249 1.5792 3.5852 1093 0.6371 1.1202 3.0336 13.4452 
CONVERDEBT 2932 0.0608 0.1738 3.6255 13.6515 1093 0.1085 0.2727 2.4801 4.7201 
ROA 2930 0.0516 0.0790 -2.1170 24.9267 1093 0.0450 0.1294 -3.9106 26.3485 
FI 2929 0.3618 2.5419 20.0803 542.0046 1091 0.1700 4.3323 -22.8178 525.9394 
STKComp 2919 1.3825 4.9300 9.0829 113.8293 1092 1.4606 6.8909 9.3509 109.2960 
BETA 2852 0.3677 33.1322 24.4962 734.3563 1068 1.3628 2.3962 26.7087 813.3751 
PRIVOL 2579 28.0913 10.2494 0.9651 0.9516 1002 34.2793 11.2966 0.7771 0.3436 
BoardSize 2374 10.9743 2.1670 0.1870 0.3984 884 9.5283 2.3442 1.3589 5.8699 
NED 2290 86.0596 7.5380 -1.5871 3.0770 871 80.6498 10.6967 -1.4563 4.2734 
CGI 2363 4.4185 0.8056 -0.6897 3.1584 870 4.1621 1.0556 -0.7743 1.0053 
LINKTSR 2932 0.4800 0.5000 0.0792 -1.9951 1093 0.3000 0.4600 0.8500 -1.2799 
SEPARATION 2363 0.3200 0.4680 0.7580 -1.4266 870 0.3900 0.4870 0.4732 -1.7801 
VOP 2932 0.1800 0.3850 1.6540 0.7362 1093 0.1500 0.3590 1.9426 1.7770 
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Panel B: UK firms 
 Hedgers Non-hedgers 
Variables N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis N Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
LogMV 1949 6.6661 1.9005 0.2269 -0.1762 856 4.4588 1.6547 0.2549 0.2808 
LogTA 2062 13.7018 1.8354 0.1684 -0.1041 968 10.9890 1.9102 -0.0503 0.2872 
LogPTI 1824 11.1420 1.9392 0.2155 0.2473 608 9.1787 1.9022 -0.2043 1.4351 
FATA 2061 0.6433 0.6213 9.5948 111.5096 968 0.9292 1.5818 3.9598 15.7360 
RDMV 914 2.9050 2.8714 0.6983 -0.6199 322 2.8525 3.0815 0.6979 -0.8897 
RDTA 2002 1.3272 2.4235 1.8943 2.5925 929 0.7329 1.9450 3.0605 8.6691 
CASH 2062 2.9342 3.0867 .6776 -0.8890 968 1.8467 2.6733 1.5204 0.9978 
LTDTA 2062 1.3139 2.4884 2.2091 3.5780 969 1.3367 2.5436 1.9504 2.5866 
DEBTMATU 2063 3.5317 1.7062 1.1202 32.8431 977 1.8932 1.9328 0.4253 -1.5136 
LEVTA 2062 0.2338 0.1791 1.1650 3.0596 968 0.1279 0.2343 4.2258 27.6486 
Z-Score 2061 1.8055 1.1498 -0.4545 6.9503 968 0.2320 4.8625 -5.7744 53.3247 
INCOV 2051 17.4522 27.3443 2.2146 3.6862 965 23.3491 35.3466 1.4498 0.4736 
CURR 2062 1.4991 1.4639 18.5735 589.1823 966 3.8324 6.5085 5.7626 46.5226 
FCF 2057 0.0582 0.0785 -2.3856 21.5775 941 -0.0778 0.3958 -5.5292 55.0956 
TOBINQ 2061 0.6373 0.4609 11.5990 174.9263 968 0.9998 1.9519 4.6766 34.7480 
CAPEXTA 2062 3.2693 2.9543 0.5405 -0.8396 968 3.0362 3.0519 0.6966 -0.7837 
CAPEXPPP 2052 1.2513 2.5352 2.3025 3.7585 966 2.0935 18.4397 22.4796 548.3635 
TXR 2061 30.3063 135.1403 23.8040 746.0602 967 2.9490 451.5738 -30.0527 924.0149 
DY 1848 0.5582 0.8870 4.2037 24.2726 631 0.1939 0.5790 6.9850 55.2178 
CONVERDEBT 2014 0.0631 0.5560 12.3456 163.7522 736 0.0473 0.2613 12.5776 230.5833 
ROA 2060 2.8572 3.8421 -0.3302 0.0716 945 1.0978 3.8648 0.0580 0.6205 
FOI 2076 4.0939 33.4260 -21.4047 796.2657 987 1.6073 25.3371 -7.8123 193.1981 
STKComp 2076 1.7339 3.4569 5.0343 41.9672 988 0.9808 10.2778 27.9643 834.0467 
STKOPT 2076 0.0015 0.0034 9.2428 154.0726 988 0.0022 0.0102 -3.9822 219.5328 
EXEComp 2076 2.0679 4.3179 6.4119 62.9560 988 1.0536 4.5009 10.1257 136.4275 
BETA           
PRIVOL 2018 5.5817 12.4748 18.3673 446.9413 905 3.4758 14.0740 14.9961 301.8231 
BoardSize 1316 9.2660 2.4952 0.7250 0.1245 373 7.6113 1.9362 0.7854 0.6683 
NED 1383 59.2010 19.7381 -1.6494 3.0672 388 52.8586 19.4294 -0.8662 1.3333 
CGI 1295 4.2903 0.7146 -0.1088 0.3693 265 4.0906 0.7683 -0.4590 0.1918 
LINKTSR 2076 0.5125 0.5000 -0.0501 -1.9994 988 0.1457 0.3530 2.0110 2.0481 
SEPARATION 1412 0.8775 0.3280 -2.3049 3.3175 388 0.8093 0.3934 -1.5806 0.5008 
VOP 1383 0.3557 0.4789 0.6033 -1.6384 384 0.2266 0.4192 1.3115 -0.2813 
ADCI 2076 59.9114 48.5299 -0.4120 -1.8145 985 34.3222 46.9667 0.6540 -1.5533 
CPCI 2076 58.1811 46.9317 -0.3845 -1.7773 985 33.7195 46.5602 0.6757 -1.5180 
NMCI 2076 39.5795 39.8505 0.1577 -1.7127 985 22.3987 38.1031 1.2185 -0.3202 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
4.2 Non-parametric Estimation 
 
To test hypothesised relation stated in the Section 4.2, the study utilises the non-parametric Wilconxon-
Mann-Whitney test for the differences between hedgers and non-hedgers based on ranks. The results of 
this test are reported in Table 4-2. Column 2 provides the hypothesised expectations, where “H” stands 
for “hedgers” and “NH” stands for non-hedgers. Column 3 and 4 is the mean ranks for US hedgers (US 
H) and non-hedgers (US NH), and column 6 and 7 are the ranks for UK hedgers (UK H) and non-hedgers 
(UK NH).  
 
It can be shown that the test rejects the null hypothesis for underinvestment problem, financial distress 
and taxation (p-value <0.100). So, as expected, there are differences in the financial characteristics of 
hedgers and non-hedgers. Hedgers are less liquid, have more debts, longer debt maturity and more tax 
liabilities. The results generally reject the null hypothesis that hedgers and non-hedgers face same level 
of growth opportunities. Hedgers have significantly higher R&D expenditure than non-hedgers. However, 
the mean ranks for TOBINQ is more complex. UK hedgers appear to have higher mean rank than non-
hedgers, but the mean rank of TOBINQ for the US hedgers is surprisingly lower than the one for non-
hedgers. This result, however, is consistent with the US firms evidence by Mian (1996). The possibility 
considered is the small-firm premium13. This will be discussed further with Kruskal-Wallis test later on. 
 
Table 4-2 also shows that the test is significant for the overinvestment measures. The hypothesis relation 
is not always in the expected direction. For example, both US hedgers and UK hedgers have higher mean 
ranks for free cash flows to total assets (2035.743 vs. 1948.377 for the US, and 1632.849 vs. 1208.656 
for the UK), consistent with hypothesised expectation. However, the finding that non-hedgers exhibit 
higher capital expenditure to plant, property and equipment (CAPEXPPP) is contrary to the expectation. 
                                                          
13 For example, it is well-known that on average the stock price of small firms outperforms the price of large firms. 
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The alternative investment intensity measure, capital expenditure to total assets (CAPEXTA), just loads 
higher mean rank for UK hedgers (1542.840 vs. 1457.261). As such, we cannot firmly reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference on the investment intensity between hedgers and non-hedgers. 
 
Table 4-2 Mann-Whitney Test for US and UK Hedgers and Non-Hedgers  
Variables Hypothesised 
Expectation 
Mean Rank Z-statistic 
US 
Mean Rank Z-statistic 
UK 
US H US NH  UK H UK NH  
Growth options 
RDMV H>NH 2087.4448 1768.6747 -8.4288a 620.9956 611.4161 -0.4143 
RDTA H>NH 2076.3426 1843.0819 -6.1607a 1521.7395 1345.8811 -5.8590a 
TOBINQ H>NH 1903.2234 2303.5970 -9.7257a 1646.9592 1234.0413 -12.1174a 
Underinvestment 
LEVTA H>NH 2210.0866 1484.3102 -17.6259a 1741.7005 1033.6555 -20.8084a 
DEBTMATU H>NH 2052.4258 1873.9066 -4.3301a 1741.3076 1054.2503 -20.1964a 
FATA H<NH 2063.7894 1873.1683 -4.6318a 1550.2826 1439.8786 -3.2399a 
Overinvestment 
FCF H>NH 2035.7336 1948.3774 -2.1220b 1632.8493 1208.0021 -12.4714a 
CAPEXTA H>NH 2010.8184 2015.1674 -0.1056 1542.8400 1457.2614 -2.5107b 
CAPEXPPP H>NH 1930.1860 2219.8435 -7.0448a 1377.8492 1775.0592 -11.6796a 
Managerial incentives 
STKComp H>NH 2102.2456 1748.7257 -9.2578a 1676.9422 1228.9960 -15.0538a 
STKOPT H<NH    1545.2288 1505.7540 -1.2236 
EXEComp H>NH    1715.5395 1147.8947 -18.2752a 
Financial Distress 
ZScore H<NH 1846.3595 2436.6957 -14.3282a 1637.7885 1253.5671 -11.2753a 
LTDTA H>NH 2187.2361 1510.7690 -16.4214a 1655.0919 1220.0170 -12.8427a 
CURR H<NH 1771.6731 2510.5364 -18.1294 1343.8930 1864.4105 -15.3092a 
INCOV H<NH 1902.6249 2218.4429 -7.6956a 1503.0007 1352.9844 -4.4097a 
SPRATING H<NH 2309.2751 1218.2347 -26.7002a    
Taxation 
MTR H>NH 2108.8088 1755.9904 -8.7462a    
TXR H>NH    1625.3583 1278.2239 -10.1872a 
NOL H>NH 2030.2439 1966.7429 -1.8059c    
ITC H>NH 2035.1698 1953.5288 -6.0026a    
Size 
LogMV Undetermined 2276.4831 1276.5682 -24.2925a 1667.5672 800.6151 -26.1067a 
LogTA Undetermined 2358.3581 1081.9963 -31.0111a 1853.2362 796.0661 -31.0157a 
LogPTI H>NH 2251.7244 1372.6157 -21.3630a 1381.4507 721.6480 -20.0648a 
Substitutes 
DY H>NH 2186.9932 1546.2589 -16.1148a 1398.4072 776.0753 -18.9322a 
CONVERDEBT H<NH 2020.1601 1993.7928 -0.8904 1372.6152 1383.3940 -0.7984 
CASH H<NH 1872.7306 2389.2763 -12.5427a 1563.6440 1412.9452 -4.4213a 
Profitability 
ROA H>NH 1974.0592 2113.7077 -3.3923a 1646.9376 1189.2312 -13.4273a 
FI H>NH 1334.7471 1222.2860 -3.0804a 1731.9000 1111.5415 -18.3417a 
        
PRIVOL Undetermined 1622.3356 2225.1173 -15.6619a 1672.9779 991.5541 -20.1825a 
BETA Undetermined 1895.3491 2134.4799 -5.8898a    
Corporate Governance 
BoardSize H<NH 1798.2502 1176.3179 -16.9336a 918.7451 584.8164 -11.7815a 
NED H>NH 1730.9817 1186.6739 -15.0057a 937.7787 701.4381 -8.0568a 
CGI H>NH 1667.6676 1479.3822 -5.5175a 797.0046 699.8453 -3.5160a 
LINKTSR H>NH 2108.9393 1755.6404 -9.9972a 1713.6869 1151.7874 -19.4153a 
SEPARATION H>NH 1589.9592 1690.4454 -3.3095a 913.7309 852.3505 -3.4570a 
VOP H>NH 2029.1603 1969.6496 -2.2306b 908.8037 749.6680 -4.7702a 
ADCI H>NH    1659.5901 1259.9817 -13.3463a 
CPCI H>NH    1651.5894 1276.8442 -12.1393a 
NMCI H>NH    1638.3148 1304.8218 -10.7735a 
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The statistic of all the corporate governance measures is significant (p-value < 0.100), allowing us to 
reject the null hypotheses that there is no difference in board structure and the strength of corporate 
governance between hedgers and non-hedgers. The mean rank of NED, CGI, LINKTSR, and VOP for 
hedgers are higher both in the US and the UK, consistent with the hypothesised expectation. The finding 
illustrates that hedgers generally exhibit stronger corporate governance. The only aspect of the corporate 
governance that is contrary to the prediction is from the size of board of directors (BoardSize). Corporate 
governance theories suggest a smaller board yields more effective monitoring and stronger governance, 
and therefore higher likelihood of hedging. However, our table shows that the mean rank of BoardSize 
for hedgers is higher than the mean rank for non-hedgers.  
 
The above Mann-Whitney test exams whether there is significant difference between hedger and non-
hedgers, but it does not pull out the effect of size. Given that hedgers exhibit significant economies of 
scale in Table 4-2, it raises the concern that the relations for the explanatory variables between hedgers 
and non-hedgers are driven by the size effect. To pull out size effect, We separated the sample into three 
equal groups based on total assets. Kruskal-Wallis test is employed to test for differences among the six 
groups: small hedgers, small non-hedgers, middle hedgers, middle non-hedgers, large hedgers, and large 
non-hedgers. Table 4-3 Panel A and Panel reports the results from Kruskal-Wallis test for the US and UK 
firms respectively. Note that, by capturing the size effect, all of the statistics are significant at 10% level. 
 
Large firms generally have higher tax liabilities because of higher taxable income. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to find that hedgers exhibit more tax liabilities given that large firms are more likely to be 
hedgers. Table 4-3 provides support that hedgers exhibit more tax liabilities after pulling out size effect. 
The mean ranks of MTR, NOL, and ITC for small hedgers, middle hedgers and large hedgers are all higher 
than the corresponding groups of non-hedgers. The mean ranks of corporate governance measures are 
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generally higher for hedgers. The effect of size on the corporate governance does not influence the 
conclusion that hedgers are better governed. 
 
Table 4-3 Panel B shows provides support that all of the three groups of UK hedgers exhibit higher R&D 
expenditures. Panel A shows similar results for the middle-size and large US hedgers. It is noticeable, 
however, that the small-size US hedger appears to have lower R&D spending than small non-hedgers. 
Likewise both the mean ranks of TOBINQ for the small US hedger and UK hedgers are lower than the 
ranks for small non-hedgers, suggesting that small hedgers in the US and UK have few valuable growth 
opportunities. This is surprising because smaller firms are like to have greater informational asymmetries 
and are more liquidity constrained. 
 
Table 4-3 also shows that mixed results for the relation for the debt maturity between hedgers and non-
hedgers. In the US, small hedgers appear to have longer debt maturity, whereas middle-size hedgers and 
large hedgers appear to have shorter debt maturity compared to the middle and large non-hedgers. 
Consistent with the results for debt maturity, the mean ranks of liquidity measures for middle-size and 
large hedgers are slightly higher than the mean ranks for non-hedgers. In the UK, by contrast, hedgers are 
generally have longer debt maturity than non-hedgers.  
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Table 4-3 Kruskal-Wallis test for the hedgers and non-hedgers by size group 
Panel A: US firms 
Variables  Mean Rank     Chi-Square 
 Small H Small NH Middle H Middle NH Large  H Large NH  
Growth options        
RDMV 1791.5372 1902.4432 2168.7181 1483.2739 2147.4613 1344.1441 169.4377a 
RDTA 1824.2230 1997.4046 2139.1396 1508.1383 2130.9211 1370.0811 134.9795a 
TOBINQ 2188.4593 2554.2558 1903.4771 1760.6748 2241.0614 2253.6937 272.2457a 
Underinvestment        
LEVTA 1951.3628 1279.7545 2302.3855 1830.1529 2241.0614 2253.6937 438.9178a 
DEBTMATU 2138.4690 1730.1034 2148.7366 2257.7233 1921.1395 2122.9189 85.4858a 
FATA 1735.6805 1677.0464 2146.4057 2213.7621 2137.1611 2607.4685 161.5430a 
Overinvestment        
FCF 2143.5053 2085.0664 2154.2824 1724.0801 1875.3324 1406.3649 87.2430a 
CAPEXTA 1986.2584 1988.1269 1936.3705 1995.1058 2089.9020 2233.9505 15.0499a 
CAPEXPPP 2151.6832 2302.7146 2146.1092 1879.4061 1874.0110 1769.3153 96.7332a 
Managerial incentives       
STKComp 1660.2326 1748.2062 2003.9304 1608.8956 2391.8888 1852.7636 284.0045a 
Financial Distress        
ZScore 2449.7044 2680.2829 1864.8678 2026.0537 1550.5309 1487.7706 572.2779a 
LTDTA 1916.1619 1300.3623 2292.7987 1858.4805 2212.9890 2334.5092 409.5820a 
CURR 2290.7034 2799.5545 1905.8771 2036.2789 1398.7074 1370.3874 782.6416s 
INCOV 2139.9216 2337.4427 1797.3160 2012.2791 1890.437 1789.5766 122.8289a 
SPRATING 1537.4655 889.9207 2192.6661 1791.1359 2768.4471 2440.8559 1412.4535a 
Taxation        
MTR 1933.3319 1702.1798 2152.6476 1701.5583 2145.8198 2216.5811 113.5933a 
TXR        
NOL 2021.1115 2005.8698 2173.2987 1915.9223 1898.8763 1771.8649 277.0427a 
ITC 1935.5000 1935.5000 1947.8828 1935.5000 2158.0915 2098.1351 2300.8491a 
Size        
LogMV 1056.9388 870.5335 1976.0035 2009.0000 3314.4617 2796.3333 2300.8491a 
LogTA 850.3257 540.4343 2011.8040 2013.0801 3371.6839 3140.0946 3601.5577a 
LogPTI 1275.2540 1021.9111 1949.2828 1949.8641 2977.8287 2728.5766 1690.6221a 
Substitutes        
DY 1594.6584 1418.7899 2077.2172 1631.1311 2557.0883 2270.0360 619.6282a 
CONVERDEBT 2025.4284 1948.7951 1992.1498 2099.0170 2039.9125 2099.8288 10.0756c 
CASH 1949.0929 2613.9330 1987.5414 2093.6286 1728.6233 1342.1486 321.8306a 
Profitability        
ROA 2115.3929 2237.8409 1946.7996 1879.4515 1933.3621 1672.1171 55.2406a 
FI 1867.6531 1567.3950 2279.0776 1721.4272 2213.1233 1402.6306 274.5093a 
        
PRIVOL 2088.4490 2353.4490 1771.8729 2187.3333 1307.8703 1413.0196 535.2586a 
BETA 1909.6008 2186.8742 2120.6656 2084.7670 1682.9104 1859.8468 129.8964a 
Corporate Governance       
BoardSize 1232.4306 889.3398 1604.1449 1614.9844 2115.9205 2006.0735 751.1272a 
NED 1279.2645 1023.7607 1668.7196 1297.8770 1905.3153 1937.0758 430.8686a 
CGI 1455.9069 1418.4592 1693.6995 1670.8620 1690.1165 1455.9069 56.9427a 
LINKTSR 1525.9035 1615.7436 2071.6982 2039.6165 2407.9882 2192.2928 459.1272a 
SEPARATION 1755.6791 1766.4672 1611.6286 1648.5703 1525.2442 1337.2500 83.4331a 
VOP 1797.7531 1929.4240 2038.1229 2043.2233 2123.9337 2097.3108 61.8125a 
(Continued) 
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Panel B: UK firms 
Growth options        
RDMV 682.6641 624.5398 639.5508 549.5667 575.9811 559.0000 15.0919a 
RDTA 1757.9050 1463.2100 1487.5841 1098.3533 1462.7817 1055.5455 123.5148a 
TOBINQ 1152.8221 1225.2169 1628.1186 1344.9440 1840.2153 958.0694 312.8527a 
Underinvestment        
LEVTA 1211.7471 942.1184 1659.8093 1211.8513 1997.2410 1302.2917 668.7068a 
DEBTMATU 1184.9250 900.7500 1703.6779 1260.9418 1931.5803 1780.0927 655.5247a 
FATA 1093.9868 1302.9902 1406.5464 1635.1466 1832.4836 2073.0972 287.9960a 
Overinvestment        
FCF 1798.3698 1109.9922 1726.3054 1381.1762 1496.6161 1541.9437 228.1970a 
CAPEXTA 1539.3294 1453.8373 1539.5226 1470.4116 1546.8229 1446.4653 6.4137 
CAPEXPPP 1577.9971 1842.6917 1349.4296 1685.9935 1328.7516 1448.3611 174.8956a 
Managerial incentives       
STKComp 1053.2971 1046.2259 1560.0335 1544.5366 1954.4156 1685.4653 694.4205a 
STKOPT 1410.1721 1483.2711 1505.5535 1547.9332 1582.6432 1430.61111 13.9814a 
EXEComp 976.7471 916.7605 1637.5503 1482.3103 1999.4154 2014.72222 925.8423a 
Financial Distress        
ZScore 1927.1294 1125.0663 1797.7784 1498.4440 1402.3090 1649.5833 306.1227a 
LTDTA 1448.2853 1099.5113 1647.3758 1438.7392 1733.6961 1628.3611 234.4399a 
CURR 1783.3676 1942.0174 1438.7384 1578.9353 1103.4300 2057.3056 435.0087a 
INCOV 1654.8985 1194.8972 1569.1794 1675.6019 1375.7843 1687.7958 117.5011a 
Taxation        
TXR 1698.7691 1110.9623 1673.7835 1638.6853 1559.1810 1656.9375 191.1980a 
Size        
LogMV 637.5077 502.9456 1373.0196 1253.6683 2267.6924 2065.8689 2079.5608a 
LogTA 669.1888 417.0941 1540.1888 1402.5065 2535.5465 2336.9444 2718.9700a 
LogPTI 486.8272 389.6113 1128.7362 996.1751 1912.1683 1860.7768 1714.0916a 
Substitutes        
DY 1090.6589 622.5452 1328.6793 1024.0484 1555.4691 1003.2364 507.3328a 
CONVERDEBT 1340.6139 1372.6689 1330.7563 1356.0092 1412.8413 1510.8472 46.8842a 
CASH 1410.9118 1403.7922 1592.1914 1435.8987 1595.1200 1423.3958 32.2045a 
Profitability        
ROA 1552.8732 1043.7105 1688.0625 1475.5241 1646.9111 1593.9014 244.4649a 
FI 1504.2147 1005.4344 1685.1933 1327.5259 1803.5523 1236.7014 383.0114a 
PRIVOL 1187.8923 720.8314 1518.1929 1392.5903 1945.3679 2098.3125 852.1309a 
Corporate Governance       
BoardSize 345.6548 400.4367 623.9881 611.6623 1091.1864 982.3413 529.0285a 
NED 589.8222 628.0337 797.7616 742.6065 1026.1652 772.7609 152.8380a 
CGI 527.6765 611.1379 729.6189 741.1336 839.1397 747.1639 53.0663a 
LINKTSR 983.2941 982.7304 1532.8376 1388.7026 2081.0803 1732.6250 1080.8109a 
SEPARATION 1006.7281 885.0059 901.0625 952.1013 912.6106 765.6429 24.2144a 
VOP 614.1222 705.5692 874.4756 845.1581 940.9307 876.0362 66.9133a 
ADCI 895.4118 1050.5324 1487.0103 1617.0302 2034.5344 1864.6042 922.3582a 
CPCI 900.6881 1077.2428 1494.6881 1633.4914 2008.0719 1805.0486 793.0585a 
NMCI 994.2647 1147.4577 1452.4240 1608.6918 1979.7146 1599.0486 621.8959a 
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4.3 Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
4.3.1 Findings regarding growth opportunities 
 
The study finds that firms in the US and the UK firms with greater growth opportunities have greater 
incentives to hedge to reduce the volatility of cash flows and potential predation risk. We found that the 
optimal hedge ratio is negative when investment opportunities are extremely sensitive to the risk variables. 
The growth opportunities motivation for hedging substantially differs across different level of credit 
rating. High-rated firms undertake hedging to limit the possibility that rating fall below certain level which 
the firm would start giving up valuable projects. On contrary, low-rated firms tend not to hedge when 
they have greater investment opportunities. It is noticeable that the use of derivative among UK firms are 
less sensitive to the change of R&D spending than US firms. In addition, the use of interest rate derivatives 
in the UK does not appear to be significantly affected by the R&D spending of a firm. 
 
 
4.3.2 Findings regarding agency problem hypothesis 
 
Given that growth and investment policies affects corporate hedging policy and that investment and 
financing decisions are interdependent, intuitively, the investment distortion by the conflict between the 
main stakeholders will also affect corporate hedging policy under imperfect market. The study provides 
additional evidence for the hypotheses based on two forms of agency problems, shareholder-bondholder 
conflicts and shareholder-manager conflicts. Both of the US and UK firms hedge to reduce the agency 
costs arising from overinvestment and underinvestment problem. Firms with longer debt maturity are 
more likely to hedge. The interaction between debt maturity and fixed assets ratio is significantly negative 
in the UK models, suggesting that the effect of debt maturity on UK firms’ hedging policy differs 
depending on the asset tangibility (collateralisability). Notwithstanding that this interaction effect is not 
significant for the US firms, the regression with US sample shows a significantly negative estimate for 
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the interaction of large firm dummy variable and debt maturity. This is consistent with the evidence from 
the UK. Furthermore, we found that the underinvestment incentive of hedging among firms with high 
underinvestment costs are stronger and more significant (higher Wald statistics) than the firms with 
moderate Tobin’s Q both in the US and the UK. However, US firms are less sensitive to underinvestment 
problem than UK firms. 
 
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, empirical results from the UK shows a negative relation of long-
term debt and hedging, while there is no such evidence in the US. The plausible explanation is that, under 
the creditor-friendly environment in the UK, firms with high costs of financial distress may issue less 
long-term debt. Such exogeneity, in turn, results in a negative sign of long-term debt in the model. Such 
effect is insignificant in the US because, under the equity-friendly legal framework, US firms face lower 
bankruptcy costs compared to their UK counterparts. The creditor-friendly environment in the UK offers 
a typical framework for such an analysis since their firms are expect to have high exogenous financial 
distress costs. 
 
Firms in the US and the UK hedge to reduce the costs of overinvestment problem of high free cash flows. 
For firms using resources poorly, likelihood of hedging increases as free cash flows increase. It appears 
that the currency hedging among US firms is more sensitive than UK firms to the increase of free cash 
flows when the costs of overinvestment are high. In addition, US firms with higher investment intensity 
also appear to have stronger propensity of hedging. Overall, evidence with US sample presents stronger 
motivation of hedging in response to the overinvestment problem, while evidence with UK sample 
presents stronger motivation in response to underinvestment costs. This is not surprising, given that under 
the creditor-friendly environment in the UK creditors, especially the secured creditors, have more claims 
on a firm’s assets in the process of bankruptcy, and that the equity-friendly environment in the US induces 
lower bankruptcy costs. Alternatively, the differences may also reflect the fact of powerful managers of 
74 
 
US firms (e.g. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) shows that most of CEOs of US firms also chair the 
board). 
 
 
4.3.3 Findings regarding managerial risk aversion and compensation 
 
Having shown that, with the existence of information asymmetry and market imperfection, firms hedge 
to reduce agency costs, the study also examines the managerial based motives on hedging policy. A firm’s 
managers decide hedge or not to maximise shareholders interest in a firm, but they also consider their 
own interest when making risk management decision. Firms use stock-based compensation to align 
shareholder/manager interests. The study finds that the managerial motive is an important determinant of 
corporate hedging policy among US and UK firms. And, not surprisingly, multinational hedgers generally 
pay higher compensation to their managers than domestic non-hedgers. The evidence from US also relates 
managerial motives for hedging to overinvestment problem. The results suggest that, with high level of 
free cash flows, managers who received more stock-based compensation have stronger propensity to 
hedge. This is consistent with the finding of strong overinvestment incentive amongst US firms. By 
contrast, regression with UK sample does not present similar result, which might reflect a stronger 
corporate governance mechanism in the UK. Interestingly, however, the results with US sample shows a 
positive relation between stock-based compensation and hedging, while the results with UK sample 
shows a negative relation. One plausible reason is that the data is provided by different database and 
includes different items. Alternatively, it might reflects the different risk preference of managers in the 
two countries. 
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4.3.4 Findings regarding costs of financial Distress 
 
The empirical analysis shows a non-monotonic relation between costs of financial distress and the 
likelihood of corporate hedging. Firms with higher leverage are more likely to engage in hedging. By 
contrast, more liquid firms and firms with strong ability to pay interest are less likely to hedge. However, 
when the costs of financial distress are extremely high, the distinction between financial distress and 
bankruptcy disappears, while the costs of hedging on liquidity may worsen the financial states of a firm. 
As a result the marginal benefit of hedging diminishes along with ex-post risk management motivations.  
 
It is noticeable that Altman Z-Score is positively related to hedging decision in UK firms, whereas the 
results are more complicated from the US sample. We found a positive relation between Z-Score and 
hedging decision, consistent with the results from UK. However, the estimate becomes negative after 
introducing a low rating dummy variable. The likelihood of hedging among firms rated BBB or above 
increases as the likelihood of bankruptcy increases. In contrast, the likelihood of hedging among firms 
below investment grade increases as the likelihood of bankruptcy decreases, because hedging is more 
costly for firms with high bankruptcy risk. The evidence suggests that, when hedging is costly, the 
dynamics associated with the costs of hedging alter the optimal hedging policy of a firm. Firms have 
different hedging policies in response to the same hedging motivation. The effect of credit rating on UK 
firms’ hedging policy is not tested because the credit rating data is available for part of firms. Nevertheless, 
given the fact that UK firms generally make less use of ratings than its US counterparts (Duff and Einig, 
2009), we believe that US offers a better framework for such an analysis than UK. 
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4.3.5 Findings regarding taxation hypothesis 
 
The empirical analysis with US sample finds additional supporting evidence for taxation hypothesis for 
hedging. Firms with higher expected tax liability and tax preference items are more likely to engage in 
hedging. The results suggest that, in general, firms place more emphases on tax benefit from increased 
debt capacity by hedging than tax function convexity. The results also imply that managers of purely 
domestic firms and multinational firms have different emphasis when making actual hedging decisions. 
In addition, managers may emphasise different objects in terms of types of hedging. It appears that firms 
are more likely to hedge their foreign exchange exposure with the existence of NOL carryforwards, 
whereas not significantly response to the increasing simulated marginal tax rate. By contrast, the decision 
of interest rate hedging appears to be very sensitive to the change of marginal tax rate, which is consistent 
with the notion that firms hedge to increase the debt capacity and the interest deductions. However, the 
logistic results with UK sample do not support the taxation hypothesis, as evidenced by the insignificant 
coefficients on the effective tax rate. The results do not support the explanation of increasing tax benefit 
on debt, either. 
 
 
4.3.6 Findings regarding hedging substitutes 
 
Considering hedging substitutes, the empirical evidence support the notion that firm alter their dividend 
payout policy to avoid default on financial obligations. The results from both US and UK suggest that 
likelihood of hedging is higher for firms with higher dividend yield. By contrast, firms which issue more 
convertible debts to control agency problem are less likely to engage in hedging. Exception is the 
domestic model with US sample, which shows negative estimate of dividend yield. We consider this 
finding as support for liquidity hypothesis rather than contradiction to substitute hypothesis. Purely 
domestic firms which pays higher dividend are less likely to hedge because, only the highly liquid firms 
can afford high dividend. 
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In the light of increase in cash holding in recent years, the study also examines the influence of cash 
holding on corporate hedging. We found that holding large amount of cash does not necessarily equivalent 
to adverse impact on hedging. In general, US firms holding more cash are less likely to hedge. In particular, 
international hedgers hold more cash than domestic non-hedgers. Domestic firms tend to hold more cash 
rather than to issue convertible debts to avoid the costs of accessing capital markets. However, cash 
holding is positive to currency hedging. Contrary to the evidence from US, empirical analysis with UK 
sample rejects the substitute relation between cash and hedging. Hedging is more likely to happen in the 
firms with higher level of cash. 
 
 
4.3.7 Findings regarding firm size and industry 
 
The empirical study shows that firm size matters to corporate hedging, consistent with the hypothesis of 
economies of scale. Though the results from both countries suggest a positive relation between size and 
hedging, the corporate hedging policy is more sensitive to economies of scale in the US than UK. Prior 
literature poses an empirical puzzle for the effect of firm size on hedging. While theories of hedging 
suggest smaller firms should be more likely to hedge because of their higher riskiness, empirical results 
show that large firms hedge more than small firms. Our finding with that credit rating is positively related 
with hedging in the US is consistent with the economies of scale and may be able to explain the puzzle. 
The effect of credit rating on UK firms’ hedging policy is not tested because the credit rating data is 
available for part of firms. Empirical evidence from the two countries also suggests that size matters when 
it comes to the relation between hedging and debt maturity. 
 
The industry that a firm operates in also affects hedging policy in the two countries. Firms in the regulated 
industries, which considered to have lower level of information asymmetries, have lower incentives to 
78 
 
undertake hedging. This finding is consistent across countries. It appears that US firms in the construction 
industry, retailed industry and services industry have lower incentive to hedge. This reflects that such 
firms are likely to have less of an international presence compares with (say) manufacturing firms and 
technological firms. In contrast, UK firms in the retailed industry have higher incentive to hedge. The 
differences suggest that industry-specific characteristics associated with increased foreign exchange rate 
exposure or incentives for optimal risk reduction on hedging may vary across countries. The possible 
reason is the systematic differences across countries. That is, the findings from previous empirical studies 
are likely to be industry-driven or country-driven, which may explain the mixed empirical evidence 
among previous studies. Therefore, one should carefully consider the country-level differences and 
industry effects on corporate hedging study. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 present important insights into the influence of firm-specific 
financial characteristics, industry conditions and macroeconomic environment on corporate hedging 
decision over time. Evidence from the US and the UK mostly are consistent and strongly support the 
hypotheses for hedging. Hedging theories hold across countries. There are, however, significant country 
differences in the way that place emphasis on different hedging incentives and in terms of type of hedging. 
These differences are mainly driven by the differences on bankruptcy codes, corporate governance, and 
other institutional differences. Our findings underscore the importance of incorporating industry-specific 
and country-level factors in cross-country studies. The following two chapters provide detailed 
discussions of the determinants of hedging by US non-financial firms and UK non-financial firms. 
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CHAPTER 5                                                         
US FIRMS AND THEIR FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Existing studies on the determinants of corporate hedging suggests that firms choose to hedge in a real 
world with market imperfections in response to the volatilities and costs from risk arising from financial 
exposures. This chapter identifies US firm’s incentives to hedge using Logistic (logit) regression analysis 
for the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. In an earlier chapter, the justifications for considering the 
corporate hedging problem in the contexts of both the UK and US firms was provided. So this chapter 
presents additional evidence on the hedging behaviour of US firms with some refined data, such as 
classifying firms more specifically into hedgers with international operation and with domestic operation 
only, non-hedgers with international operation and with domestic operation only. This additional analysis 
for US firms is possible because of the larger data set that is available.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the logistic results for the 
determinants of corporate hedging activities and the empirical evidence for the hedging hypotheses. 
Section 5.3 provides conclusion of the empirical evidence and its implications. 
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5.2 Multivariate Analysis – Binary Logistic Analysis 
 
5.2.1 Regression Diagnostics 
 
First of all, we consider the diagnostic tests for our estimates since this will enable us to assess the 
reliability of the results. Panel B of each table shows the diagnostic tests for our logistic regressions. In 
general, the diagnostic tests indicate that the logistic regressions provide a reasonable good fit to the data. 
So, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test is insignificant at acceptable level14. Also, the Omnibus statistics are 
significant (p-value  0.01), suggesting that the coefficients of the logistic regressions besides the 
intercept are significant. 
 
To assess the performance of the logistic regression models, we also utilise a naïve proportional chance 
model (see Morrison, 1969 and Joy and Tollefson, 1975). For example, on the basis of the proportional 
chance criterion, the percentage of correct classification is 606.0
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 for Equation (1) and Equation (2) respectively. The maximum chance criterion for 
the two equations are 0.733 and 0.334 respectively. Given that 83.6 percentage and 83.9 percentage 
correct classification in Equation (1) and (2), the discriminant functions performed significantly better 
than both the maximum and proportional chance models at a 1 percentage level. The rest of models also 
appear to reject the null hypothesis that the logistic regressions do not outperformed a naïve proportional 
chance model. So overall, these are good diagnostic results.  
 
                                                          
14 The p-value of Hosmer and Lemeshow test is greater than 0.10 for all models, except Model (9) whose p-value is 0.066. 
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However, the Studentized residuals and the Standardised residuals are significant using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic. So the residuals are non-normally distributed. Since the analysis uses Maximum 
Likelihood method with large sample, the parameter estimates are still unbiased. We therefore interpret 
our logistic regression results in the following sections. 
 
 
5.2.2 Baseline Model 
 
We start with the model estimated with all sampled US firms regardless if a firm operates internationally 
or domestically. We later separate the firms into more refined groups. In what follows, our analysis and 
results apply only to Equation (1) and (2) of our baseline models. The coefficients of this logistic 
regression model are estimated using Maximum Likelihood method, with the results reported in the first 
four columns of Table 5-1. This is similar in approach to our UK analysis. The first two columns provides 
the results for Equation (1) which omits nonlinear and interaction effects. The third and fourth columns 
report the results for Equation (2), which includes curvilinear and interaction effects. The number of 
observations in Equation (1) and (2) is different as cases are dropped due to missing values.  
 
The coefficient for LogTA is significant (p-value 0.01) and positive and has the highest Wald statistic 
in both Equation (1) and (2), indicating that the economies of scale is the most important determinant of 
hedging for our sample firms. Since large firms have the advantage in being able to afford the cost of risk 
management programmes, they are more like to undertake corporate hedging. The coefficient for ROA is 
statistically significant in both regressions at least at the 5% level. The positive coefficient implies that 
derivative use is positively related with the efficiency of using a firm’s assets to generate earnings – 
meaning that hedging minimises that variable of ROA and in turn enhances firm profitability. 
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Table 5-1 Logistic regression results for Baseline Model 
Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4) 
Variables  Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
Constant   -7.5218 a 
(0.4797) 
 -8.6427a 
(0.7322) 
 -9.5950 a 
(0.7546) 
 -8.5616a 
(0.7976) 
 
LogTA   2.3413 a 
(0.1099) 
0.3405 2.7714a 
(0.1803) 
0.3890 2.8060 a 
(0.1820) 
0.3546 3.1072a 
(0.2073) 
0.3290 
ROA  2.1060 a 
(0.6925) 
0.3063 1.2885c 
(0.6984) 
0.1809 1.3730 c 
(0.7145) 
0.2034 1.7921b 
(0.7445) 
0.1898 
RDMV  2.1714 
(1.3360) 
0.3158     5.1414c 
(2.7612) 
0.6044 
DEBTMATU   0.1149a 
(0.0413) 
0.0167 0.1633a 
(0.0456) 
0.0229 0.3195b 
(0.1482) 
0.0812 0.1396 a 
(0.0487) 
0.0426 
LargeFirm    0.6853 
(0.4782) 
0.0966 -0.7342 
(0.4830) 
-0.0097 1.5740b 
(0.6953) 
-
0.0057 
LargeFirm×DEBTMATU    -0.2865a 
(0.1018) 
-0.0402 -0.2909a 
(0.1030) 
-0.0225 -0.4856a 
(0.1477) 
-
0.0571 
FATA  -2.1292 a 
(0.2705) 
-0.3097 -2.3484 a 
(0.2932) 
-0.3296 -2.5580 a 
(0.2967) 
-0.3518 -3.0928 a 
(0.3672) 
-
0.3699 
CURR  -0.3902 a 
(0.0562) 
-0.0567 -0.3719 a 
(0.0615) 
-0.0522 -0.3534 a 
(0.0620) 
-0.0460 -0.4018 a 
(0.0658) 
-
0.0417 
FCF  1.8281 b 
(0.8217) 
0.2659 0.6457 
(0.9137) 
0.0906 0.6294  
(0.9128) 
0.0829 -0.1633 
(1.0159) 
-
0.0024 
LEVTA  2.8089 a 
(0.3777) 
0.4085       
STKComp  0.0315 a 
(0.0104) 
0.0046 0.0277c 
(0.0142) 
0.0039 0.0273 c 
(0.0144) 
0.0032 0.0295b 
(0.0150) 
0.0023 
STKCompFCF    0.3239 b 
(0.1564) 
0.0456 0.3299b 
(0.1483) 
0.0466 0.3499 b 
(0.1593) 
0.0474 
CAPEXPPP  2.4550 a 
(0.7753) 
0.3571 2.2372 a 
(0.8224) 
0.3140 2.4311 a 
(0.8305) 
0.3308 2.8780 a 
(0.9560) 
0.3043 
ITC  -0.0029 c 
(0.0017) 
-0.0004 -0.0044 a 
(0.0017) 
-0.0006 -0.0055 a 
(0.0017) 
-0.0007 -0.0070 a 
(0.0017) 
-
0.0008 
MTR  1.9590 a 
(0.6147) 
0.2849 1.5458 b 
(0.6299) 
0.2170 1.5004 b 
(0.6355) 
0.2064   
NOL  0.2087 b 
(0.0989) 
0.0300 0.1839 c 
(0.1012) 
0.0256 0.1530  
(0.1024) 
0.0227   
Z-Score  0.0413 a 
(0.0152) 
0.0060 -0.2007 a 
(0.0576) 
-0.0282 -0.1889 a 
(0.0580) 
0.0253 -0.1968 a 
(0.0664) 
-
0.0262 
LR    -0.0600 
(0.2201)) 
-0.0084 -0.1026 
(0.2228) 
-0.0163 1.1398 
(0.2564) 
-
0.0007 
LRZ-Score    0.2621 a 
(0.0570) 
0.0368 0.2506a 
(0.0575) 
0.0331 0.2666 a 
(0.0659) 
0.0332 
LEVHIQ    4.9855 a 
(0.7362) 
0.6998 5.1125a 
(0.7390) 
0.6588 3.8846 a 
(0.7004) 
0.5088 
LEVMIQ    3.4185 a 
(0.5942) 
0.4798 3.8008a 
(0.5902) 
0.4872 2.3241 a 
(0.5459) 
0.3057 
LEVLOQ    2.9885 a 
(0.5832) 
0.4195 3.2855a 
(0.5860) 
0.4101 2.1656 a 
(0.5204) 
0.2799 
TOBINQ    0.3743 b 
(0.1495) 
0.0465 0.3195b 
(0.1482) 
0.0486 0.3857 b 
(0.1689) 
0.0526 
LRTOBINQ    -0.5520 a 
(0.1569) 
-0.0249 -0.5066a 
(0.1559) 
-0.0245 -0.6509 a 
(0.1774) 
-
0.0241 
INCOV  -0.0074 a 
(0.0023) 
-0.0011 -0.0045 c 
(0.0025) 
-0.0006 -0.0048 c 
(0.0025) 
-0.0006 -0.0058 b 
(0.0027) 
-
0.0007 
CASH    1.0567 
(0.8041) 
0.1483 0.3633 
(0.8157) 
-0.0194 -0.2500 
(0.7890) 
0.0294 
HI_LEV    -0.0620 
(0.1850)) 
-0.0087     
CASHHILEV    -2.5403 b 
(1.2324) 
-0.3566 -3.1263 
(1.2503) 
-0.4062   
CASHRDMV        -22.4660c 
(12.4283) 
-
2.6408 
DY        0.0875c 
(0.0508) 
0.0041 
CONVERDEBT  -0.7697 a 
(0.2190) 
-0.1120 -0.7554 a 
(0.2244) 
-0.1060 -0.8894 a 
(0.2273) 
-0.1161 -0.8381 a 
(0.2412) 
-
0.1025 
Year2002  0.6157 a 
(0.1726) 
0.0759 0.6356 a 
(0.1784) 
0.0749 0.6573 a 
(0.1804) 
0.0731 0.7485 a 
(0.2052) 
0.0748 
Year2003  0.5652 a 
(0.1656) 
0.0707 0.5884 a 
(0.1694) 
0.0703 0.6183 a 
(0.1713) 
0.0704 0.5840 a 
(0.1911) 
0.0621 
Year2007        -0.3042c 
(0.1774) 
-
0.0390 
FCRISIS  0.2495 b 
(0.1251) 
0.0346 0.2636 b 
(0.1276) 
0.0351 0.2549 b 
(0.1288) 
0.0343   
CONSTD  -1.1371 
(0.3184) 
-0.2226 -1.2267 a 
(0.3210) 
-0.2387 -1.2159a 
(0.3206) 
-0.2125 -1.2325 a 
(0.3308) 
-
0.2075 
TRANSD  -1.8917 a 
(0.1682) 
-0.3767 -1.9358 a  
(0.1731) 
-0.3790 -1.7107 a 
(0.1763) 
-0.3403 -2.0184 a  
(0.2043) 
-
0.4082 
RETAILD  -1.2759 a 
(0.1399) 
-0.2395 -1.2787 a 
(0.1403) 
-0.2342 -0.9983 a 
(0.1468) 
-0.1654 -0.6688 a 
(0.1718) 
-
0.0962 
SEVD  -1.3273 a 
(0.1510) 
-0.2550 -1.3330 a 
(0.1563) 
-0.2503 -1.1534 a 
(0.1604) 
-0.2096 -1.0289 a 
(0.1792) 
-
0.1780 
INTL DUMMY   0.1784   1.0288a 
(1.1483) 
0.1784  
(Continued) 
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Panel B Summary Statistics (Continued) 
  
  
  
Number of Observation  3852  3852 3852 3409 
Omnibus model test  1560.289  1627.646a 1675.707 1610.319a 
-2 Log likelihood  2894.700  2833.532 2785.472 2255.752 
Cox &Snell R  0.334  0.345 0.353 0.376 
Nagelkerke R  0.486  0.502 0.514 0.555 
Hosmer &Lemeshow test  6.198  12.310 16.158a 6.428 
Percentage correctly classified  83.6a  83.6a 84.0a 85.9a 
K-S test on studentized residuals  0.224 a  0.210a 0.215 a 0.210a 
K-S test on standardized residuals  0.285 a  0.275a 0.231 a 0.320a 
           
a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, respectively.         
82 
 
 
The regressions provide strong support for the agency problem related hypotheses, including 
underinvestment hypothesis and overinvestment hypothesis. In the classic Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
stockholder-bondholder conflict, the conflicts of interest between bondholders and shareholders cause 
higher costs for financing and investments. Hedging internal cash flows can improve corporate capital 
structure of a firm by reducing the costs of external financing, which in turn harmonises financing and 
investment policies (see Froot et al., 1993). This also means that hedgers are less likely to underinvest 
and positive NPV projects will be undertaken are the returns for such investments will go to investors 
rather than lenders. Similarly, hedgers are less likely to engage in non-profitable projects. Consistent with 
the underinvestment hypothesis, the results show that the coefficients for RDMV which proxies for 
growth opportunity and the leverage ratio (LEVTA) are positive and statistically significant (see Equation 
(1)). The marginal effect is an increase in the probability of hedgers of 31.6% and 40.9% respectively. 
This suggests that use of hedgers are more likely to be firms with higher R&D spending and higher level 
of debt. Corporate hedging will reduce the riskiness and variability of the associated internal cash flows 
and in turn reduce underinvestment costs. The weighted average of the length of debts held by a firm, 
DEBTMATU, is highly significant in both models and is positively correlated with hedging. The findings 
are in line with Leland (1998) and suggest that firms with longer debt maturities should have stronger 
incentive to hedge, since they are more likely to face serious stockholder-bondholder conflict. 
 
Bartram et al. (2009) find a negative relation between debt maturity and hedging. This result is in contrast 
to our positive coefficient for DEBTMATU. Prior work also reports a positive relation between debt 
maturity and firm size. Barclay and Smith (1995) find that firm size and bond rating are positively 
correlated with debt maturity. Similarly, Stohs and Mauer (1996) find that firm size is positively 
correlated with debt maturity. Therefore, our positive coefficient for DEBTMATU may simply be because 
the large firm in our sample, generally have longer-term asset maturity, but has nothing to do with the 
agency cost incentive for hedging. We explore this argument by using a dummy variable to take on a 
value of one for total assets above the median, LargeFirm, zero, otherwise. Surprisingly, the coefficient 
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for LargeFirm is not significant. Using the LargeFirm, we construct an interaction term for DEBTMATU 
which relates to size (LargeFirm ×DEBTMATU).  We find that the estimated coefficients for LargeFirm 
×DEBTMATU are all significant and negative in line with Bartram et al. (2009) who to not interact for 
size. So size matters when it comes to the relation between hedging and debt maturity. Small firms with 
longer debt maturity are more likely to engage hedging. By contrast, the increase in the length of debt 
maturity in large firms actually decreases the probability of hedging. The marginal effect is 4.0%. This 
finding could be consistent with the notion that large firms generally have higher credit rating and pay 
lower rate of interest. Large firms which hold more long-term fixed rate borrowings are less exposed to 
change of cash flows from changes in market price. Such firms are less likely to hedge as they have lower 
external financing costs and are less likely to suffer in underinvestment problem. 
 
Conditioned on the firms that have high-growth opportunities, the coefficient for the interaction term for 
LEV × HIQ is positive and significant in the Equation (2). This indicates a tendency for firms to hedge in 
order to reduce costs of underinvestment when the leverage ratio increases. The result is in line with Gay 
and Nam (1998) and Géczy et al. (1997) argument that under investment problem might be a serious 
problem for levered firms with significant growth options. Interestingly, the interaction has the highest 
marginal effect in the model. For the firms whose Tobin’s Q falls into the top one-third of the sample, a 
one percent increase on the total leverage over total assets of a firm yields an significant increase of 70.0 
percent in the probability that a firm uses hedging instruments.  
 
Yet, even if shareholder-bondholder conflict are alleviate, managers may invest in negative NPV projects 
to maximise managers’ personal utility rather than maximise the value of firm. Prior literature that explore 
agency cost incentives for hedging occasionally tests underinvestment with little regard for 
overinvestment problem. Our results provide support for the overinvestment hypothesis in relation to 
hedging. The coefficient for CAPEXPPP is highly significant and positive in both regressions, suggesting 
that firms having higher investment intensity tend to undertake more hedging. The marginal effect is an 
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increase in the probability of hedging of 35.7 percent and 31.4 percent in Equation (1) and Equation (2) 
respectively.  The positive coefficient of FCF shows that high free cash flows contribute to the incentive 
to hedge. A one percent increase in the free cash flows yields a statistically significant increase of 26.6 
percent in the probability that a firm uses hedging instruments. The results consistently provide primarily 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis that firm will hedge if it is holding substantial free cash flows and 
want to reduce the cost of overinvestment. This variable becomes insignificant in Equation (2) following 
the inclusion of interaction term.  
 
Given the importance that prior work attribute to leverage in a hedging domain (Joseph and Hewins, 1997; 
Smith and Stultz, 1985), we interact leverage with different levels of Tobin Q High (HIQ), Medium (MIQ) 
and Low (LOQ). The coefficients for leverage and overinvestment indicator, LEV × LOQ, are positive 
and significant in all cases. For the firms which are very like to face overinvestment problem, that is, a 
low Tobin’s Q, the probability of hedging increases with the rise of total level of leverage. This is 
consistent with Jensen’s argument (1986) that firms using leverage to control overinvestment problem. 
Simultaneously higher level of debt increases the costs of underinvestment and financial distress, which 
provides motives of hedging. Notice that the marginal effect 42.0 percent of LEV × LOQ is smaller than 
the effect of LEV × HIQ. That is, the increase of leverage has stronger effect on hedging for 
underinvestment problem than for overinvestment problem. The plausible explanation is that 
underinvestment problem is caused by costly external financing, whereas overinvestment problem arises 
from excess free cash flows and therefore firms are less concerned about leverage. Firms determine their 
leverage ratio and hedging policy by weighting these costs and benefits against each other.  
 
The few prior studies that examine the underinvestment hypothesis do so simply from the leverage level 
perspective. However, according to the underinvestment hypothesis in the Froot et al. (1993) framework, 
firms will hedge in response to the potential underinvestment cost on the assumption that, hedging has no 
significant impact on the expected level of internal wealth of the firm. The optimal hedge ratio can be 
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negative when investment opportunities are extremely sensitive to the risk variables. More realistically, 
since the supply-side barriers leads to higher costs of using derivative financial instruments (e.g. 
diseconomies and transaction costs of derivatives contract15), it is impossible for low-rated firms to take 
large positions in derivative because of the lower credit risks involved. In that case it may make sense for 
a firm to actually keep its exposure unhedged, so as to have sufficient cash flows when large positive 
NPV investments are required (Froot et al., 1993)16. To substantiate this inference, we interact TOBINQ 
with low rating dummy variable (LR) to examine whether the effect of investment incentive on hedging 
substantially differs across credit ratings. The regression results show that the probability of using hedging 
instruments increase with the Tobin’s Q for high-rated firms. It is consistent with the argument that firms 
engage hedging to limit the possibility that rating fall below certain level which the firm would start 
giving up valuable projects (Nocco and Stulz, 2006). On contrary, Low-rated firms are less likely to hedge, 
nor does Q increase, implying that firms whose credit ratings are lower than BBB tend not to hedge when 
they have greater investment opportunities. The plausible explanation considered is that firms rated below 
BBB are not at investment grade and regarded as having significant speculative characteristics (Standard 
& Poor’s, 2012), and therefore it is difficult and expensive for such firms to engage in financial hedging 
contracts. It is consistent with the notion that the investment motivation for hedging substantially differs 
across different level of credit rating. Bearing in mind that in practice firms make risk management 
decision and other financial decisions simultaneously, the negative sign of the LR × TOBINQ interaction 
term may also due to the debt maturity structure for borrowers with lower rating. Low-rated borrowers 
prefer long-term debt to reduce liquidity risk of short-term debt (Diamond, 1991) while it also introducing 
agency cost at the same time, therefore they hedge to increase debt capacity and to reduce the ex-post 
costs of liquidity risk and financial distress. 
  
                                                          
15 Emerson Electric Co. states in its 2011 10-K statement that their derivatives counterparties can require immediate full 
collateral, if the debt credit ratings fall below pre-established levels. CenterPoint Energy Inc. has similar statement in its 2011 
10-K form that, the firm might be required to post cash collateral under its hedging arrangements if credit rating were 
downgrade. 
16 Specifically, in this study it is the level of positive Tobin’s Q the indicator of whether a firm have large positive NPV investment 
opportunities. 
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The results also provide strong evidence for financial distress hypothesis. The coefficient for CURR is 
negative and significant implying a negative association between liquidity and hedging. This is also 
consistent with theoretical prediction (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot et al., 1993) and the results from prior 
empirical studies (e.g. Nance et al., 1993; Bartram et al., 2009)). The marginal effect is a decrease in the 
probability of hedging of 5.7% and 5.2% respectively. The stronger ability to pay short-term obligations, 
the lower the need to hedge to reduce the expected financial distress. Equation (1) and (2) show that firms 
hedge not only in response to the potential costs of financial distress, but also to increase their debt 
capacity. The coefficients for INCOV are consistently negative and significant in both logit regressions, 
indicating that high level of leverage or relatively low ability to pay off its interest expense contributes to 
the incentive to hedge.  
 
Altman’s Z-score is significant at 1% with a surprisingly positive sign in Equation (1), which is contrary 
to theoretical prediction. However, the coefficient is negative and significant in Equation (2), consistent 
with financial distress hypothesis for hedging. The plausible reason for the change of coefficient sign is 
the inclusion of low credit rating dummy variable and its interaction term with Z-score in the second 
regression. For firms with BBB credit rating or higher, Altman’s Z-score is negatively associated with 
corporate hedging activities. The higher the distress cost is, the more likely a firm engages hedging. And, 
more interesting, the coefficient derived from the interaction term LR × Z-score. This term has positive 
and statistically significant coefficient of 0.2621 (p-value0.01) with a marginal effect of 3.7 percent, 
suggesting a positive relation between Altman’s Z-score and hedging for firms with low ratings. These 
results have three interesting implications. First, when the credit rating below investment grade, firms 
that have better financial state are more likely to use hedging instruments. The possible reason is that such 
firms are highly sensitive to the ongoing uncertainties or the exposure to adverse business, financial, or 
economic conditions. Since credit rating is commonly used appraisal schemes in the financial market 
(Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Hseuh and Kidwell, 1988; Baker and Mansi, 2002) and a low rating 
indicates low credit quality and poor-quality information available, low credit rating also brings 
unfavourable signal to market. Therefore firms have motivations to utilise hedging as a positive signal to 
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the market that the firm is hedging its ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business and financial 
conditions and improving its financial state. Second, high distress costs reduces the tendency of hedging 
in low-rated firms, as the distinction between financial distress and bankruptcy diminishes along with any 
ex-post hedging motivations. This is consistent with Purnanandam’s (2008) predictions of a U-shaped 
relation between financial distress costs and hedging and a negative relation between costs of financial 
distress and hedging for highly leveraged firms. Third, low-rated firms with high risk of financial distress 
are less likely to hedge due to the supply-side barriers of hedging. This evidence is consistent with prior 
research findings that supply-side barriers limit access to hedging (Bodnar et al., 1998; Guntay et al., 
2004). Furthermore, the finding that credit rating influences hedging may explain why theories of hedging 
suggest smaller firms should be more likely to hedge because of their higher riskiness, whereas, empirical 
results show that large firms hedge more than small firms (see Bodnar et al., 2009; Dionne and Triki, 
2013). More importantly, going back to the essence of hedging theory, the evidence empirically supports 
Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) arguments in terms of the cost of financial distress and 
bankruptcy implications. When hedging is costly, hedging can still be beneficial but the total holdings of 
hedging instruments may decrease. The costs of hedging and market price dynamics alters the optimal 
hedging policies of those firms. Prior studies examining hedging motives rarely take the supply-side 
factors and the costs of hedging into account. The evidence from this study suggests that, when hedging 
is much more costly for some firms than others, firms have different hedging policies in response to the 
same hedging motive. 
 
Another interesting finding is from the significant empirical results for taxation hypothesis. The 
coefficient for marginal tax rate (MTR) is positive and statistically significant, which is consistent with 
theoretical prediction (Smith and Stultz, 1985) and the findings from Graham and Rogers (2002). Our 
result suggests that higher expected tax liability motivates firms to hedge. The marginal effect is an 
increase of 28.5 percent in Equation (1) and 21.7 percent in Equation (2). The ITC is statistically 
significant predictor in both regressions as expected, but it is negatively associated with hedging. 
Consistent with Smith and Stulz (1985) argument about tax convexity incentive to hedge, Equation (2) 
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finds that the tax convexity proxy NOL, a zero/one dummy variable where one representing the existent 
of net operating loss carry forwards and zero otherwise, is significantly positive. Notice that MTR has 
higher Wald statistic than NOL, implying that the tax convexity incentive from NOL carryforards is 
behind the effect from overall tax liabilities. This result is also consistent with Graham and Rogers 
(2002)’s findings that firms place more emphases on tax benefit from increased debt capacity by hedging, 
rather than hedge in response to tax function convexity. The relatively small Wald statistic of NOL may 
be able to explain why many empirical studies have insignificant NOL carryforward variable. Our 
evidence implies that firms do hedge in response to tax function convexity, but due to the complexity and 
variety of tax code in practice, it is not as important as debt capacity side factor.  
 
We examine the impact of hedging substitutes on corporate hedging decisions by testing firms’ dividend 
yields and convertible debts over total leverage (CONVERDEBT). Consistent with prediction the 
Equation (1) finds that dividend yield id positively associated with hedging, whereas the convertible debt 
ratio have negative impact on hedging. The results are also in line with Nance et al. (1993) argument. 
Another noticeable result is the cash holding and high leverage ratio dummy variable interaction effect 
on hedging. Haushalter et al. (2007) suggest that a firm may either hold large amount of cash instead or 
use derivatives to protect its growth opportunities and investments. However, the relationship between 
cash holding and hedging can be confounded by endogeneity. As pointed out by Opler et al. (1999), most 
of the variables that are empirically associated with high levels of cash holding are also the variables 
associated with low debt. Our prior results show lower probability of hedging when the leverage level is 
lower. Thus the negative estimation of cash is not sufficient to prove a substitute relationship between 
cash and hedging. We test the relation between hedging and the cash holding, amongst those firms with 
higher leverage level and therefore higher hedging needs. The coefficient of the HI_LEV×CASH is 
significantly negative with the marginal effect of a decrease of 35.7 percent in the probability of hedging. 
The result provides additional evidence for Froot et al. (1993) and Gay and Nam (1998) underinvestment 
hypothesis for hedging. When the costs of external financing is high, investment funds are highly sensitive 
to internal cash flows. For such firms, high level of cash reserve will reduce the motivation for hedging 
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driven by the need to cope with adverse impact of financial price on investment.  The result is also 
consistent with Acharya et al. (2007) argument that cash holding could be an alternative of derivatives if 
they provides with similar benefits. This may occur, for example, firms borrow a lot from the foreign 
markets where financial hedging is not available or too expensive, so that they utilise hedging substitutes 
to reduce the adverse impacts from unhedged risks. 
 
The estimated parameter for STKComp is always significantly positive, suggest that the probability of 
hedging is positively related to the after-tax stock compensation scaled by the total number of employee 
in the firms (STKComp). Managers hedge to reduce the volatility of their compensation packages, which 
is consistent with Rogers (2002) and Knopf et al. (2002). The interaction term of STKComp and free cash 
flows ratio STKComp×FCF exams the interaction effect of stock compensation and overinvestment 
problem on hedging. The coefficient is coefficient significant and positive, which is consistent with prior 
prediction. This is interesting because it provides additional empirical evidence for Stulz (1984) and 
Smith and Stulz (1985) argument of managerial compensation theory for hedging, , which suggests that 
if the payoff is a function of the value of the firm, then hedging can benefit both risk-averse managers 
and the firm. Prior empirical studies (such as Tufano, 1996; Rogers, 2002) which find supporting evidence 
for managerial incentive hypothesis for hedging do not take into account the agency problem. Yet stock-
based compensation schemes should align managers with shareholders’ interests and managers should 
have lower incentives to overinvest. Our evidence is consistent with the theoretical prediction of positive 
relation between free cash flows and stock-based compensation. Since the manager-shareholders conflict 
are severer with the increase of free cash flows, the result suggests that, the motivation for hedging 
increases as the costs of overinvestment problem increases especially when managers receive more stock-
based compensation. The marginal effect is an increase of 4.6 percent on the probability of hedging.  
 
To examine the industry effect, this regression also includes industry indicators based on two-digit SIC 
code. The results show that four industry indicators, CONSTD, TRANSD, RETAILD, and SEVD are 
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significantly (p-value 0.01) negatively associated with derivative usage. Firms in construction industry 
(i.e., SIC codes 1500-1799), transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services industry 
(i.e., SIC codes 4000-4999), retail trade industry (i.e., SIC codes 5200-5999), and services industry (i.e., 
SIC codes 70-89) are less likely to hedge. The corresponding marginal effects are various degree of 
decrease ranging from 22.3 percent to 37.9 percent on the probability of hedging. The results also indicate 
significant difference among industries on corporate hedging policy. These results are partly consistent 
with Mian (1996) and Bertram et al.’s (2008) findings that there are much more non-hedgers than hedgers 
in the construction industry, transportation industry and services industry. This result reflects that such 
firms are likely to have less of an international presence compares with (say) technological firms. 
However, the results are contrary to prior empirical evidence that firms hedge more in the retail trade 
industry and utility industry. 
 
Both of the regressions include year dummies to capture potential macroeconomy impacts on for hedgers 
and non-hedgers and to gain more insights into the corporate hedging behaviour over time. The dummy 
variable of Year2002, Year2003 and FCRISIS are always positive as predicted and statistically significant 
(p-value < 0.10), indicating that corporate hedging decisions were impact during those years and the 
financial crisis. The probability of hedging in the US firms generally increase about 7.0 percent in 2002 
and 2003 and increase about 3.5 percent during 2008-2009 financial crisis years (based on the marginal 
effects in Equation (2). This suggests that firms are more likely to hedge their risk of exposure during the 
period of financial market downturn in response to tightened credit and the increase of cost of external 
financing. It is noticeable that the marginal effect of FCRISIS is much lower than the other two year 
dummies and is almost the lowest among all predictors in the model. 
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5.2.3 International Model 
The baseline model provides an overall view for the determinants of corporate hedging policies amongst 
all sampled firms. However, it does not distinguish between multinationals and local firms that operate 
entirely domestically within hedger/non-hedger group. In fact, multinationals may hedge differently with 
purely domestic firms since purely domestic firms may not have measurable foreign exchange rate 
exposure. Whereas hedging theory is about firms that consciously choose not to hedge despite having risk 
exposures and those that hedge. Not allowing for this distinction may cause distortions in the results. 
 
To better understand corporate hedging decision we re-estimate our logistic regressions using a dummy 
variable of 1 for international firms with risk exposures and 0, otherwise (INTLDUMMY). If the foreign 
involvement of a firm does not influence its hedging decision, the predictor should not be significant in 
the model. Therefore, we test the null hypothesis that there is no difference on the international 
involvement of hedgers and non-hedgers. 
 
Table 5-1 fifth and sixth columns present the regression results of the Equation (3), which includes INTL 
DUMMY as an explanatory variable. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test is not significant at 1% level, 
indicating that Equation (3)’s estimates fit the data at an acceptable level. The results reject the null 
hypothesis stated above. The estimated coefficient of international indicator, INTLDUMMY, is positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level, with a high Wald statistic. It indicates that international indicator 
is an important factor in determining hedging. Firms with foreign involvement are more likely to engage 
derivatives to hedge their risk exposures than firms without foreign involvement. 
 
To better characterise the story, Equation (4) examines US firms hedging policy in more detailed groups. 
Specifically, by excluding purely domestic firms, the model examines the determinants of hedging in the 
group of firms with foreign involvement. So the dependent variable of Equation (4) is the dummy variable 
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of hedging or not and the selection variable is international dummy. Table 5-1 seventh and eighth column 
present the regression results of Equation (4) on the condition that -2 log likelihood are maximised.  
 
Most of the results from this model are consistent with those of the baseline model (in section 5.2.2.) The 
results confirm the role of growth opportunities motive in hedging, and suggests that the holding more 
cash reduces the motivation of financial hedging. Table 5-1 shows that RDMV and TOBINQ are 
significantly positive, indicating that firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to engage 
hedging. R&D spending presents strong influence on US firms’ hedging policy. The marginal effect of 
R&D on hedging is the strongest in the model, with an increase of 60.4 percent on the probability of 
hedging. By contrast, the marginal effect of TOBINQ is much smaller, with just about 4.5 percent increase 
on the likelihood. Dividend yield (DY) is significant (p-value <0.1) and positive (0.088) in this model. 
Considering hedging substitutes, the likelihood of hedging is higher for firms with higher dividend yield, 
if they want to maintain both dividends and investment17. A one percent increase in the dividend yield of 
the firm yields an increase of one percent in the probability that a firm uses hedging instruments. The 
possible reason that dividend yield becomes statistically significant in this model is that firms operating 
internationally generally experience higher variability in their cash flows and therefore exhibit significant 
desire to hedge. Consistent with the positive sign of DY, CASH × RDMV is statistically significant in this 
model and is negatively associated with hedging. It is consistent with the precautionary motive for holding 
cash and suggests that firms choose either to hedge or hold more cash to better protect their growth 
opportunities. This finding are also in line with the second hypothesis of Gay and Nam (1998) that firms 
with high investment opportunities and high level of cash holding will leads to less use of financial 
hedging than similar firms with low cash holding. Notice that the interaction of CASH and high leverage 
dummy variable is not statistically significant in this model. The cash-to-assets ratio does not significantly 
affect hedging policy for the firms with high debt-to-assets ratio. It rejects that hypothesis that high-
                                                          
17 Prior literature such as predicts dividend yield to be a substitute for hedging in two ways. Firms may alter their dividend 
payout policy to avoid default on financial obligations. Other literature (e.g. Aretz and Bartram 2010; Dionne and Triki, 2013) 
points out a negative relation between dividend and hedging, because firms paying out dividends are highly liquid firms and 
have few incentives to hedge. Our regression results support the first prediction. In an unreported regression, the interaction 
term of dividend yield and interest coverage ratio is significantly negative. 
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levered firms hold cash as a substitute for hedging to protect themselves against adverse cash flows shocks. 
The interaction term LR × TOBINQ remains significantly negative, suggesting that low-rated firms tend 
not to hedge when they have greater investment opportunities. The investment incentive for hedging 
substantially differs across different levels of credit rating. The investment tax credit (ITC) is always 
significant but surprisingly negative, notwithstanding the small coefficient and marginal effect. The 
possibility consider is that large number of “zero” value in the investment tax credit variable. 
 
The regression provides further evidence that firms hedge in response to potential costs of financial 
distress. CURR remains negative and significant to hedging at the 1 percentage level. The main effect of 
Z-score is significantly negative and its interaction term with low credit rating dummy variable is 
significantly positive. These results imply that our explanation on the costs of financial distress incentive 
for hedging is robust under international context. Low-rated firms hedge to protect its competition 
position in product market and to take advantage of signalling benefits of hedging.  
 
The results for underinvestment hypothesis are also consistent with prior findings. DEBTMATU and LEV 
× HIQ remains statistically significant and positive as it is in the baseline model. The marginal effect of 
DEBTMATU increase from 2.3 percent to 4.3 percent, but the marginal effect of the interaction term 
weakens from 70.0 percent to 1.7 percent and 51 percent respectively. Comparing with the results from 
the baseline models, regression of the international model also provide additional evidence for the 
overinvestment hypothesis. The coefficients for FCF and CAPEXPPP are significantly positive, and the 
interaction term LEV ×LOQ are positive and significant. The estimated coefficientfor 
FCF×HI_CAPEXPPP is positive and significant, indicating that the overinvestment incentive to hedge 
is significant and positive for those firms with higher costs of overinvestment. In addition, such 
motivation is stronger when free cash flows increases in the firms whose investment intensity is higher 
than the sample median. The marginal effect is an increase of percent on the probability 
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US firms are found to be less likely to hedge in 2007 – the start of the 2008 financial crisis. This is 
surprising, given the fact that interest rate spread widened after mid-2007 (Angelini et al., 2011), and the 
finding that the propensity of hedging becomes stronger with tightened credit and the increase of cost of 
external financing. The possibility considered is that firms speculate on the interest rate movements (see 
Faulkender, 2005). Notice that the marginal effect of the dummy variable is just 3.9 percent, and its Wald 
statistic is also relatively small. This indicating that this year dummy is a less important predictor amongst 
others. FCRISIS, which is significant in the baseline model, is not significant in the Equation (4). This is 
consistent with the notion that international firms are large enough to engage operational hedging and 
natural hedge in their risk management programmes to bear the tightened credit. The evidence suggests 
that international firms have greater propensity of undertaking hedging because they have significant 
exposures, but their hedging policy is less likely to be affected by the economic downturn.  
 
 
5.2.4 International Hedgers v.s. Domestic Non-hedgers 
 
The euqations in previous sections present a comprehensive view of the determinants of hedging amongst 
U.S. non-financial firms. Equation (1) and Equation (2) includes both international and domestic firms. 
Equation (4) distinguishes between firms with international operation and those that do not to provide 
more robust insights on the corporate hedging behaviour. This section intends to examine the hedging 
decisions between international hedgers and domestic non-hedgers. The dependent dummy variable is 
coded as 1 for multinational hedgers with risk exposures and 0 for domestic non-hedgers. Theoretically, 
purely domestic firms may choose not to hedge because they are much less exposed. International firms 
are significantly exposed to variety of risk. Tus international firms chose to hedge and seek to mitigate 
exposures to an acceptable lesser extent to which similar with the level of exposure the domestic non-
hedgers undertake. Therefore we should expect the model shows insignificant results for most of 
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predictors. Table 5-2 presents the estimated regression results of the third logistic model using the method 
of maximum -2 log likelihood.  
 
The LogTA is reasonably statistically significant at 5% level, since firms operating internationally 
generally larger than purely domestic firms. It is not surprising to find that STKComp is significantly 
positive, since multinational firms generally pay higher compensation to their managers. The coefficient 
for the operating loss carryforwards (NOL) dummy variable has a significantly positive coefficient, while 
the marginal tax rate (MTR) is statistically insignificant. It is noticeable that the coefficient for ITC which 
is negative in our previous models is positive in this model and is statistically significant. The positive 
coefficients for NOL and ITC are consistent with the prediction and suggest that the multinational firms 
have greater tax-based incentive to hedge. The change on the sign of ITC coefficient may due to the 
significant reduction on the zero-value cases, corroborating our prior inference on the negative ITC 
coefficient. The fact that tax preference items are significant in the model while the simulated marginal 
tax rate is not may suggest market imperfection and difference between tax return data and financial 
statement data (see Graham and Mills, 2008). The tax preference items incurred from foreign operations 
cannot reduce US tax liabilities. Firms operating internationally and firms operating domestically face 
different tax functions, and such differences cannot be eliminated through financial hedging. The results 
also imply that managers of purely domestic firms and multinational firms have different emphasis when 
making actual hedging decisions. 
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Table 5-2 Logistic regression results 
Equation (5) Equation (6) Equation (7) Equation (8) 
Variables  Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
Constant   -1.5985 
(0.8469) 
 -1.5879 
(0.9727) 
 -3.5924a 
(1.0232) 
 -4.0439a 
(1.0756) 
 
LogTA   -0.6907c 
(0.3969) 
-0.0035 0.8798a 
(0.2273) 
0.0034     
LogMV  1.4616a 
(0.3387) 
0.0073       
DEBTMATU      0.3343b 
(0.1442) 
0.0671 0.3988b 
(0.1630) 
0.0773 
FCF  8.2507a 
(1.6723) 
0.0413 7.9902a 
(1.6529) 
0.0310     
DY      -0.1830 b 
(0.0774) 
-0.0368 -0.2106a 
(0.0813) 
-0.0408 
STKComp  0.8231 c 
(0.2346) 
0.0041 0.8142a 
(0.2312) 
0.0032 0.8787 a 
(0.2754) 
0.1765 0.9800 a 
(0.2872) 
0.1900 
CAPEXPPP  4.1983 a 
(1.4433) 
0.0210 4.4169 a 
(1.4127) 
0.0171   3.3930c 
(1.8108) 
0.6578 
ITC  0.0148 b 
(0.0068) 
-0.0001 -0.0147 b 
(0.0067) 
-0.0001 0.0186a 
(0.0070) 
0.0037 0.0219a 
(0.0073) 
0.0043 
MTR     
 
 3.6511b 
(1.7066) 
0.7333 2.9810c 
(1.7434) 
0.5779 
NOL  0.6966a 
(0.2140) 
0.0034 0.6429a 
(0.2103) 
0.0024     
Z-SCORE  -0.0828 b 
(0.0371) 
-0.0004 -0.2095 a 
(0.0666) 
-0.0008   0.1353c 
(0.0744) 
0.0262 
LR    -0.9231 
(0.3327) 
-0.0042     
LRZ-Score    0.2090 a 
(0.0656) 
0.0008     
LEVTA  4.6012a 
(0.7793) 
   5.7043a 
(0.9957) 
1.1456   
LEVHIQ    10.5144 a 
(1.9932) 
0.0408   8.4769 a 
(2.2447) 
1.6433 
LEVMIQ    4.4316a 
(0.5459) 
0.0172   7.6082a 
(1.2690) 
1.4749 
LEVLOQ    2.6685 a 
(0.7703) 
0.0104   6.2287 a 
(1.1662) 
1.2075 
TOBINQ      0.4421c 
(0.2443) 
0.0888   
RDMV  21.0593a 
(7.0382) 
0.1055 23.3839c 
(6.6914) 
0.0908     
CASH  5.6428a 
(1.5464) 
0.0283 6.6535 
(1.6068) 
0.0258 -11.9046 a 
(3.4826) 
-2.3908 -12.2534a 
(3.6205) 
-2.3754 
CONVERDEBT  2.6246 a 
(0.8317) 
0.0131 -2.3926 a 
(0.8366) 
-0.0093     
FCRISIS      0.6068c 
(0.3535) 
0.1111 0.7598b 
(0.3606) 
0.1302 
TRANSD  -2.0512 a 
(0.3500) 
-0.0257 -2.2839 a  
(0.3554) 
-0.0252     
RETAILD  -2.5843 a 
(0.2648) 
-0.0423 -2.5116 a 
(0.2646) 
-0.0310 -0.8270a 
(0.3220) 
-0.1735 -1.0677a 
(0.3392) 
-0.2193 
SEVD  -2.2963 a 
(0.3150) 
-0.0353 -2.2443 a 
(0.3159) 
-0.0262 -1.1607a 
(0.4456) 
0.3717 -1.8776a 
(0.4680) 
-0.4275 
      
Panel B Summary Statistics 
  
  
      
Number of Observation 2805  2805 434 434 
Omnibus model test 399.999  418.279a 180.331a 193.389a 
-2 Log likelihood 844.063  825.663 387.705 374.647 
Cox &Snell R 0.133  0.139 0.340 0.360 
Nagelkerke R 0.371  0.387 0.466 0.493 
Hosmer &Lemeshow test 7.091  5.392 6.033 5.242 
Percentage correctly classified 94.4a  94.6a 79.3 80.2 
K-S test on studentized residuals 0.364 a  0.367a 0.133a 0.125a 
K-S test on standardized residuals 0.435 a  0.437a 0.153a 0.151a 
a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, 
respectively.  
       
 
 
 
99 
 
The coefficient for RDMV is significant positive, confirm the prior finding that firms operating 
internationally hedge to cope with the adverse impact of variability in the cash flows on their growth 
opportunities. The results for underinvestment and overinvestment hypotheses are mixed. The coefficient 
for assets tangibility measure by FATA and debt maturity is insignificant at 10% level. In contrast, LEV 
×HIQ, LEV × LOQ and FCF are statistically significant at 1% level.  
 
The evidence in Table 5-2 also shows that the liquidity variables are statistically insignificant, whereas 
the coefficients of financial distress proxies, Z-score, LR, and Z-score× LR, remain statistically significant. 
The negative sign of LR and Z-score suggest that domestic firms that do not engage hedging have lower 
ratings but lower costs of financial distress. Considering that purely domestic firms are rarely exposed to 
the fluctuations in foreign exchange rate, it is not surprising that they have less pressure on liquidity and 
lower costs of financial distress.  
 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to distinguish between hedgers with international involvement 
and specifically allowing for non-hedgers operating domestically on influencing corporate hedging 
decisions. Purely domestic firms normally have less variability in the cash flows generated by assets in 
place. Multinational firms face more financial exposures and therefore more volatile if not hedge. In the 
world of capital market imperfection, this variability in internal cash flows, in turn, results in both 
variability in the amount of investment spending and the costs of external financing. Thus multinational 
firms have motivations to engage hedging to mitigate exposures to be less risky like purely domestic non-
hedgers. The mixed results on investment-based and financial distress costs hypothesis for hedging 
suggest that multinational firms cannot eliminate but can mitigate variability of cash flows to an 
acceptable level through financial hedging. In other words, financial hedging is not a perfect solution for 
managing financial price risks. Accordingly, firms may utilise alternative techniques, such as issuing 
convertible debt or retaining high level of cash stock. Consistently, the regression finds that 
CONVERDEBT and CASH is significantly positive in the model. 
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5.2.5 Domestic Hedgers v.s. Domestic Non-hedgers 
 
Since multinationals conduct business in different countries, their net revenue and profitability are 
affected by adverse market and economic conditions. Since purely domestic firms do not operate 
internationally they are not exposed to measurable financial risk would not be exposed, except in terms 
of commodity prices. Such firms would also have fewer substitute options to financial hedging. The 
limited geographic concentration means that the ability to diversify financial risk is limited. In that case 
it may make sense for domestic firms to manage market risk differently. Therefore it is important to 
examine the determinants of corporate hedging decision among purely domestic firms and multinationals. 
So the dependent variable of Equation (7) and Equation (8) is a binary variable which equals to 1 if a 
domestic firm hedges, 0 otherwise.  
 
Table 5-2 Equation (7) and (8) presents the regression results. Overall, the diagnostic tests show 
reasonably good performance for the logistic models. Regression results provide mixed empirical 
evidence compared to the baseline model and international models. One plausible reason is the relatively 
smaller sample size. There are only about 44 domestic firms in total in our sample, 16 of which are non-
hedgers and 28 are hedgers. Secondly, domestic firms should be less exposed, and therefore their 
incentives to hedge are not as strong as multinational firms. Nevertheless, this model still provides 
interesting evidence for the corporate hedging behaviour. 
 
The results show that domestic firms hedge to reduce costs of underinvestment problem. DEBTMATU 
and LEVTA are both significantly positive, indicating that domestic firms with higher and longer debts 
have stronger propensity to hedge. LEV × HIQ is consistently significant and positive. The coefficient of 
101 
 
CAPEXPPP and LEV × LOQ are positive and statistically significant, but FCF is not significant, 
providing mixed evidence for overinvestment incentive. It is noticeable that domestic model is the only 
one model that finds insignificant estimate of FCF. The evidence suggests that firms hedge to reduce 
underinvestment costs. Overinvestment costs provides weak motives for domestic firms. This is not 
surprising since monitoring multinational firms are more costly due to the complexity of their business 
operations and information asymmetry (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003; Lin et al., 2009). Multinational firms 
are more sensitive to higher agency costs than domestic firms, and therefore have greater desire of 
hedging. The situation arises because of the higher financial risks posed by the impacts of the variability 
in financial markets on firm value and cash flows. This finding supports the notion that hedging lowers 
information asymmetry and the costs of related agency problems. It also implies that hedging should be 
more beneficial for multinational firms.  
 
The evidence in Table 5-2 suggests that domestic firms utilise hedging instruments to mitigate costs of 
financial distress. It is noticeable that the coefficient of DY is significantly negative. The negative sign is 
opposite to the hypothesis that firms alter their dividend payout policy to ease the concern over financial 
distress. On the other hand, it is in line with the prediction of negative association between dividend yield 
and hedging, since only highly liquid firms can commit themselves to paying out dividends. Credit rating 
does not influence domestic firms’ hedging policy. Neither the continuous variable of the S&P long-term 
domestic issuer credit rating (SPRATING) nor the low-rating dummy variable LR is significant in the 
model.  
 
 Consistent with taxation hypothesis, the estimates of investment tax credit (ITC) and simulated marginal 
tax rate (MTR) are both significantly positive. The marginal effect is an increase of 0.4 percent and 57.8 
percent respectively on the probability of use hedging instruments. This suggests that domestic US firms 
hedge price risks in response to tax-based incentives. Domestic firms may also utilise other means as 
substitutes of financial hedging. The tests show that the coefficient of CASH is always negative and 
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statistically significant, whereas the coefficient of CONVERDEBT is not significant. The results suggest 
that domestic firms tend to hold more cash rather than to issue convertible debts to avoid the costs of 
accessing capital markets. The 2008-2009 financial crisis dummy FCRISIS is positive and statistically 
significant, consistent with prior prediction in Chapter 3. Purely domestic firms have strong incentive to 
hedge during the periods of economic downturn, since domestic firms cannot diversify the adverse impact 
from domestic economy, and therefore are more sensitive to market volatility.   
 
 
 
5.2.6 Foreign Exchange Hedging 
 
Next, we examine the use of currency derivatives for a sample of U.S. firms that have ex ante exposure 
to foreign exchange rate risk. The dependent variable is a binary variable which equals to 1 if a firm hedge 
its foreign exchange rate exposures, 0 otherwise. The selection variable is the dummy variable of foreign 
exchange rate exposure. Logistic regressions are estimated using linear variable only (Equation (9)) and 
including both linear and interaction terms (Equation (10)). The results are shown in Table 5-3. The p-
value for goodness of fit is 0.066 and 0.300 for Equation (9) and (10) respectively, indicating that the 
model fit the data at acceptable level.  
 
Consistent with hypothesis and the results in the previous models, Table 5-3 shows that the coefficient 
for RDMV is significantly positive. US firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to hedge 
their foreign exchange rate (FX) exposures. DEBTMATU and its squared term is statistically significant 
in Equation (10). The positive coefficient of DEBTMATU is consistent with underinvestment problem 
hypothesis. The marginal effect is an increase of 10.3 percent in the probability of currency hedging. The 
negative coefficient of the squared term of debt maturity (SQDEBTMATU) suggests a nonmonotonic 
103 
 
relation between debt maturity and hedging. The possible explanation is that, because most firms normally 
hold hedging instruments normally in short term to medium term, at extremely long maturity, the marginal 
benefit of hedging decreases and thus firm loses risk management incentive. This finding is also consistent 
with the negative interaction term LargeFirm ×DEBTMATU. The coefficient for the interaction term LEV 
× HIQ is not significant. This finding is surprising as, according to underinvestment problem hypothesis, 
firms with valuable investment opportunities and more debts should have greater motivation to reduce 
the volatility of their foreign cash flows.  
 
The overinvestment problem hypothesis is supported because the coefficient of free cash flow ratio is 
significantly positive at 5% in Equation (9) and its interaction with dummy variable for low Tobin’s Q is 
significant and positively related with FX hedging in Equation (10). The investment intensity is also 
positively related with FX hedging. Again, the results indicate that firms which are expected to have high 
overinvestment problem are more likely to use currency derivatives to eliminate high expected agency 
costs of equity. It is noticeable that the interaction term FCF × LOQ is significantly positive and has the 
strongest marginal effect 75.9 percent in the model, implying that the use of FX hedging instruments is 
very sensitive to the increase of free cash flows when the expected costs of overinvestment is high. By 
contrasts, the marginal effects of underinvestment proxies are much smaller. Given that the fact that the 
corresponding interaction term for underinvestment problem, LEV × HIQ, is insignificant, the finding 
that the results present strong hedging motivation for overinvestment problem and relatively mild 
motivation for underinvestment problem is interesting. The plausible explanation is that multinational 
firms are more difficult to monitor. The result reflects the concern over overinvestment problem with the 
growing cash holding in US firms and the large amount of cash held by foreign subsidiaries in recent 
years (Bates et al, 2009). 
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Table 5-3 Logistic regression results for FX hedging and IR hedging 
Equation (9) Equation (10) Equation (11) Equation (12) 
Variables  Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
Constant   -8.0759a 
(0.4488) 
 -8.8309a 
(0.5201) 
 -4.4339a 
(0.4292) 
 -5.7655a 
(0.4893) 
 
LogTA   2.2656a 
(0.1202) 
0.5619 2.5610a 
(0.1298) 
0.6369 0.9299a 
(0.0914) 
0.2317 1.0168a 
(0.0976) 
0.2535 
FATA  -1.3977a 
(0.2118) 
-0.3466 -1.4556a 
(0.2180) 
-0.3620 -1.3013a 
(0.2071) 
-0.3242 -0.9919a 
(0.2005) 
-0.2473 
DEBTMATU    0.4150b 
(0.1694) 
0.1032 0.0782c 
(0.0413) 
0.0195 0.9173a 
(0.1717) 
0.2287 
SQDEBTMATU    -0.0636b 
(0.0280)) 
-0.0158   -0.1350a 
(0.0269) 
-0.0337 
FCF  1.6005b 
(1.6723) 
0.3969 -0.0901 
(0.9211) 
-0.0224   1.5666c 
(0.8116) 
0.3905 
DY       0.0676b 
(0.0286) 
0.0168 0.0501c 
(0.0281) 
0.0125 
STKComp  -0.0194 c 
(0.0103) 
-0.0048 -0.1103a 
(0.0246) 
-0.0274 0.0248 a 
(0.0097) 
0.0062 0.0255 b 
(0.0100) 
0.0064 
FCFSTKComp    1.0092a 
(0.2414) 
0.2510     
CAPEXPPP    1.5270c 
(0.7842) 
0.0171 1.4426b 
(0.6719) 
0.3594 1.8107b 
(0.7211) 
0.4514 
CURR  -0.3102a 
(0.0557) 
-0.0769 -0.3545a 
(0.0624) 
-0.0882 -0.2602a 
(0.0566) 
-0.0648 -0.2002a 
(0.5985) 
-0.0499 
IRC  -0.0110a 
(0.0021) 
-0.0027 -0.0091a 
(0.0024) 
-0.0023 -0.0139a 
(0.0023) 
-0.0035 -0.0132a 
(0.0024) 
-0.0033 
MTR     
 
 1.6514a 
(0.5361) 
0.4114 1.6990a 
(0.5386) 
0.4236 
NOL  0.4629a 
(0.0898) 
0.1140 0.0221 
(0.2263) 
0.0055 -0.1314c 
(0.0794) 
-0.0327 -0.1766b 
(0.0798) 
-0.0440 
Z-Score  0.0604a 
(0.0117) 
0.0150 0.0705a 
(0.0136) 
-0.0175 0.0602a 
(0.0138) 
0.0150 0.0537a 
(0.0134) 
0.0134 
SPRATING  0,0288b 
(0.0115) 
0.0072   0.0683a 
(0.0105) 
0.0170 0.0497a 
(0.0109) 
0.0124 
LEVTA      2.2494a 
(0.2977) 
0.5604   
LEVHIQ        1.9229 a 
(0.3939) 
0.4794 
LEVMIQ        1.7285a 
(0.3510) 
0.4309 
LEVLOQ        3.2167 a 
(0.3737) 
0.8019 
FCFLOQ    3.0537b 
(1.3367) 
0.7594   -5.2759a 
(1.4070) 
-1.3153 
RDMV  2.0593b 
(0.9156) 
0.1055 1.8167b 
(0.9091) 
0.4518 1.2640b 
(0.5741) 
0.3149   
ROA  0,9809 
(0.6124) 
0.2433 2.4841a 
(0.8523) 
0.6178 1.8229b 
(0.5956) 
0.4541 1.2562b 
(0.6255) 
0.3132 
LogPTI    -0.2474a 
(0.0805) 
-0.0615     
NOLLogPTI    0.1651c 
(0.0865) 
0.0410     
CASH  2.7690a 
(0.6268) 
0.6867 2.0519a 
(0.7114) 
0.5103 -2.0392a 
(0.6085) 
-0.5080 -1.6297a 
(0.5985) 
-0.4063 
CASHHILEV    2.1096b 
(0.8656) 
0.5246     
CONVERDEBT  -0.5187b 
(0.2106) 
-0.1286 -0.7195a 
(0.2236) 
-0.1789 -0.9258a 
(0.2151) 
-0.2307 -1.0293a 
(0.2164) 
-0.2566 
BETA      0.0049c 
(0.0028) 
0.0012   
Year2002  0.231 
(0.1545) 
0.0567       
CONSTD        -0.8256b 
(0.4097) 
-0.1993 
TRANSD  -1.5907 a 
(0.1820) 
-0.3645 -1.8091 a  
(0.1860) 
-0.4004   -0.4126a 
(0.1256) 
-0.1028 
RETAILD  -0.6973 a 
(0.1772) 
-0.1722 -0.7298 a 
(0.1794) 
-0.1796     
SEVD  -0.7097 a 
(0.1811) 
-0.1752 -0.8596 a 
(0.1856) 
-0.2098     
MANUFD  0.6394 a 
(0.1408) 
0.1574 0.6338a 
(0.1402) 
0.1564 
Panel B Summary Statistics 
  
  
      
Number of Observation 3428  3410 3666 3666 
Omnibus model test 1451.654a  1492.900a 1115.852a 1185.415a 
-2 Log likelihood 3280.211  3211.346 3946.694 4011.159 
Cox &Snell R 0.345  0.355 0.262 0.270 
Nagelkerke R 0.461  0.474 0.351 0.361 
Hosmer &Lemeshow test 14.671c  10.686 12.413 6.443 
Percentage correctly classified 76.6a  76.4a 73.6a 73.2 
K-S test on studentized residuals 0.102 a  0.099a 0.154a 0.161a 
K-S test on standardized residuals 0.083 a  0.080a 0.123a 0.133a 
           a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, respectively.         
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The table also shows that NOL remains positively related to the FX hedging, consistent with the tax-based 
findings in prior sections. And, more interestingly, its interaction term with pre-tax income (LogPTI) is 
statistically significant in Equation (10). This result suggests that with the existence of tax preference 
items, firms that have higher taxable income have higher propensity to hedge FX exposures. Consistently, 
ROA is also positively significant at 1% level in Equation (9), suggesting that a firm with better 
performance are more likely to execute FX hedging to protect its earnings. However, we find no evidence 
that the simulated book marginal tax rate significantly affects the use of FX derivatives. 
 
While the evidence in Table 5-3 shows that liquidity and the ability to meet interest payment obligations 
is negatively related with FX hedging, the coefficient for the Altman’s Z-Score is significantly positive. 
The coefficient of bond rating is significant and positive in Equation (9), too. This is surprising, because 
the financial distress based argument suggests that low-rated firms and firms with high distress risk have 
greater desire of hedging their FX exposures. The result is similar to the Equation (1) in the earlier section, 
but in the previous section, the coefficient of Z-score changes to negative after including the significant 
low bond rating dummy variable (LR) in Equation (2). This does not appear to occur, however, in either 
Equation (9) or Equation (10). Therefore there is no evidence that the positive sign of Z-score is biased. 
By contrast, the continuous bond rating variable (SPRATING) is significant and positive in Equation (9), 
and Z-score remains significantly positive in Equation (10), consistent with the positive sign in Equation 
(9). The finding challenge financial distress hypothesis but suggests that firms with high financial distress 
risks are less likely to engage FX hedging. Though the results offers some support for costs of financial 
distress theory for hedging, it also raises the question as to whether the economies of scale and distress 
costs hypothesis are jointly effective in practice.  
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5.2.7 Interest Rate Hedging 
 
This section examines the determinants of corporate hedging when US firms use interest rate risk 
derivatives only. The comparison is between firms that hedge their interest rate exposures and those do 
not. The dependent variable is a dummy variable of the use of interest rate derivative. Interest rate hedging 
is largely associated with debt issuance, whereas many FX hedging aims to reduce the transaction-based 
exposures Therefore, we expect that debt-related evidence is stronger in this model. The fifth and sixth 
column of Table 5-3 provides the results for Equation (11) which omits nonlinear and interaction effects. 
The last two columns report the results for Equation (12), which includes curvilinear and interaction 
effects. 
 
Table 5-3 shows leverage ratio (LEVTA) and debt maturity (DEBTMATU) are significantly positive. The 
results suggests that firms with more debts and debts with longer maturity have greater desire of IR 
hedging. And, noticeably, the marginal effect of LEVTA, an increase of 56.0 percent in the probability of 
using interest rate derivatives, is the highest effect in the Equation (11). In addition, the marginal effects 
of LEVTA and DEBTMATU on IR hedging are larger than the effects on FX hedging. This finding is 
consistent with Belghitar et al. (2008) evidence in the UK. Among all models in our analysis on US firms, 
the marginal effects of the two leverage variables in IR models are the strongest. The costs of financial 
distress from change of interest rate provides stronger motivation on using interest rate instruments than 
other types of hedging instruments18. 
 
Table 5-3 also shows that CONVERDEBT and DY are both significant in Equation (11) and (12). The 
negative coefficient for convertible debt and the positive sign of dividend yield are consistent with 
                                                          
18 The results shows very strong leverage incentives of using IR derivatives. Though it offers support for costs of financial distress 
theory for hedging, it also raise question that are the positive correlation between leverage and use of IR derivatives driven by 
the large benefits from successful speculation (see Faulkender, 2005; Chernenko and Faulkender, 2011). This will be further 
discussed later in this section. 
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hedging substitute hypothesis. Notice that the marginal effect of convertible debt on IR hedging is much 
stronger than the effect by altering dividend payout policy. This may be because IR hedging aims to 
reduce the interest rate exposure to firm’s debt obligations.  
 
Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) argue that the use of derivatives for hedging not change significantly 
from year to year, assuming that a firm’s exposure to interest rate risk of their operations is stable over 
time. Consistent with this argument, the regressions shows no year dummy variable is statistically 
significant in the model. IR model is the only model finds significant estimate for stock price sensitivity 
measurement (BETA). The positive coefficient indicates that firms which are more sensitive to market 
risk are more likely to engage IR hedging. This is not surprising, given the common notion that firms 
engage hedging aiming to reduce the adverse impact from market prices fluctuation on the firm. 
 
 
5.3 Conclusion and Implications 
 
The study employs logistic regression to examine possible determinants for corporate hedging decision. 
Apart from the baseline model, we examine hedging behaviour in more detail according to specific groups. 
The baseline model provides an overall view for the determinants of corporate hedging policies amongst 
all sampled firms. Section 5.2.2 examines the determinants of hedging only amongst multinationals. 
Section 5.2.3 examines the hedging decisions amongst firms that operate in different context, and Section 
5.2.4 tests the determinants of corporate hedging decision among domestic firm, apart from multinationals. 
These tests, together, help to gain robust insights on the determinants of corporate hedging decision. 
Overall, the conclusions for most of hypotheses from previous section are unaffected by the alternative 
proxies and models. Compared the results in the four models, we conclude that multinational firms do 
behave differently with domestic firms on the derivatives use for hedging, but that does not change the 
majority of our conclusions on the determinants for hedging. The last two sections examines corporate 
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hedging behaviour by types of risk exposures. Firms appear to place different emphasis on different type 
of hedging.  
 
The study finds that larger firms are more likely to use derivatives, implying the existence of economies 
of scale in the costs for establishing and managing a hedging program. LogTA is shown to be significant 
and positive in the most of the models except Equation (7) and (8). Economies of scales also appears to 
lead to higher probability of hedging because the transaction is less costly. Low rated firms having high 
financial distress risk may not be able to use derivatives because the costs of hedging is too high. 
Nevertheless, the study finds strong evidence consistent with financial distress hedging. The liquidity 
condition of a firm is negatively correlated with corporate hedging activity, whereas the high expected 
costs of financial distress provides significant incentive for hedging. When the simultaneity of credit 
rating and leverage is controlled, we find that the credit rating on the debt and the costs of financial 
distress interactively determine hedging decision of the firm. In the case of low rated firms may also 
hedge as signalling to market and investors. This is in line with DeMarzo and Duffie (1995).  When 
hedging is costly, market price dynamics affects the total benefits from holding derivatives and thus the 
optimal hedging policy. 
 
The study finds evidence consistent with underinvestment problem hypothesis. Conflicts of interest 
between bondholders and stockholders and high expected cost of underinvestment provide strong 
incentive to hedge. The incentive is even stronger among the firms with high Tobin’s Q, and it is robust 
in alternative models. The results also suggest that, it is important and more precise to identify firms 
which are more likely to encounter underinvestment problem to test underinvestment hypothesis. 
 
While many previous studies just examine the agency costs on underinvestment, the models also provide 
strong evidence on another less well-explored hypothesis, alleviating the overinvestment problem through 
hedging. It is proved that the empirical evidence supporting overinvestment are robust. Firms which face 
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low underinvestment costs but high expected overinvestment costs hedge to alleviate overinvestment 
problem, regardless of whether the firm is multinational or the type of hedging. 
 
Following Smith and Stulz (1985) taxation argument for hedging, we also find that firms hedge in 
response to tax convexity and managerial risk aversion. The different proxies used to test taxation 
hypothesis are all statistically significant. Due to the limited access of database we do not use alternative 
proxy for managerial risk aversion and managerial compensation, but we tested the hypothesis in different 
models. Almost all models tested provide consistent evidence that derivative usage is positively related 
with the level of stock compensation in the firm, except the evidence for FX hedging model. 
 
Our study also presents important insights into the influence of industry conditions and macroeconomic 
environment on corporate hedging decision over time. While the results for industry indicators are mixed, 
the results for the year dummies suggest that different economic environment influences corporate 
hedging decision differently.  
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CHAPTER 6                                                                     
Determinants of Derivatives Usage in amongst U.K. firms 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The results in the previous chapter provide consistent evidence with most of theoretical explanations for 
corporate hedging under imperfect markets. However, those theoretical explanations may not be support 
in financial markets that are subject to different regulatory and accounting arrangements. To illustrate, 
for example, Hakkarainen et al (1998) show that unlike UK and US firms, Finnish firms places more 
emphasis on accounting than transaction exposure, a focus that was influenced by the tax arrangement in 
Finland. This means that the tax considerations when hedging would be more important for Finnish firms 
compared to the UK or US firms. Similarly, Judge (2006) show that financial distress costs factor has 
stronger influence on corporate hedging for the UK compared to the financial distress factor for the US 
firms. Whilst, the accounting and financial regulations in the UK are more closely aligned with those of 
the US than (say) Finland, it is well know that the US accounting regulations are rules based whereas, 
those of the UK are principles based. Koutmos and Martin (2003) argue that firms respond asymmetrically 
to exchange rate movements. and Clark and Mefteh (2011) find that the exposures with respect to the US 
dollar and non-USD currencies are asymmetric and different. This differnence and other differences can 
give risk to the differences in our results for US and the UK and as such makes a case for also examining 
corporate hedging motives for the UK firms. This chapter attempts to investigate and provide evidence 
for UK non-financial firms on both the determinants of corporate hedging and the choice of types of 
derivatives. By providing additional evidence from the UK, this chapter facilitates comparisons with our 
results from the US sample but also the extant empirical literature. 
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Before discussing the empirical results in detail, some broad observations are in order. The results from 
this study provide strong support for several explanations for corporate hedging. All the logistic 
regression models provide a good fit to the data based on the Hosmer and Lemeshow significance 
statistics, classificatory efficiency statistics, and other measures. Another feature of the logistic 
regressions is the fact that they not only provide strong evidence to support nearly all theories for hedging, 
but also provide consistent results and new evidence for the recently published literature about corporate 
hedging. The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 provides the logistic regressions for the 
determinants of corporate hedging. Section 6.3 provides conclusion of the empirical evidence and its 
implications. 
 
 
6.2 Multivariate Analysis – Binary Logistic Analysis 
 
6.2.1 Baseline Model 
 
This baseline logistic regression is estimated for all the firms in the sample regardless if a firm operates 
internationally or domestically. We estimate the coefficients of this logistic regression model using the 
method of maximum -2 log likelihood, with the results reported in the Table 6-1. The sample size drops 
due to missing values on accounting data. The first two columns report the regression omitting nonlinear 
variables and the third and fourth columns reports the regression with both linear and curvilinear effects. 
Overall, the result provides strong evidence for most of the theories. The -2 log likelihood of Equation 
(13) and Equation (14) is 1942.184 and 1984.729 respectively. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test of both 
models are not significant (p-value > 0.10), indicating the statistical goodness-of-fit of the models. The 
omnibus statistics are significant (p-value  0.01) suggesting that the coefficients of the logistic 
regressions besides the intercept are significant. The overall percentage of cases that are correctly 
predicted by the logistic model is 83.9% and 84.2% respective, which show strong predictive power.  
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Table 6-1 Logistic regression results for Baseline Model 
    Equation (13)     Equation (14) 
Variables   Coefficient ME WS    Coefficient ME WS 
         
Constant  -8.3136a  207.442  -8.7467a  261.526 
  (0.579)    (0.541)   
DY  0.1573a 0.0236 27.492  0.1447a 0.0265 24.225 
  (0.030)    (0.029)   
LogTA  0.6490a 0.0973 186.127  0.6612a 0.121 229.610 
  (0.048)    (0.044)   
FATA  -0.2120a -0.0318 10.514  -0.1189 -0.0218 2.118 
  (0.066)    (0.082)   
RDTA  0.2881a 0.0432 79.288  0.2428a 0.0444 66.563 
  (0.032)    (0.030)   
DEBTMATU  0.1391a 0.0209 13.535  0.1702a 0.0311 16.451 
  (0.038)    (0.042)   
DEBTMATU×FATA      -0.0566c -0.0104  
      (0.034)   
Z-Score  0.1276b 0.0191 6.165  0.0687 0.0126 1.764 
  (0.052)    (0.052)   
INCOV  -0.0034c -0.0005 2.836     
  (0.020)       
CURR  -0.1739a -0.0261 18.816  -0.1162a -0.0213 10.406 
  (0.040)    (0.036)   
Year2002  0.7543b 0.0896 3.836  0.6979c 0.1062 3.261 
  (0.385)    (0.386)   
INDUS  0.5772a 0.0810 16.542  0.5554a 0.0962 15.478 
  (0.142)    (0.141)   
CONSUMG  0.5943a 0.0763 7.679  0.7287a 0.1131 11.224 
  (0.215)    (0.218)   
CONSUMS  0.7392a 0.0902 7.455  0.8981a 0.1321 10.554 
  (0.271)    (0.276)   
TELECOM  -0.9738a -0.1874 7.580  -1.0266a -0.2271 7.965 
  (0.355)    (0.364)   
UTILIT  -1.2403 -0.2512 6.218  -1.3343a -0.3038 8.157 
  (0.496)    (0.467)   
LTDTA  -0.0475b -0.0071 4.726     
  (0.022)       
LEVTA  1.0345a 0.1550 6.880     
  (0.395)       
SQLEVTA      -4.1525a -0.7601 20.806 
      (0.910)   
LEV×HIQ      4.8820a 0.8936 40.462 
      (0.767)   
LEV×MIDQ      4.0503a 0.7414 36.019 
      (0.675)   
FCF  .9196 0.1378 2.283     
  (0.609)       
FCF×LOQ      3.6057a 0.6600 15.830 
      (0.906)   
FCF×Z-Score      -0.2998b -0.0549 3.946 
      (0.151)   
STKComp  -0.0105c -0.0016 2.868  -0.0084 -0.0015 1.858 
  (0.006)    (0.006)   
EXEComp  -0.0340c -0.0051 9.038  -0.0491a -0.0090 10.609 
  (0.011)    (0.015)   
LINKTSR  0.5906c 0.0857 13.021     
  (0.164)       
LINKTSR×INTLOP      0.0178 0.0033 1.768 
      (0.013)   
LINKTSR×EXEComp     0.0712a 0.0130 7.436 
      (0.026)   
Panel B Summary Statistics 
             
Number of Observation 2745    2846  
Omnibus model test 1338.117a    1522.600a  
-2 Log likelihood 1942.184    1984.729  
Cox &Snell R 0.386    .414  
Nagelkerke R 0.553    .585  
Hosmer &Lemeshow test 5.176    10.359  
Percentage correctly classified 83.9a    84.2a  
K-S test on studentized residuals 11.290a    10.702a  
K-S test on standardized residuals 9.898a    9.206a  
a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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Because the agency costs depend on the bankruptcy rules (Acharya et al., 2011b) and the UK bankruptcy 
rules are relatively more creditor-friendly than the US rules, UK firms have high expected costs of 
financial distress. Therefore we expect that financial distress proxies appear to be very significant in the 
model. Consistent with the prediction, the coefficients for current ratio (CURR) are both negative and 
significant at 1% level. Interest coverage ratio is negatively significant at 10% level in Equation (13), 
indicating a negative relation between hedging and the liquidity position of a firm. The results are in line 
with Judge (2006) who finds that the avoidance of financial distress is a strong motive for hedging among 
UK firms. Judge (2006) also finds that the incentives of reducing financial distress cost are more 
important for his sample of UK firms than samples of previous US studies. This conclusion, however, is 
not supported by our results. Comparing with the results from US sample, the marginal effect of INCOV 
(-0.0005) is almost the same with the marginal effect of INCOV (-0.0011) in US baseline model (see 
Table 6-1), but the marginal effect of CURR in this model are lightly smaller. Overall, the marginal effects 
of the two variables are not very different. Z-score is insignificant and decline in the final Equation (14), 
whereas the interaction term Z-score× FCF is very significant (p-value<0.05) and negative. It indicates 
that the relation between financial distress incentives and hedging also depends on the level of free cash 
flows of the firm. As a lower Z-score implies a higher probability of bankruptcy, the negative coefficient 
implies that, for firms with low free cash flows, the expected cost of financial distress is expected to have 
a stronger positive effect on hedging. The marginal effect of the interactive term is -0.055. Overall, the 
results provide consistent evidence to support view that the incentive to hedge arises from the cost of 
financial distress, but it does not show any evidence that this incentive have a stronger effect on UK firms 
than on US firms. 
 
The significant positive coefficient leverage ratio (LEVTA) implies that the firms hedge in response to the 
expect distress costs arising from high leverage. One percent increase in the total level of leverage to total 
assets yields a significantly increase of 15.5 percent possibility of engaging hedging. Purnanandam (2008) 
finds a non-monotonic relation between leverage and hedging. He argues that due to the costs of financial 
distress leveraged firms have a strong incentive to hedge, but such an incentive disappears for firms with 
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extremely high leverage due to the risk-shifting incentives. At very high leverage, the financial distress 
costs are so high that the distinction between financial distress and insolvency disappear and thus 
shareholders lose risk management motivation. Consistent with this prediction, the Equation (14) shows 
that the estimated coefficient of SQLEVTA is significant (p-value  0.01) and negative, indicating a 
negative relation between extremely high leverage and the probability of engaging in hedging activities.  
 
Géczy et al. (1997) point out that exogenous financial distress costs affects a firm’s debt choice. If a firm 
with high cost of financial distress choose a low long-term debt ratio, then its hedging activities is 
expected to be negatively correlated with long-term debt ratio. The creditor-friendly environment in the 
UK offers a typical framework for such an analysis since their firms are expect to have high exogenous 
financial distress costs. Interestingly, the logistic regression shows a significant negative coefficient for 
long-term debt over total assets (LTDTA), implying that the long-term debt ratio is negatively correlated 
with hedging. This is opposite to that predicted by the financial distress hypothesis. The negative 
coefficient of LTDTA is in line with Géczy et al (1997) finding that the long-term debt ratios of currency 
hedgers are lower than those of non-hedgers. Leland (1998) argues that the long-term debt has lower 
hedging benefits and is less incentive-compatible with hedging than short-term debt, which might be 
another explanation of the negative coefficient. 
 
Our results are also consistent with those of Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) for the cases of 
managerial risk aversion and managerial compensation. This is because the coefficients of stock based 
compensation (STKComp) in both the linear and nonlinear baseline models are negative and statistically 
significant. So here, stock based compensation is negatively related to the probability of hedging. Thus, 
the findings are consistent with the early hypothesis that bonus or stock option provisions of compensation 
plans make the manager’s expected utility to be convex. When manager’s utility is convex, manager will 
behave more like a risk-taker and choose to bear the risk to achieve higher expected income. A one percent 
increase in the after-tax stock compensation yields a slightly decrease of 0.2 percent in the probability 
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that a firm uses hedging instruments. The results, however, is contradict to the results from previous 
chapter, which indicate that the similar measure STKComp is positively associated with hedging in US 
firms. The contradiction may due to the difference of the two measures 19 . The senior executives’ 
compensation (EXEComp) is another proxy of managerial risk aversion. The higher the manager’s claims 
on the firm are, since the risk of claims are nondiversifiable for individual, the more likely that manager 
decides to hedge. Surprisingly, the results show a significantly negative relationship between EXEComp 
and hedging. The plausible explanation is that, since this variable is the total compensation paid to senior 
executives of the firm, it also includes the stock based compensation plan for the senior executives. That 
is, the variable EXEComp can be a convex function of the firm value because it has already included the 
effect of stock based compensation plan on manager’s utility function. 
 
The situation changes when CEO compensation is linked to shareholder’s benefits in a firm. The 
coefficient of LINKTSR×EXEComp, interaction term between dummy variable of CEO compensation 
links to total shareholder return and total senior executives compensation, is positively correlated with 
dependent variable and statistically significant at a 1% level. It indicates that, when the managerial wealth 
is highly undiversified, the higher managerial wealth becomes, the more likely managers would hedge to 
decrease the volatility of the firm profits on their end-of-period wealth. A one percent increase on the 
total amount of senior executive compensation of the firm yields a significant increase of 1.3 percent in 
the probability that a firm engage hedging. In contrast, for the UK firms which do not link the shareholder 
return to its executive compensation plans, a one percent increase on the amount of executive 
compensation leads to a decrease in the probability of hedging. Another interaction term 
LINKTSR×INTLOP, which interacts international operating income of a firm with CEO compensation 
link to total shareholder return is positive but insignificant. Between the two interaction terms, 
LINKTSR×EXEComp is significant and has a higher Wald statistic compared with LINKTSR×INTLOP.  
                                                          
19  The stock compensation expense of U.S. firms includes stock bonus, deferred compensation, amortization of deferred 
compensation, non-cash compensation expense and the stock-based compensation to employees and non-employees, 
according to Compustat. The total stock-based compensation of U.K. firms is the total fair value of all the stock options and 
restricted stock awarded to the employees of the company during the year, according to Datastream. 
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To our knowledge, this is the first study in the literature to test the effect of manager risk aversion on 
corporate hedging decisions when managerial wealth in a firm is closely link to shareholder’s return. 
 
The results indicate that there is a positive size effect on hedging. The estimated coefficient of natural log 
of total assets is positive and significant at 1% level, which is consistent with economies of scale 
hypothesis. The regressions show that the number of growth opportunities is positively associated with 
corporate hedging. RDTA has positive coefficient for hedging and is highly significant for Equation (13) 
and Equation (14), consistently with our empirical results for US firms. The UK firms with greater 
investment opportunities hedge more to reduce the potential predation risk. It is noticeable that growth 
opportunity proxy is highly significant and has third highest Wald statistic in the model, which is much 
higher than that of growth opportunity proxy in the US baseline model (see Section 5.2.2). However, the 
marginal effect of growth opportunities incentive for this model is much smaller than the marginal effect 
in the US baseline model, implying that the use of derivative among UK firms are less sensitive to the 
change of R&D spending than US firms. This might due to the differences arise from how investment 
varies with internal cash flows across interest rate environments. In addition, as UK yield curve is less 
volatile than US yield curve (Verdelhan, 2010), the change of interest rate has less influence on the 
investment funds. Thus the hedging policy of UK firms is less sensitive to the change of R&D spending. 
 
The regressions provide strong support for the agency problem based hypotheses. DEBTMATU, the 
measure of the weighted length of debts held by a firm, is highly significant in both models and positively 
correlated with hedging. Like the analyses for the US firms, Equation (14) includes squared term of debt 
maturity, SQDEBTMATU, and additional variable to examine the moderation by interacting size proxy, 
LogTA, multiplicatively with and the dummy of debt maturity lower than median. Though the signs of 
coefficients are consistent, SQDEBTMATU and LogTA×LMATU are insignificant and withdrawn to get 
a better final model. The interaction term between high total assets dummy and debt maturity is not 
significant either. The only interaction found to be statistically significant is the interaction terms between 
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debt maturity and fixed assets, DEBTMATU×FATA, indicating that the effect of debt maturity on 
corporate hedging differs depending on the fixed assets ratio of the firm. Since long debt maturity 
indicates greater agency costs, the negative sign of the coefficient implies that firms with fewer fixed 
assets should have greater agency cost incentive of hedging.  This is consistent with finance theory. Asset 
tangibility have been found to be positively correlated with leverage and debt maturity (see Barclay et al., 
2003; Dang, 2011).Therefore firms with more fixed assets should have greater debt capacity and longer 
debt maturity, while firms with a fewer fixed assets should have more restricted borrowing capacity and 
therefore more likely to raise shareholder-bondholder conflicts. Consequently firms with low fixed assets 
ratio have higher need of hedging to reduce investment distortions associated with debt financing. 
 
Theoretically levered firms with high-investment opportunities may experience high agency costs of 
underinvestment. Thus the regression examines interaction between high Tobin’s Q dummy, which as an 
indicator of underinvestment, and the debt ratio. The coefficient is positive and significant, with the 
strongest marginal effect of 0.894 and a high Wald statistic. If a firm face high expected costs of 
underinvestment, the incentive to hedge to mitigate underinvestment problem is significant and is 
positively related to the total level of debt in the firm. The estimated coefficient on LEV×MIQ is also 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms which have moderate level of Tobin’s Q hedge 
with the increase of leverage, alleviating costs of underinvestment. However, compare with those firms 
with high Tobin’s Q, the underinvestment incentive of hedging among firms with moderate Tobin’s Q 
lighter and less important (a smaller marginal effect and a lower Wald statistic). The findings are perfectly 
consistent with the regression results from US sample. 
 
The estimated coefficient of free cash flows to total assets (FCF) is marginally significant at 10% and is 
positive in Equation (13), indicating potential motive of hedging in response to overinvestment problem. 
However, high free cash flows would increase the probability of overinvestment problem if the free cash 
flows is used to engage in manager’s self-interest activities rather than positive net present value projects. 
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To test the overinvestment hypothesis we need to distinguish between overinvesting and underinvesting 
firms. Thus we add an interaction term between unfavourable investment opportunities, a dummy variable 
of low Tobin’s Q, and FCF, in Equation (14) to test the hypothesis. The regression finds that the 
interaction term is highly significant and positively correlated with hedging, whereas the FCF is not 
significant. It indicates that the possibility of hedging of overinvesting firms increases with the free cash 
flows. The marginal effect of interaction is an increase in the probability of hedging of 66.0 percent. 
 
To examine the industry effect, this regression also includes industry indicators based on two-digit SIC 
code. The model shows that four industry indicators, INDUS, CONSUMG, CONSUMS, TELECOM, and 
UTILIT are significantly (p-value 0.01) associated with the use of derivatives. Firms in the industrial 
industry (INDUS), consumer goods industry (CONSUMG), and consumer services industry (CONSUMS) 
are more like to engage hedging activities because these industries are highly competitive. Firms in the 
telecommunications and utilities are less likely to hedge. The corresponding marginal effects are also 
negative. These results are consistent with Bertram et al. (2009) findings that that derivatives usage rates 
are high in the retail trade industry and utilities industry, but contrary to the finding that consumer goods 
industry has lowest usage rates.  
 
Both of the Equation (13) and (14) show that the coefficient of year 2002 dummy variable is positive and 
statistically significant at 10% level, consistent with the results from US analyses. The result suggests 
that economic downturn influences firm’s hedging behaviour on downside risk. Compared with US 
results in the previous chapter, however, the regressions do not provide evidence that UK firm’s hedging 
decisions are influenced by 2008-2009 financial crisis. The plausible explanation is that the financial 
crisis has limited impact on non-financial firms in the UK. 
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6.2.2 International Hedgers v.s. International Non-hedgers 
 
Baseline model provides an overall view for the determinants of corporate hedging policies amongst all 
sampled firms. In fact, multinationals may hedge differently with purely domestic firms since purely 
domestic firms do not have foreign exchange rate exposure, whereas hedging theory predict firms choose 
hedge or not on the assumption that a firm has risk exposure then they choose to hedge such risk exposure 
or not. Therefore, the empirical evidence may not match precisely given certain characteristics of firms 
and the operational activities. To better understand corporate hedging decision and to be more clinical 
about our results, we add the international dummy as an explanatory variable into the baseline model. If 
the foreign involvement of a firm does not influence its hedging decision, the predictor should not be 
significant in the model. Therefore, we test the null hypothesis that there is no difference on the 
international involvement of British hedgers and non-hedgers. 
 
Table 6-2 presents the regression results of the model including international indicator. The Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test p-value is not significant as before, indicating that the goodness-of-fit of the regression is 
acceptable. The results reject the null hypothesis stated above. The estimated coefficient of international 
indicator, INTL DUMMY, is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, with third highest Wald 
statistic 77.874. These results indicate that the international indicator is an important factor in determining 
hedging indeed. Multinational firms are more likely to engage derivatives to hedge their risk exposures. 
The results imply that our concern of mismatch problem may exist in the baseline model indeed. 
 
To better characterise our analysis, we therefore examine hedging behaviour in more detailed groups. 
Specifically, by a sample of firms which excludes purely domestic firms, the model examines the 
determinants of hedging only amongst multinationals. Table 6-3 presents the regression results of 
international model on the condition that -2 log likelihood are maximised. Overall, the result provides 
strong evidence for most of the theories, apart from some others with mixed results. Again the Hosmer 
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and Lemeshow test confirms a good model fit (p-value > 0.10). The Omnibus statistic is significant (p-
value  0.01) suggesting that the coefficients of the logistic regressions besides the intercept are 
significant. 
 
The regressions find that size effect proxy LogTA remains significant and is positively correlated with 
hedging. It is still the most important variable in the model. That is, large multinationals are more likely 
to use derivatives than small multinationals. Return on assets (ROA) is statistically significant in Equation 
(16) and has positive coefficient, indicating that high firm performance motivates the use of derivatives. 
That is, firms with good performance tend to use derivatives to manage its financial risk to protect such 
achievement. By contrast, the coefficient of Tobin’s Q is not significant. A plausible explanation is that 
accounting rates of return like ROA are widely used and highly important in determining executive 
compensation. Managers have incentives to make corporate risk management decisions in such a way as 
to affect ROA and, thus their compensation. 
 
As before, the strong support for the agency costs hypothesis still holds. Coefficients of DEBTMATU in 
Equation (16) and (17) are both positively significant, suggesting that there is a positive association 
between hedging decision and long debt maturity choice. Holding longer weighted length of debts 
provides incentives for firms to engage in hedging to reduce costs of shareholders-bondholders conflict. 
It is interesting to notice that once we control for the international operation dummy, the estimated 
coefficient of interaction term DEBTMATU×FATA is not statistically significant. Given that the asset 
tangibility variable FATA is not significant either, the insignificance of the interaction term most likely 
reflects the fact that multinational firms are financed with less external debt in countries with 
underdeveloped capital markets and employ internal capital markets (Desai et al, 2004). And as such 
assets tangibility as an important determinant of a firm’s ability to finance externally (Almeida and 
Campello, 2007) become less important. LEV×HIQ remains positively and highly significant (p-value < 
0.01), and has stronger marginal effect (0.605) than that in the US international model (0.509).  
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Table 6-2 Logistic regression includes dummy variable of international operation 
    Equation (15)  
Variables   Coefficient ME WS  
     
Constant  -11.5976a  207.442 
  (0.676)   
DY  0.1450a 0.0247 23.315 
  (0.030)   
LogTA  0.7154a 0.1205 242.847 
  (0.047)   
FATA  -0.1074 -0.0186 1.824 
  (0.080)   
RDTA  0.2396a 0.0406 63.414 
  (0.030)   
DEBTMATU  0.1623a 0.0275 14.365 
  (0.043)   
DEBTMATU×FATA  -0.0020 -0.0002 0.003 
  (0.035)   
Z-Score  0.0659 0.0112 1.661 
  (0.051)   
CURR  -0.1132a -0.0191 9.874 
  (0.036)   
Year2002  0.7002c 0.0977 3.083 
  (0.398)   
INDUS  0.6222a 0.0981 18.411 
  (0.145)   
CONSUMS  0.9893a 0.1323 18.897 
  (0.227)   
CONSUMG  0.9534a 0.1267 11.622 
  (0.280)   
TELECOM  -1.0003a -0.2081 7.300 
  (0.370)   
UTILITD  -1.5969a -0.3559 11.078 
  (0.480)   
SQLEVTA  -4.3929a -0.7442 22.798 
  (0.919)   
LEV×HIQ  5.3484a 0.9071 46.607 
  (0.783)   
LEV×MIDQ  4.1194a 0.7000 35.641 
  (0.689)   
FCF×LOQ  4.1099a 0.6968 19.484 
  (0.930)   
FCF×Z-Score  -0.1566 -0.0271 1.265 
  (0.139)   
STKComp  -0.0095 -0.0016 2.377 
  (0.006)   
EXECOM  -0.0500a -0.0084 11.045 
  (0.015)   
CompLINK×INTLOP  0.0109 0.0019 0.739 
  (0.013)   
CompLINK×EXEComp  0.0751a 0.0128 7.744 
  (0.027)   
INLT DUMMY  2.2292a 0.4990 77.874 
  (0.253)   
Panel B Summary Statistics       
Number of Observation 2841  
Omnibus model test 1590.834a  
-2 Log likelihood 1906.290  
Cox &Snell R 0.429  
Nagelkerke R 0.606  
Hosmer &Lemeshow test 9.108  
Percentage correctly classified 84.5a  
K-S test on studentized residuals 10.680a  
K-S test on standardized residuals 9.086a  
a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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Table 6-3 Logistic regression results for international hedgers and non-hedgers 
      Equation (16)     Equation (17) 
Variables   Coefficient ME WS Coefficient ME WS 
         
Constant  -8.6305a  192.733  -8.6276a  186.489 
  (0.625)    (0.631)   
DY  0.1336a 0.0167 18.803  0.1288a 0.0156 16.743 
  (0.031)    (0.031)   
LogTA  0.6569a 0.0823 165.085  0.6432a 0.0778 151.341 
  (0.052)    (0.052)   
RDTA  0.2688a 0.0337 66.829  0.2594a 0.0314 62.593 
  (0.033)    (0.033)   
DEBTMATU 0.1477a 0.0185 13.695  0.1031b 0.0125 6.02 
  (0.040)    (0.043)   
DEBTMATU×HICAPEXP    0.0685c 0.0083 2.859 
      (0.040)   
INCOV  -0.0043b -0.0005 4.246  -0.0035c -0.0004 2.745 
  (0.002)    (0.002)   
CURR  -0.1248a -0.0156 10.793  -0.0933a -0.0113 6.556 
  (0.039)    (0.036)   
Year2002  0. 8222b 0.0783 3.964  0.8214c 0.0752 3.661 
  (0.417)    (0.427)   
INDUS  0.7806a 0.0893 28.964  0.7137a 0.0792 22.25 
  (0.144)    (0.149)   
CONSUMG  1.4509a 0.1207 31.510  1.4365a 0.1152 30.619 
  (0.259)    (0.262)   
COMSUMS  1.5058a 0.1210 23.174  1.5113a 0.1165 22.249 
  (0.311)    (0.318)   
TELECOM  -0.6499c -0.1001 2.866  -0.6682 -0.1003 2.542 
  (0.383)    (0.407)   
UTILIT  -1.3378a -0.2459 6.614  -1.7094a -0.3293 11.054 
  (0.509)    (0.517)   
LTDTA  -0.0545b -0.0068 5.435  -0.0373 -0.0045 2.617 
  (0.023)    (0.024)   
LEVTA  1.2505a 0.1568 9.016     
  (0.419)       
SQLEVTA      -3.8033a -0.4599 18.781 
      (0.850)   
LEV×HIQ      5.0028a 0.6050 34.505 
      (0.817)   
LEV×MIQ     3.7976a 0.4592 23.768 
      (0.738)   
FCF  2.6812a 0.3361 20.375  1.0020 0.1212 1.759 
  (0.599)    (0.689)   
FCF×LOQ     3.6059a 0.4360 11.898 
      (1.099)   
STKComp      -0.0116c -0.0014 3.118 
      (0.007)   
EXECOM  -0.0406a -0.0051 11.437  -0.0405a -0.0049 8.232 
  (0.012)    (0.012)   
LINKTSR 0.8613a 0.1030 22.005  0.8714a 0.1004 23.029 
  (0.170)    (0.189)   
ROA  0.0274c 0.0034 2.865  0.0289c 0.0035 3.238 
  (0.016)    (0.017)   
 
Panel B Summary Statistics             
Number of Observation 2609    2609  
Omnibus model test 1342.277a    1393.254a  
-2 Log likelihood 1704.286    1653.309  
Cox &Snell R 0.402    0.414  
Nagelkerke R 0.584    0.601  
Hosmer &Lemeshow test 12.864    10.340  
Percentage correctly classified 85.2a    85.7a  
K-S test on studentized residuals 12.690a    12.735a  
K-S test on standardized residuals 10.164a    10.168a  
a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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FCF remains positively significant (p-value < 0.01) in Equation (16) and (15) but becomes marginally 
significant in Equation (17), with a marginal effects of 0.336 and 0.121 respectively, indicating that 
international firms do hedge in response to the overinvestment costs caused by high free cash flows held 
by managers. The interaction term FCF×LOQ is positively significant, suggesting firms which potentially 
face high overinvestment costs are more likely to engage hedging.  
 
The evidence supports the financial distress hypothesis, consistent with our findings in the baseline model. 
Both the two liquidity measures CURR and INCOV are negatively significant in Equation (16) and 
Equation (17), as predicted in Chapter 3. The high current ratio implies high liquidity and the high interest 
cover ratio implies strong ability to pay financial obligations and relatively low risks of financial distress. 
Thus the negative coefficients imply that firms with lower expected costs of financial distress are less 
likely to hedge. According to the results of Equation (17), one percent increase in the interest coverage 
ratio leads to a slight decrease of 0.04 percent in the possibility of hedging. A one percent increase in the 
current ratio yields a decrease of 1.13 percent in the probability that a firm uses hedging instruments. The 
finding is consistent with our findings from the US, which show that the marginal effect of the interest 
coverage ratio is weaker than the marginal effect of the current ratio. This implies that the hedging policies 
of firms in the US and the UK are not highly sensitive to the change on the ratio, though the policies are 
significantly affected by the ability to pay interest on outstanding debts of a firm. This might reflect the 
fact that many firms set an acceptable minimum for interest coverage in their day-to-day financial 
management practices. 
 
All of the leverage measures for financial distress hypothesis are statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficient of LTDTA is negative, consistent with results in section 6.2.1. LEVTA is found to be positively 
correlated with corporate hedging, while its squared term SQLEVTA is negatively correlated with hedging. 
These results are consistent with baseline model results. It is worth noting that SQLEVTA has almost the 
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strongest marginal effects (0.460) in the Equation (17). Assuming that leverage is proxy for the expected 
costs of financial distress, the high marginal effect implies that when a firm holds extremely high level of 
the debt, the expected costs of financial distress are so high that the distinction between financial distress 
and insolvency diminishes, and therefore the incentives of ex-post hedging fall substantially. In brief, 
regression results indicate that the cost of financial distress is an important determinant of hedging. 
 
Managerial risk aversion hypothesis is the only hypothesis for which mixed support is found. LINKTSR 
is statistically significant and positively correlated with hedging, indicating that firms are more likely to 
hedge when the manager’s benefits in the firm are highly undiversified with shareholders’ return. 
However, LINKTSR×EXEComp, which is positively significant in baseline model, is insignificant in this 
model. The interaction between LINKTSR and Tobin’s Q is positively correlated with hedging, but is not 
statistically significant either. It suggests that the effect of firm value on hedging is not different for 
whether manager’s compensation is link to total shareholder return or not. Despite of the empirical 
evidence that hedging can increase the value of the firm (e.g. Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Bartram et 
al., 2011; Allayannis et al., 2012), adding value is not significant determinant of hedging for those firms 
which align shareholder/manager interests. The possible explanation is that the definition of hedging 
employed in this model includes all forms of derivative users rather than currency derivative users. 
STKComp and EXEComp are negatively and significant, consistent with our previous results.  
 
The coefficient for RDTA is positive and significant, with the third highest Wald statistic among all 
explanatory variables. So growth opportunities remain an important determinant for hedging under an 
international context. DY is significant and has positive coefficient, consistent with the hedging substitute 
hypothesis. Hedging is more likely for firms with higher dividend yield. According to Equation (17), one 
percent increase in the dividend yield gives a decrease of 1.6 percent in the probability that a firm uses 
hedging instruments. The logistic results do not support Smith and Stulz (1985) tax explanation for 
hedging, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficients on the effective tax rate and low-tax dummy 
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variable. The results do not support Graham and Rogers (2002) explanation of increasing tax benefit on 
debt. 
 
6.2.3 Foreign Exchange Rate Hedging 
 
Next, we examine the use of currency derivatives for a sample of UK firms that have ex ante exposure to 
foreign exchange rate risk. The dependent variable is the dummy variable of the use of currency 
derivatives. The selection variable is the dummy variable of foreign exchange rate exposure. Logistic 
regressions are estimated using linear variable only (Equation 18) and including interaction terms 
(Equation 19). The results are shown in Table 6-4. Our diagnostic tests shows that the estimates are 
reliable. Overall, the results provide strong evidence for most of the hypotheses in the Chapter 3, apart 
from the hedging substitute hypothesis which is evidenced by mixed results.  
 
Consistent with hypothesis and the results in the previous models, regressions find that high expected 
costs of agency problem provides strong motivation for hedging its foreign exchange rate (FX) exposure. 
To our knowledge, this is the first literature using UK sample to find strong evidence for overinvestment 
cost explanation for FX hedging. Most of UK empirical studies examining agency costs hypothesis focus 
on the underinvestment explanation for FX hedging (e.g. Joseph and Hewins, 1997; Judge 2006; Bartram 
et al., 2009). Free cash flows ratio and its interaction with dummy variable for low Tobin’s Q are both 
highly significant (p-value<0.1 in Equation (18) and Equation (19), respectively) and positively correlated 
with dependent variable. Again, the results indicate that firms which are expected to have high 
overinvestment problem are more likely to use currency derivatives to eliminate high expected agency 
costs. It is interesting to note that FCF×LOQ has the second strongest marginal effect 0.897 in the model, 
implying that the use of currency derivatives is very sensitive to the increase of free cash flows when the 
expected costs of overinvestment is high. It is noticeable that this marginal effect of FCF×LOQ in 
Equation (19) is strongest among all the equations.  
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Table 6-4 Logistic regression results for FX model 
      Equation (18)     Equation (19) 
Variables   Coefficient ME WS Coefficient ME WS 
         
Constant  -9.4453a  182.419  -9.4324a  303.882 
  (0.561)    (0.550)   
LogTA  0.7215a 0.1591 162.648  0.7098a 0.1582 266.298 
  (0.045)    (0.044)   
FATA  -.2707a -0.0597 11.809  -0.0881 -0.0196 0.015 
  (0.079)    (0.086)   
RDTA  0.2820a 0.0622 99.386  0.2786a 0.0621 96.151 
  (0.028)    (0.028)   
DEBTMATU     0.1789a 0.0399 12.854 
      (0.050)   
DEBTMATU×FATA     -0.1908a -0.0425 9.578 
      (0.062)   
CAPEXPTA  0.0275 0.0061 2.448     
  (0.018)       
CURR  -0.0381 -0.0084 2.469  -0.0713b -0.0159 6.131 
  (0.024)    (0.029)   
Year2002  0.6507b 0.1264 3.918  0.7259b 0.1408 4.548 
  (0.329)    (0.340)   
INDUS  0.6517a 0.1358 26.492  0.6286a 0.1338 25.763 
  (0.127)    (0.124)   
CONSUMG  1.0554a 0.1920 24.474  1.2337a 0.2196 33.739 
  (0.213)    (0.212)   
CONSUMS  1.1737a 0.2064 25.403  1.2365a 0.2180 28.483 
  (0.233)    (0.232)   
OIL  -0.5808b -0.1371 4.574  -0.4723c -0.1114 3.036 
  (0.272)    (0.271)   
MATERL  -0.5168a -0.1206 6.895     
  (0.197)       
LTDTA  -0.0379c -0.0084 3.393  -0.0497b -0.0111 5.799 
  (0.021)    (0.021)   
LEVTA  0.7704a 0.1700 6.732     
  (0.297)       
SQLEVTA      -0.7962 -0.1775 0.126 
      (0.520)   
LEV×HIQ      1.3303a 0.2965 7.914 
      (0.473)   
FCF  3.2492a 0.7163 34.795  2.1256a 0.4738 10.743 
  (0.551)    (0.649)   
FCF×LOQ     3.2930a 0.7340 11.006 
      (0.993)   
STKOPT  -18.8959c -4.1660 3.175     
  (10.606)       
EXEComp  -0.0222b -0.0049 4.719  -0.0181c -0.0040 3.135 
  (0.010)    (0.010)   
LINKTSR 0.4177a 0.0904 8.372     
  (0.144)       
LINKTSR×INTLOP     0.0315b 0.0070 5.163 
      (0.014)   
LINKTSR×TOBINQ     0.2519c 0.0561 3.574 
      (0.014)   
ROA  0.0295b 0.0065 8.372  0.0345b 0.0077 5.934 
  (0.014)    (0.014)   
CASH  0.0355b 0.0078 4.039  0.0375b 0.0084 4.346 
  (0.018)    (0.018)   
LOWTAX×IGEAR     -0.0345c -0.0077 2.83 
      (0.021)   
Panel B Summary Statistics             
Number of Observation 2736    2729  
Omnibus model test 1379.317a    1397.941a  
-2 Log likelihood 2240.757    2211.464  
Cox &Snell R 0.396    0.401  
Nagelkerke R 0.540    0.546  
Hosmer &Lemeshow test 9.175    8.467  
Percentage correctly classified 81.0a    81.3a  
K-S test on studentized residuals 8.718a a   6.966a  
K-S test on standardized residuals 6.545a    6.452a  
a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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The results also strongly support underinvestment explanation for hedging. The coefficient for 
DEBTMATU is highly positively significant (p-value<0.01). It is interesting to note that, though the 
interaction term between debt maturity and fixed assets ratio DEBTMATU×FATA is insignificant in the 
international model, it has positively significant (p-value<0.01) coefficient in Equation (19). That is, the 
incentive of hedging FX exposures to alleviate costs of underinvestment becomes stronger with lower 
fixed assets ratio.  
 
Managerial risk aversion and management compensation are found to be important determinant of 
currency hedging. The dummy variable of whether the manager’s compensation of a firm is link to total 
shareholder return, LINKTSR, and its interaction terms LINKTSR×TOBINQ, LINKTSR×INTLOP, 
LINKTSR×EXEComp remain statistically significant in Equation (18) and Equation (19) (p-value ≤ 
0.086). Linking managers’ compensation to shareholder’s benefits provides strong incentives to hedge 
FX exposures. According to the results, it will yield 9.04 percent increase in the likelihood of using 
currency derivatives. It is interesting to notice that, contrary to results that LINKTSR×INTL is statistically 
insignificant in baseline model, estimated coefficient of the interaction term is significant (p-value=0.050) 
and positively correlated with FX hedging. It implies that, though manager may not hedge in response to 
personal-wealth exposures affected by a firm’s foreign operations, manager typically hedges to reduce 
exposures to exchange rate market risk. Similarly, the interaction between LINKTSR and Tobin’s Q, 
which is not significant in the international model, is positively correlated with FX hedging and is 
statistically significant (p-value<0.1). This is the only one equation that shows that LINKTSR×TOBINQ 
is statistically significant, which implies that the effect of firm value on hedging is different for whether 
manager’s compensation is link to total shareholder return or not. That is, a firm is more likely to hedge 
its FX risk with high Tobin’s Q if it links managerial compensation to shareholder’s return. This is 
consistent with Allayannis and Weston (2001), Mackay and Moeller (2007) and Allayannis et al. (2012) 
findings that hedging can increase the value of the firm. Between the two interaction terms of LINKTSR, 
LINKTSR×INTLOP has the higher Wald statistic but smaller marginal effect than LINKTSR×TOBINQ. 
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ROA is also positively significant at 5% level in Equation (18) and Equation (19), suggesting that a firm 
with better performance are more likely to execute ex-post FX hedging to protect its earnings. 
 
The probability of financial distress also affects FX hedging, but the support is not as strong as in the 
baseline model. Equation 18 shows LEVTA is statistically significant (p-value<0.01) and positively 
correlated with FX hedging, indicating that firms hedge their FX risk to reduce the costs of financial 
distress (see also Purnanandam (2008) for the US firms). Consistently, the liquidity proxy CURR is 
negative and significant, indicating that since firms with high current ratio have enough resources to pay 
short-term obligations their needs to reduce costs of financial distress throughout hedging are decline. 
However, like Joseph and Hewins (1997), we find no evidence from the UK sample that interest coverage 
ratio is statistically significant on FX hedging. Surprisingly, the squared term of leverage SQLEVTA is 
negatively but not significantly. This implies that the negative relation at extremely high level of leverage 
is not very significant on determining the use of currency derivatives. 
 
Interestingly, the regressions find evidence for supporting tax explanation for hedging. Among all models 
in this chapter, Equation for FX hedging is also the only one model that finds significant tax variable. 
According to Smith and Stulz (1985), if hedging is costly, which is more practical in the reality, hedging 
will still increases firm value only if transactions costs of hedging do not exceed the benefits of hedging. 
However, when the tax liabilities are low and hedging is costly, hedging does not always leads to 
significant benefits. Our results shows that estimated coefficient of interaction term between LOWTAX 
dummy variable and gearing ratio is negative (-0.033) and marginally significant. It is consistently with 
Haushalter (2000) and Graham and Rogers (2002) findings that tax incentive to hedge is also related to 
increasing debt capacity, and considering that there is positive relation between debt levels and tax rates 
(Graham et al., 1998), leverage and tax rate are be jointly determined with the corporate hedging activities. 
That is, if the tax rate of the firm drops to the lower third tax rates in the sample, ceteris paribus, the 
probability of using FX hedging instruments does not increase with the level of leverage increases. It 
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implies that if the tax liabilities are relatively small, the tax incentive to hedge is actually weakened. The 
corresponding unreported interaction term HITAX×IGEAR is positively correlated with hedging, but is 
not statistically significant. 
 
The FX hedging model is also the only model finds weak evidence for hedging substitute hypothesis. The 
coefficient of DY is insignificant in Equation (18) and Equation (19), indicating that the payout policy of 
a firm does not affect the use of currency derivatives. The cash-asset ratio CASH has positively significant 
coefficient (p-value ≤ 0.050) in the Equation (18) and (19), implying that holding large amount of cash 
does not necessarily equivalent to negative impact on hedging. That is, the result rejects the hypothesis 
of substitute relationship between cash and hedging. This result is consistent with Judge’s (2006) finding 
that firms with higher cash are more likely to hedge with derivatives. 20  
 
 
6.2.4 Interest Rate Hedging 
 
This section examines the use of interest rate derivatives to hedge the exposure of interest rate risk among 
domestic and multinational U.K. firms (Equation (20)) and Equation (21)) and using both linear and 
interaction terms. The diagnostic tests are acceptable. The Interest Rate Hedging (IR) models provide 
similar analysis to that in FX models except the dependent variable is the dummy variable of the use of 
interest rate derivative. Table 6-5 reports the logistic regression for currency hedging. Since interest rate 
(IR) hedging aims to reduce the interest rate exposure to firm’s debt obligations, the results for leverage 
related variables are strong.  
                                                          
20 Judge (2006, pp417) defined cash ratio as the total cash and cash equivalents divided by current liabilities. Cash ratio is a  
better proxy for liquidity condition of a firm, while the cash-assets ratio used in this study has been the preferred measure of 
cash holding in many finance studies. However, since Judge (2006) classifies the cash ratio as proxy for hedging substitutes, we 
believe the results are still comparable. 
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Table 6-5 Logistic regression results for interest rate hedging 
    Equation (20)   Equation (21) 
Variables   Coefficient ME WS Coefficient ME WS 
         
Constant  -10.2786a  148.425  -9.0105a  120.723 
  (0.844)    (0.820)   
LogTA  0.6568a 0.1627 46.038  0.4823a 0.1191 25.967 
  (0.097)    (0.095)   
LogMV  0.1587c 0.0393 3.299  0.2376a 0.0587 7.418 
  (0.087)    (0.087)   
DY  0.0961a 0.0238 14.851  0.1024a 0.0253 15.829 
  (0.025)    (0.026)   
TOBINQ  0.1609c 0.0399 2.699     
  (0.098)       
FATA  -0.2012b -0.0498 4.526     
  (0.095)       
DEBTMATU 0.2558a 0.0634 40.277  0.5827a 0.1440 12.801 
  (0.040)    (0.163)   
DEBTMATU×FATA     -0.0494c -0.0122 2.838 
      (0.029)   
INCOV  -0.0119a -0.0030 19.858  -0.0092a -0.0023 11.446 
  (0.003)    (0.003)   
CURR  0.2946a -0.0730 29.825  -0.2090a -0.0159 6.131 
  (0.054)    (0.056)   
TELECOM  -1.063b -0.2538 6.128  -1.3094a -0.3050 0.001 
  (0.429)    (0.411)   
UTILIT  -0.9745c -0.2345 3.568  -0.9732c -0.2351 3.685 
  (0.516)    (0.507)   
CONSUMS      0.5434b 0.1287 5.603 
      (0.230)   
OIL  0.4093 0.0985 1.751     
  (0.309)       
CONVERDEBT  -1.1535a -0.2858 7.229  -0.9933b -0.2454 4.446 
  (0.429)    (0.471)   
Z-Score  0.1211b 0.0300 4.422     
  (0.058)       
LEVTA  3.3549a 0.8313 51.614  7.1437a 1.7648 63.845 
  (0.467)    (0.894)   
SQLEVTA      -5.4423a -1.3445 26.62 
      (1.055)   
LEV×LOQ     -5.0334a -1.2435 26.652 
      (0.975)   
FCF  1.5608b 0.3868 4.734  2.2515a 0.5562 10.155 
  (0.717)    (0.707)   
FCF×STKComp     -0.5736a -0.1417 7.872 
      (0.471)   
STKComp  -0.0343c -0.0085 3.072     
  (0.020)       
EXEComp  -0.0330a -0.0082 7.197  -0.0293b -0.0072 5.945 
  (0.012)    (0.012)   
LINKTSR        
         
LINKTSR×INTLOP     0.0275c 0.0068 3.237 
      (0.015)   
CASH  0.0434b 0.0108 5.109     
  (0.019)       
PRIVOL  -0.0167b -0.0041 4.376     
  (0.008)       
         
         
         
Panel B Summary Statistics             
Number of Observation 2597    2603  
Omnibus model test 1654.951a    1710.853a  
-2 Log likelihood 1915.654    1869.406  
Cox &Snell R 0.471    0.482  
Nagelkerke R 0.631    0.645  
Hosmer &Lemeshow test 11.751    12.865  
Percentage correctly classified 83.4a    83.4a  
K-S test on studentized residuals 23.974a    18.580a  
K-S test on standardized residuals 4.286a    4.211a  
a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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The results in Table 6-5 show similar strong results for financial distress hypothesis to that in the baseline 
models. Coefficients of liquidity ratios INCOV and CURR are highly significant at 1% level in Equation 
(20) and Equation (21), indicating a negative relationship between liquidity and interest rate hedging. The 
leverage ratio LEVTA is positively correlated with hedging as expected, and SQLEVTA is negatively 
correlated with hedging. Both the two variables are highly significant (p-value<0.01) and have strong 
marginal effects in Equation (21). In addition, among all models in our analysis on the UK firms, the 
marginal effects of the two leverage variables in IR models are the strongest. This suggests that the cost 
of financial distress provides larger marginal change on the likelihood of interest rate hedging with 
derivatives than that hedging of other types of exposures. LEVTA also has the highest Wald statistic in 
both models as expected, indicating that cost of financial distress is the most important determinants of 
interest rate hedging. UK firms use interest rate derivatives to hedge the exposure to changes in interest 
rate relates to their debts in order to reduce the costs of financial distress.21 
 
Consistent with hypothesis that hedging can alleviate cost of overinvestment arising from free cash-flows 
agency problem, the results show that FCF is significant (p-value ≤ 0.05) and positively correlated with 
the use of IR derivatives in Equation (20) and Equation (21). The marginal effects are also strong. 
Interestingly, we find a negative and highly significant (p-value<0.01) relation between IR hedging and 
the interaction term between leverage and the dummy variable of low Tobin’s Q. In addition, Equation 
(21) is the only equation which we find a statistically significant relation with the interaction term 
LEV×LOQ. The interaction term is the second most important independent variable in the model and has 
the third strongest interaction effect and marginal effect after LEVTA and SQLEVTA. The results are 
consistent with Jensen’s (1986) argument that the debt can help to alleviate overinvestment problem by 
reducing the available cash flows for discretionary spending which, in turn, reduces the incentive to hedge 
to control these agency costs of free cash flows (Morellec and Smith, 2007). For firms which are expected 
                                                          
21 The results shows very strong leverage incentives of using IR derivatives. Though it offers support for costs of financial distress 
theory for hedging, it also raise question that are the positive correlation between leverage and use of IR derivatives driven by 
the large benefits from successful speculation (see Faulkender, 2005; Chernenko and Faulkender, 2011). This will be further 
discussed later in this section. 
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to have high costs of overinvestment, high level of debt reduces the possibility of using interest rate 
derivatives. Correspondingly we find a positive relation between the use of IR derivatives and LEV×HIQ, 
the interaction term between leverage and the dummy variable of high Tobin’s Q 22. The interaction term 
between free cash flows and stock-based compensation is statistically significant at a 1% level in Equation 
(21) but surprisingly has a negative coefficient. The negative correlation implies that the incentive to use 
IR derivatives to reduce overinvestment costs is greater when the total stock-based compensation of 
employees of a firm is lower. 
 
The coefficient for DEBTMATU is positive and significant in Equation (20) and Equation (21). This result 
is consistent with hypothesis that hedging can alleviate cost of underinvestment arising from shareholder-
bondholder conflicts. In addition, the square term and the interaction term of DEBTMATU with fixed 
assets ratio (FATA) are also significant (p-value ≤ 0.100) and negatively correlated with the use of IR 
derivatives (see Equation (21)).  The negative relation between IR hedging and DEBTMATU×FATA 
implies that, for firms holding low fixed assets, the incentive of reducing cost of underinvestment has 
strong positive effect on hedging. The negative sign of the coefficient of SQDEBTMATU indicates there 
is a nonlinear relation of debt maturity and IR hedging. The extremely long debt maturity lowers the 
likelihood of IR hedging.  
 
Contrary to the regression results from FX hedging (Equation (18) and Equation (19), the results from IR 
hedging regressions provides strong evidence for hedging substitute hypothesis. The coefficients are 
significant (p-value < 0.05) in Equation (20) Equation (21). The negative coefficient for convertible debt 
suggests that the use of convertible debts reduces the incentives of hedging to control agency costs of 
shareholder-bondholder conflicts. Dividend yield is statistically significant at 1% level and positively 
correlated with IR hedging, indicating that the firms that pay high dividends are more likely to hedge use 
interest rate derivatives. The marginal effect of CONVERDEBT on interest rate hedging is much stronger 
                                                          
22 However, this interaction term is not statistically significant so it is not presented in the final model. 
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than that of DY. This may be because interest rate hedging aims to reduce the interest rate exposure to 
firm’s debt obligations.  
 
The evidence shows UK firms hedge interest rate exposure due to the economies of scale. The coefficients 
for LogTA and LogMV (see Table 6-5) are both positive and statistically significant (p-value ≤ 0.10). 
However, there is no support for the growth opportunities and taxation hypotheses. The plausible 
explanation is that the interest rate in the UK is less volatile than the rate in the US (Verdelhan, 2010). 
Compare to the US firms, the adverse impact from the change of interest rate on the investment funds and 
debt capacity of a UK firm is smaller. Thus the tax incentives and growth opportunities incentives of 
interest rate hedging are weak in the UK. This finding implies country differences in the way that the 
macroeconomic factors influence corporate hedging policy. In addition, no year dummy variable is 
statistically significant from zero in the IR model, suggesting that the influence of macroeconomy on IR 
hedging is not significant. Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) argue that the use of derivatives should not 
change significantly from year to year, assuming that a firm’s exposure to interest rate risk of their 
operations is stable over time. Consistently, the regressions do not find any evidence that UK firms use 
IR derivatives to manage earnings or performance. 
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6.3 Summary and Implications 
 
The main objective of this chapter was to examine the determinants of corporate hedging amongst the 
UK firms. The baseline model provides support for several theoretical explanations for corporate hedging 
behaviour. The second model, estimating under international operating context, provides insights on the 
determinants of corporate hedging. The third and fourth models assess the problem in terms of the types 
of risk exposures. All the models provide new evidence that largely support theoretical predictions.  
 
We find that UK firms hedge to reduce the agency costs arising from overinvestment and underinvestment 
problem. Proxies of high agency costs of overinvestment, such as free cash flow and its interaction term 
with dummy variable of low Tobin’s Q, are highly significant in all models and are positively correlated 
with hedging. The results also imply that the use of FX derivatives is very sensitive to the increase of free 
cash flow when the expected costs of overinvestment is high. Proxies of high agency costs of 
underinvestment, such as debt maturity and interaction terms of dummy variable of high Tobin’s Q, are 
also highly significant in all models and has positive correlation with hedging. Interestingly, we find that 
the effects of underinvestment on hedging are stronger for UK firms compared with US firms. Also, the 
effects of overinvestment incentives of US firms are stronger than those of UK firms. These findings are 
in line with Franks et al. (1996) argument that the legal arrangements in the UK are very creditor-friendly, 
thereby increasing the cost of underinvestment. Similarly, the equity-friendly nature of US legal 
arrangements increases the probability of overinvestment. 
 
There is also support for the financial distress motives. Firms with high liquidity position and the ability 
to meet expected dividend stream are less likely to engage hedging, consistent with previous empirical 
findings. There is a positive relation between leverage and hedging for firms with moderate level of debt, 
but such relation become significantly negative for the firms which holding extremely high level of debt. 
However, we fail to find evidence that the incentives of hedging to reduce costs of financial distress are 
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stronger in the UK firms than the US firms. One possible reason is that managers are aware of the high 
expected costs of financial distress when making financing decisions, and therefore they are less concern 
about such problems when making ex-post hedging decisions. 
 
We also find a positive relation between the size of firm and hedging. Economies of scale in the costs for 
establishing and managing a hedging programme. It is the most important determinant of using 
derivatives and hedging foreign exchange rate risk in our models, but is less important on the use of 
interest rate derivatives. Similarly, firms with high growth opportunities tends to hedge their financial 
risks, but such incentive does not significantly influence the use of interest rate derivatives.  
 
Our results support the managerial risk preference theory for hedging. A firm is more likely to hedge 
when managerial claims are linked with shareholder’s return. The marginal effect of this incentive on 
hedging is even stronger under international operating context, where firms face more complicated 
exposures of market risks than domestic operating environment. Consistently, the results show that, for 
firms whose manager’s compensation linked to the shareholder’s wealth, the higher international 
operating income is, the more likely that the firm will use hedging instruments. In addition, in line with 
the findings that hedging affects firm value from previous literature, our empirical results from FX model 
suggests that manager hedges in response to manage firm value.  A firm with high Tobin’s Q is more 
likely to hedge its FX risk if manager’s compensation link to shareholder’s benefits in the firm. The 
incentive compensation package can change manager’s risk preference and increases manager’s 
incentives to take on risky projects. As such, incentive compensation such as stock-based compensation 
including stock options is negatively related to hedging.  
 
Overviewing the results, we conclude that multinational firms behave differently from domestic firms on 
the use of derivatives for hedging. Domestic and international markets present different risk to firms that 
hedge although our conclusions for not change substantially.  
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CHAPTER 7                                                                                           
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS AND CORPORATE HEDGING: A 
FACTOR ANALYSIS APPROACH 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter shows that firms have incentives to use derivatives to ease agency conflicts and 
managerial risk aversion. Derivatives can be used for hedging to mitigate risks for all investors. However, 
managerial self-interest can also enforce excessive corporate hedging, especially when firms have poor 
corporate governance arrangements. The previous chapters also suggest that corporate governance is 
endogenous to corporate hedging decisions and other financial policies. In this chapter, emphasis is given 
to the impact of corporate governance on the relationship between the firm’s financial characteristics and 
the corporate hedging. We hypothesise that internal (firm-level) and external (country-level) corporate 
governance characteristics influence a firm’s motivation to use derivatives. To do this, we examine US 
and UK firms. This will allow us to identify the internal corporate governance characteristics of an 
individual firm which determine hedging behaviour and will provide a further insight into corporate 
hedging behaviour. We expect that the characteristics of agency conflicts, board structure and executive 
compensation for US and UK firms will also differentiate hedging behaviour. The purpose of this chapter, 
therefore, is to analyse the impact of firm-level corporate governance on firms’ use of derivatives in the 
US and the UK. A factor analysis approach is employed at first to extract the main dimensions of variation 
in financial characteristics. This approach enables us to identify the determinants of corporate hedging in 
terms of the financial variables that give rise to the greatest variability in the financial performance of the 
sample of firms. We also perform the factor analysis to form a basis for comparison. The impact of 
corporate governance variables on the financial variables correlated with these factors is then assessed 
through logistic regressions. 
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7.2 Factor Analysis 
 
We explore a principal components factor analysis approach to extract the main dimensions of variation 
in the firms’ financial characteristics for US and UK hedgers and non-hedgers. Section 7.2.1 discusses 
the empirical results for firms that undertake all forms of hedging compared with non-hedgers. The form 
of hedging activity undertaken by firms can affect their financial performance. Therefore, section 7.2.2 
presents the results for foreign exchange rate hedging against non-hedgers, while section 7.2.3 discusses 
the results for interest rate hedging. We ignore other forms of hedging because of the small sample size. 
 
 
7.2.1 Firms using all types of hedging instruments 
 
Table 7-1 shows the loadings from the factor analytical results for both US and UK firms that hedge and 
those that do not hedge. Here, we do not make a distinction between the forms of hedging undertaken by 
firms. Panel A of Table 7-1 shows that for US firms, the factor loadings for any one variable exceed 0.4 
in absolute value whether or not the firm is a hedger. The variables for US hedgers load onto six factors 
and they explain up to 60% of the total variation in the data compared to 63% for non-hedgers.  
 
For US hedgers, factor 1 captures 18.59% of the variation in the data and loads heavily onto the Z-score 
and interest coverage ratio, but has moderate negative loadings on leverage and debt maturity. This factor 
appears to capture financial distress. It implies that hedgers have more variability in financial distress and 
as such are more likely to hedge to reduce the risk of financial distress (Smith & Stultz, 1985). So, this 
finding is consistent with theory. Notice that the coefficients for the Z-score, INCOV and TOBINQ are 
highest (above 76%). These variables give hedgers the greatest variability. Pérez-González and Yun 
(2013) find that US firms that use weather derivatives increase their market-to-book ratios by at least 6%, 
whereas Jin and Jorion (2006) do not find that risk management affects the value of firms (see Guay and 
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Kothari, 2003). In our case, the Tobin’s Q is closely related to book-to-market ratio and since we find 
strong variability for Tobin’s Q for hedgers, our results indirectly support Pérez-González and Yun’s 
(2013) finding. Consistently, factor 1 also contains a tax variable simulated marginal tax rate (MTR) with 
a positive loading of 0.322, as reducing the variability of expected tax liability increases the post-tax value 
of the firm. Notwithstanding the small loading, the importance of this result is consistent with Smith and 
Stulz (1985) and Graham and Rogers (2002), who find that leverage incentives of hedging appear to be 
tax motivated, providing empirical support for the taxation hypothesis for hedging.  
 
Factor 2 is a size factor, with heavily positive loadings on the natural logarithm of total assets and market 
value, and S&P long-term debt ratings which arguably reflect the size of firm. The contract costs of 
derivatives may increase if a hedger’s credit rating is below a certain level, resulting in higher costs of 
hedging. 23  Thus it is not surprising that debt credit rating generates a large variation amongst the 
determinants of hedging for hedgers. For the size variables, economy of scale has great explanatory power 
in elucidating the variation amongst US hedgers. The fact that size and credit ratings are positively 
correlated with factor 2 suggests that firms with a higher rating are among the largest in the sample, which 
is not surprising.  
 
Factor 3 appears to represent the hedging substitutes variable. Factor 4 loads heavily onto capital 
expenditure ratios and loads mildly on free cash flow. Since the two capital expenditure ratios are 
investment measures indicating whether managers attempt to increase the size of their firms and free cash 
flow is a proxy for overinvestment, we interpret factor 4 as the agency problems factor. Factor 5 loads 
onto fixed assets over total assets (FATA) and investment tax credit. It is an investment opportunity and 
taxation factor, whereas factor 6 is a R&D and beta (systematic risk) factor. We can interpret factor 6 as 
a growth opportunities factor. If firms hedge, then systematic risk will be reduced; however, firms also 
hedge to reduce investment distortions (see Froot et al., 1993), which can have implications for growth 
opportunities. Notice that beta loads heavily onto factor 1 for non-hedgers, so in this regard non-hedging 
                                                          
23 For example, Emerson Electric Co. and CenterPoint Energy Inc. reported in their 10-K statement that additional collateral might be required 
if the rating were downgraded. 
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creates more variability for non-hedgers, which is expected. The results are surprising because the 
investment- cash flow factors are expected to explain most variance amongst hedgers. However, the 
empirical results show that the cash flow related factor, agency problem factor and growth factor are just 
the fourth and sixth factors for US hedgers respectively. The possibility considered is that the variable 
ROA captures part of the cash flow variability. The situation in non-hedgers is the opposite and will be 
discussed below. 
 
Factor 1 for US non-hedgers has positive loadings on return on assets, free cash flow ratio, and simulated 
marginal tax rate, and negative loading on R&D expenditure. These explanatory variables account for 
15.49% of the variability in the data. This can be interpreted as an investment and tax related factor. 
Notice that only ROA and MTR also have loadings on factor 1 for hedgers, implying that ROA and tax 
liability are important for both groups of firms. This might explain why prior empirical research has found 
mixed results on the taxation hypothesis for hedging. The financial distress measure for hedgers does not 
also load unto factor 1 for non-hedgers, so financial distress is less important for non-hedgers. 
Notwithstanding the negative and low loading, R&D is surprisingly in factor 1 this time, compared with 
its earlier location, which is loaded onto the last factor for the US hedgers. Taken together, the results 
suggest that hedgers do not vary on the growth opportunities, but non-hedgers vary largely along the 
growth and cash flows. A plausible explanation is that hedgers hedge their cash flow to protect their 
valuable growth opportunities, so that the ex-post R&D spending and cash flow are less varied.  
 
Factor 2 and factor 4 are related to leverage and financial distress. Leverage and financial distress have 
less explanatory power for the US non-hedgers compared with results for hedgers, where the financial 
distress factor explains the largest portion of the variance. Factor 3 is the size factor. Non-hedgers are less 
concerned about the credit ratings, maybe because of lower levels of debt or an absence of derivative 
contracts costs. Factor 5 can be identified with the agency problem, factor 6 with hedging substitutes.  
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Table 7-1 Factor Analysis for firms that use all forms of hedging compared with non-hedgersa  
Panel A: Factor Loadings for US hedgers and non-hedging  
      Hedgers           
 
Non-hedgers 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6   1 2 3 4 5 6   
Zscore 0.837           0.596    
INCOV 0.804         0.555      
TOBINQ 0.761         0.668      
ROA 0.640        0.861       
LEVTA -0.554         -0.480      
DEBTMATU -0.554         -0.551      
MTR 0.322        0.676       
LogTA  0.907         0.830     
LogMV  0.888         0.859     
SPRATING  0.704         0.735     
CONVERDEBT   0.677           0.522  
CURR   0.554         0.836    
CASH   0.548       0.721      
SKTComp   0.430         0.691    
CAPEXTA    0.858         0.880   
CAPEXPPE    0.709         0.686   
FCF    -0.589     0.796       
FATA     0.790     -0.754      
ITC     -0.759         -0.618  
DY     -0.415         -0.691  
R&D      -0.705   -0.491       
BETA      0.575          
                
VP 18.585 11.609 8.086 8.005 7.099 6.098   15.486 14.114 10.836 8.073 8.048 6.862  
CVP 18.585 30.194 38.280 46.285 53.385 59.482     15.486 29.600 40.436 48.509 56.557 63.419   
                
Panel B: Factor Loadings for UK 
      Hedgers            Non-hedgers     
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LogMV 0.922         0.741      
LogTA 0.883         0.759      
DY 0.649         0.718      
TOBINQ  0.795          0.391    
LEVTA  0.772         0.641     
CURR  -0.552          0.670    
DEBTMATU  0.485         0.778     
Zscore   0.693      0.878       
FCF   0.690      0.843       
INCOV   0.544        -0.558     
FATA   -0.446          0.727   
CASH    0.667           0.604 
CAPEXTA     0.694         0.728  
CONVERDEBT     0.479         0.514  
R&D     -0.441          0.441 
CAPEXPPE     -0.320       0.602    
ROA      -0.733       0.443   
STKComp      0.616        -0.433  
TRX             0.821               0.554 
VP 12.280 11.951 10.118 6.365 6.256 5.864 5.395  12.836 9.541 8.761 7.651 6.393 6.257 5.647 
CVP 12.280 24.231 34.349 40.714 46.971 52.835 58.230   12.836 22.377 31.138 38.789 45.182 51.44 57.086 
 
 aFor each variable and factor, we attribute the variable with the highest factor score as primarily loading onto the specific factor. 
Having identified this variable and factor score, the remaining factor scores are set to zero.  
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Table 7-1 Panel B reports the loadings on the factors in the UK sample. The results for firms in the UK 
are generally consistent with those of the US. We find that the size factor has strong explanatory power 
in both the US and the UK. The first factor in the UK hedgers is size, on which the natural log of market 
value (LogMV) and total assets (LogTA) load heavily, capturing 12.28% of total variance. The fact that 
dividend yield and LogMV and LogTA are positively correlated suggests that dividend may relate to those 
variables (see Denis & Osobov, 2009; Fama & French, 2001). UK hedgers also have higher dividend 
variability than US hedgers. Since UK firms pay a higher dividend compared to US firms (Ferris, Sen, & 
Unlu, 2009), this in turn may suggest that dividend payment in the UK is more variable. 
 
Factor 2 has positive loading on leverage variables and negative loading on current ratio, representing the 
leverage factor. So, leverage has strong effects for UK hedgers, but not as strong as for US hedgers. This 
finding is unexpected for UK hedgers since, unlike the US, the UK bankruptcy code favours the rights 
of creditors or even the largest creditor much more than in the US, thereby forcing the UK firm into 
bankruptcy more quickly than in the US (see also Franks & Touros, 1993). Thus, given the financial 
regulatory environment of the UK, we would have expected UK firms to show more variability on 
leverage measures than US firms. Our finding also contradicts the suggestion of Judge (2006) that 
financial distress cost factors are more significant for UK firms than for US firms, because UK bankruptcy 
codes are in favour of creditors’ rights, which results in higher expected costs of financial distress in the 
UK. However, a creditor-friendly bankruptcy system may prompt firms to maintain a reasonable debt 
level, resulting in a reduction of expected costs of financial distress. An alternative view for our results 
can be that because of the UK bankruptcy code, UK firms hedge more than US firms, thereby reducing 
the variability of these measures much more than for US firms. However, survey-based results show 
that a larger proportion of US firms hedge both interest and FX rate exposure than UK firms.24 
However, a creditor-friendly bankruptcy system may prompt firms to maintain a reasonable debt level, 
resulting in a reduction of expected costs of financial distress.  
                                                          
24 Almost a similar percentage of UK firms hedge FX rate (71.79%) and interest rate (68.22%) exposures (Panaretou, 2014). These 
percentages contrast with the percentages of US firms that hedge. Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) show that 83% of US 
firms use derivatives to manage FX rate risk, whereas 76% also use derivatives to manage interest rate risk, interest rate risk 
being the second most important risk managed by US firms. 
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For Factor 3, Z-score has the highest loading of 0.693, followed by free cash flow ratio (FCF) with a 
loading of 0.690. Fixed assets ratio (FATA) has a negative loading on factor 3. A firm’s level of fixed 
assets should be positively related to its debt level. Conversely, a higher level of debt lowers the free cash 
flow and increases the costs of financial distress. Thus FATA is negatively related to Z-score and FCF. 
The leverage and financial distress factors (i.e. factor 2 and factor 3) have less explanatory power for the 
UK hedgers compared with the US. Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2010) find that the incidence of corporate 
fraud and managements’ preferences of risk taking reduces after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In 
addition, the US firms’ cash holding has increased since then, as compared with UK firms. Our results 
may imply that the change of regulation environment influences the motives for corporate hedging. 
Having said that, leverage and financial distress costs still explain a large portion of the variability in UK 
hedgers. 
 
Factor 4 has only one loading on cash holding. The highest loading of factor 5 is on capital expenditure 
over assets. The loadings range from -0.320 to 0.479 for the rest of the variables. Thus, this can be 
identified with investment. Factor 6 can be identified with managerial incentive and factor 7 with taxation. 
The fact that the tax factor has relatively small explanatory power is consistent with Joseph’s (2000) 
prediction that tax measures for UK hedgers should have a lower degree of variability. 
 
UK non-hedgers have large variability in agency costs. Factor 1 for UK non-hedgers captures 12.84% of 
total variance. Z-score and free cash flow/total assets (FCF) are the only variables that load onto factor 
1. The finding that both Z-score and FCF have high positive loading scores for factor 1 is consistent with 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory. Those variables only load onto factor 3 for hedgers. Firms face a 
trade-off between debt benefit of controlling an overinvestment problem from high free cash flow and the 
high financial distress costs from increasing debt. These costs differ across UK non-hedgers and affect 
their hedging policies. Factor 2 for UK non-hedgers can be identified with size, factor 3 with leverage, 
factor 4 with investment, factor 5 with managerial incentive and factor 6 with risk taking. Factor 7 can 
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represent cash flow and tax. Note that tax explains a large portion of variation in US firms, while it is 
much less important in the UK firms. Such a difference may be due to different tax measures and tax code 
differences between the UK and US.  
 
Overall, the results from factor analysis suggest that US and UK hedgers and non-hedgers have different 
levels of variability on the measures. The theories for hedging predict that corporate hedging will lead to 
different outcomes for hedgers and non-hedgers. If the financial characteristics of hedgers and non-
hedgers differ because some firms hedge and others do not, then this should lead to differences in the 
variability of the financial measures. This is exactly what we find for both US and UK firms. So the 
strategies of hedging or not hedging lead to different outcomes. Hedgers are mostly influenced by 
financial distress, tax and size, while non-hedgers are mostly influenced by cash flow, investment, tax 
and financial distress. Non-hedgers have more variability in cash flow and less variability in financial 
distress than hedgers. In the next section, we separate out the firms according to the specific derivative 
instrument use. In this case, the following analysis is limited to firms that only use FX rate derivatives or 
interest rate derivatives, since the samples for use of other types of derivatives is too small. 
 
 
7.2.2 Firms only using FX hedging instruments 
 
A second, more focused factor analysis is conducted for firms that use FX rate derivatives only compared 
with non-hedgers. This approach is adopted because prior work suggests that the choice of derivatives 
use has different effects on financial performance (Joseph, 2000). Table 7-2 Panel A reports the loadings 
on the factors for US firms. The results are not very different from the results from all forms of hedging. 
Factor 1 captures 12.73% of the variation, ranging from a loading of 0.62 on Z-score to a loading of 0.73 
on return on assets (ROA), which reflects profitability and is closely associated with cash flow. This factor 
appears to capture cash flow and financial distress. The second factor, capturing 14.23% of the variation, 
has negative loading on cash to total assets, and positive loading on ratings, fixed assets ratio and dividend 
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yield. These variables appear to capture cash holding. That is, the first two factors appear to captures a 
firm’s cash flow and the expected costs of financial distress. This suggests that financial distress remains 
a strong explanatory power for variation for US currency hedgers. Interestingly, however, cash flow 
appears to become an important factor and explains a large portion of the variation. It can be argued that 
because firms tend to hedge their foreign exchange rate exposure from operation to reduce the variability 
of cash flow, the weak results of cash flow in the all-type hedging sample is due to the mixture of currency 
hedging and other types of hedging.  
 
Compared with results from the all-type hedging sample, the size factor slightly weakens, moving from 
the second factor to the third factor for US currency hedgers. This may be because firms with significant 
international operation normally have large foreign exchange rate exposure, and therefore are more likely 
to hedge foreign exchange rate risk.  
 
Factor 4 has positive loadings on convertible debt, current ratio and stock-based compensation expense, 
which arguably affect the hedging that risk-averse managers undertake. This can be interpreted as the 
hedging substitutes factor. Factor 5 captures growth opportunities and tax, with a loading of 0.891 on 
Beta which arguably reflects firms’ cost of accessing equity capital, 0.433 on MTR, and a negative loading 
on R&D expenditure. This suggests that firms with higher volatility and costs of accessing equity capital 
have lower R&D expenditure. FX hedgers face cross-sectional variability in firms’ costs of equity 
financing and marginal tax rate, but such variability is not as significant as it is in financial distress and 
cash flows. It is noticeable that the explanatory power of marginal tax rate on variation in US hedgers 
largely decreases in this subsample, as compared with previous results. This result can imply that US 
hedger firms do not place as strong an emphasis on tax as on the other types of hedging (e.g. interest rate 
hedging and commodity hedging), if indeed hedging leads to reduced variability of financial measures. 
In general, prior studies do not find strong support for tax measures as a determinant of hedging (e.g. 
Allayannis & Ofek, 2001; Géczy et al., 1997). Factor 6 captures investments and has the least variability 
for hedgers. This finding does not provide strong support for investment distortions (see Froot et al., 
1993). 
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Table 7-2 Factor Analysis for firms that use only FX derivatives compared with non-hedgersa 
Panel A: Factor Loadings for US firms 
       Hedgers           Non-hedgers     
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6   1 2 3 4 5 6   
Z-Score 0.752           0.605     
INCOV 0.505        0.695       
TOBINQ 0.709        0.668       
FCF 0.707         0.849      
ROA 0.668         0.859      
CURR 0.631           0.834    
CASH  -0.731       0.622       
FATA  0.640       -0.690       
DY  0.620            -0.560  
SPRATING  0.613         0.718     
LogTA   0.839        0.891     
LogMV   0.819        0.831     
SKTComp   0.602         0.662    
LEVTA    0.735     -0.644       
CONVERDEBT    0.735          0.725  
DEBTMATU    0.632     -0.691       
BETA     0.891         0.602  
R&D     -0.846         0.430  
MTR     0.433     0.652      
CAPEXTA      0.841       0.891   
CAPEXPPE      0.663       0.716   
                
VP 15.969 14.231 10.194 10.077 8.701 7.515   15.848 13.350 11.477 8.448 8.360 8.257  
CVP 15.969 30.199 40.394 50.471 59.172 66.687     15.848 29.198 40.675 49.123 57.484 65.740  
                 
                
Panel B: Factor Loadings for UK firms 
        Hedgers            Non-hedgers     
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Z-Score 0.801        0.611 -0.476      
INCOV 0.773         -0.647      
FCF 0.653        0.580       
LEVTA -0.635  0.413       0.753      
DEBTMATU -0.600         0.664      
FATA -0.469   0.457        0.766    
LogMV  0.899       0.786       
LogTA  0.875       0.890       
STKComp  0.594             0.868 
CONVERDEBT  0.447           0.569   
TOBINQ   0.703        0.404     
CURR   -0.711        0.623     
CAPEXTA    0.801         0.668   
CAPEXPPE    -0.444       0.626     
ROA     0.763      -0.533     
CASH     0.589         0.594  
DY      0.699   0.309    -0.332 -0.397 -0.365 
R&D      0.594        0.410  
TXR       0.786       0.483  
VP 15.822 13.263 7.265 6.559 6.517 6.495 6.495   13.787 10.519 8.440 6.748 6.424 5.761 5.566 
CVP 15.822 29.085 36.350 42.909 49.426 55.922 61.954  13.787 24.305 32.745 39.492 45.916 51.677 57.243 
 
aFor each variable and factor, we attribute the variable with the highest factor score as primarily loading onto the specific factor. 
Having identified this variable and factor score, the remaining factor scores are set to zero.  
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We find that factor analysis results for US FX non-hedgers are almost the same as for hedgers. Financial 
distress, cash flow and size factors continue to capture a large portion of variations. However, MTR, the 
simulated marginal tax rate, is the second factor for FX non-hedgers. This is interesting, because the 
position of MTR is exactly the opposite of its position for FX hedgers, suggesting that FX non-hedgers 
have more variability on tax. Investment factor and hedging substitutes are the fifth and sixth factors for 
non-hedgers.  
 
Table 7-2 Panel B reports the loadings on the factors for the UK sample. The financial distress factor 
remains the first factor for UK hedgers and the second factor for non-hedgers, capturing 15.8% and 13.8% 
of total variance respectively. UK firms choose to execute hedging for their foreign exposure because of 
greater variability on the costs of financial distress. This is consistent with the results from the US sample. 
 
Size is the second most important factor for FX-only hedgers. The fourth factor loads onto investment 
intensity ratios and therefore represents investment intensity. Factor 5 loads onto ROA and CASH, 
capturing cash flows. It appears that cash flow only has moderate explanatory power on the variation in 
the UK FX hedgers. Compared with the magnitude of cash flow factor for non-hedgers, in which the cash 
flow factor explains an even smaller percentage of total variance, UK FX hedgers have larger variability 
in the cash flows. Such a finding is consistent with the interpretation that firms eliminate some, but not 
all of the variability in cash flows to a reasonable, lesser extent by hedging.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Readers should note that this factor analysis is for FX-only hedging. It does not include the cases that hedge FX and other types of exposure. 
The results from this factor analysis do not mean FX hedgers do not have large variability in cash flow. In an unreported factor analysis which 
includes all FX hedgers, we find that cash flow is the second factor for hedgers, suggesting that FX hedgers have large cash flow variability form 
foreign exchange exposure. 
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7.2.3 Firms only using interest rate hedging instruments 
 
The third factor analysis is conducted for the interest rate-only hedging sample, which contains firms that 
only hedge or do not hedge their interest rate (IR) exposure. Table 7-3 Panel A and Panel B report the 
loadings on the factors for the US and the UK respectively. The results shows that the size factor explains 
the largest portion of variations in the interest rate hedgers, followed by leverage and financial distress as 
the second and third factors. Factor 4 captures the costs of overinvestment and factor 5 represents the 
investment factor. These two factors are both closely associated with cash flow. That is, interest rate 
hedgers emphasise the costs of financial distress more than the variability of cash flows. This is consistent 
with expectation, since interest rate hedging is largely associated with tailoring debt and the costs of debt 
financing (Bodnar et al., 1998; Li & Mao, 2003; Visvanathan, 1998). 
 
Not only is financial distress the most important factor for US interest rate hedgers, but it also explains 
large proportion of variability for non-hedgers. Factor 1 for IR non-hedgers captures liquidity and factor 
4 represents the financial distress factor. Together, the two factors capture 24.31% of total variance, which 
is almost as large as the two financial distress costs factors for IR hedgers. The results suggest that both 
IR hedgers and non-hedgers face large variability in the costs of financial distress. Interest rate hedging 
does not eliminate variability, but it allows firms to reduce the variability to a reasonable, lesser extent, 
which is equivalent to non-hedgers. 
 
Factor 2 for the US IR non-hedgers loads on FCF, ROA and MTR, capturing 13.35% of total variance. 
Thus this factor captures cash flow and tax, suggesting that non-hedgers have greater variabilities in cash 
flow and tax. This result is consistent with the results from FX non-hedgers. The hedging substitutes 
factor has relatively small explanatory power, as it does for all-type non-hedgers and FX non-hedgers. 
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Table 7-3 Factor Analysis for firms that use only interest rate derivatives compared with non-hedgersa  
Panel A: Factor Loadings for US firms 
        Hedgers             Non-hedger     
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6   1 2 3 4 5 6   
LogTA 0.908          0.891      
LogMV 0.836          0.831     
SPLTDRating 0.757          0.718     
FATA 0.580  -0.546      -0.690       
SKTComp  0.827          0.662    
DEBTMATU  -0.666       -0.691       
IRCOV  0.657       0.695       
CURR  0.495 0.453         0.834    
LEVTA   -0.717      -0.644       
MTR   0.589       0.652      
Z-Score   0.551 0.462        0.605    
ROA   0.524       0.859      
CURR  0.495 0.453         0.817    
FCF    0.865      0.849      
TOBINQ    0.851     0.668       
CAPEXTA     0.846        0.891   
CAPEXPPE     0.743        0.716   
DY     -0.410         -0.560  
CONVERDEBT      0.716        0.725  
CASH      0.633   0.622       
R&D      0.534        0.430  
BETA              0.602  
                                
VP 13.085 11.897 11.194 9.600 9.054 7.538   15.848 13.350 11.477 8.448 8.360 8.257  
CVP 13.085 24.982 36.175 45.775 54.829 62.367     15.848 29.198 40.675 49.123 57.484 65.740  
                  
Panel B: Factor Loadings for UK firms 
      Hedgers            Non-hedgers     
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LogMV 0.862        0.786       
LogTA 0.884        0.890       
STKComp 0.656    -0.331          0.868 
CAPEXPPE 0.333          0.626     
Zscore  0.798       0.611 -0.476      
IRCOV  0.753        -0.647      
LEVTA  -0.722 -0.331       0.753      
DEBTMATU  -0.508     -0.340   0.664      
CURR   0.829        0.623     
TOBINQ   -0.666 -0.392       0.404     
FATA   0.641    0.355     0.766    
R&D    0.767          0.41-  
DY     0.719    0.319    -0.332 -0.397 -0.365 
TXR    0.392 0.413         0.483  
CONVERDBET     0.372        0.569   
CAPEXTA      0.738       0.668   
ROA    0.330  -0.660     -0.533     
FCF  0.302    0.390 -0.382  0.580       
CASH       0.831       0.594  
VP 12.768 12.644 9.419 7.407 6.819 6.365 6.256   13.787 10.519 8.440 6.748 6.424 5.761 5.566 
CVP 12.768 25.412 34.831 42.238 49.057 55.422 61.677   13.787 24.305 32.745 39.492 45.916 51.677 57.243 
aFor each variable and factor, we attribute the variable with the highest factor score as primarily loading onto the specific factor. 
Having identified this variable and factor score, the remaining factor scores are set to zero.  
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For UK firms, LogTA, LogMV, stock-based compensation expense (STKComp) and CAPEXPPE load 
onto factor 1, thereby capturing 12.77% of total variance. The results imply a couple of possible 
interpretations. The fact that size variables and STKComp are positively correlated implies that large firms 
pay higher stock-based compensation to their managers, which is not surprising. Managers hedge to 
reduce the volatility of their compensation packages, which is consistent with Rogers (2002) and Knopf, 
Ham and Thornton (2002). In addition, the positive association between STKComp and the investment 
intensity variable CAPEXPPE suggests that stock-based compensation aligns managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests and promotes high investment intensity. It is unclear why this alignment seems so strong mainly 
for firms that use interest rate derivatives and not, say, FX rate derivatives. These results may also relate 
to managerial self-interest (see Stultz, 1985). The increase of investment exposes managers to more risk. 
To the extent that managers are undiversified with respect to firm-specific wealth, they are exposed to 
more risk than diversified shareholders. Accordingly, the higher variability on the investment intensity 
also promotes interest rate hedging. Consistent with the results from hedgers, we find that the investment 
factor (factor 3) and the managerial incentive factor (factor 7) explain less variability in IR non-hedgers. 
 
The size factor retains strong explanatory power for the variation for non-hedgers. The second factor is 
the financial distress factor, capturing 10.52% of the total variance. The cash flow factor is shown to 
explain a small portion of variation in hedgers and non-hedgers. The possibility considered is that the 
hedgers in this sample are less involved in the international economy and therefore have lower cash flow 
variability. Factor 5 for UK hedgers positively loads onto CAPEXTA and CONVERDEBT and negatively 
loads on DY. Therefore it can be identified as the hedging substitutes factor. Although prior empirical 
studies have different predictions on the direction of the relationship of dividend variable with hedging, 
our results support the prediction of negative relationship between dividend payment and hedging. A firm 
can alter its dividend policy in response to the volatility of available cash flows for investments. The 
effective tax rate (TXR) is negatively related to DY, in line with the notion that tax liabilities affect firms’ 
dividend policy. STKComp is also negatively related to DY, consistent with the contracting hypothesis 
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that, given the certain level cash flow in the firm, the greater the dividend paid out, the more restrictions 
on the investment during the period, and, in turn, the less likely that the firm ties compensation to the 
effect of managers’ decisions on firm value. 
 
7.2.4 Summary 
 
In summary, hedgers have greater variabilities in financial distress costs and size, while non-hedgers have 
greater variabilities in tax, leverage and cash flows. The second factor analysis shows that cash flow 
appears to an important factor and explains a large portion of the variation in FX hedgers. Firms tend to 
hedge their foreign exchange rate exposure from operation to reduce the variability of cash flow; the weak 
results of cash flow in the all-type hedging sample may be due to the mixture of currency hedging with 
other types of hedging. The empirical results suggest that the magnitude of variability on tax across 
different types of hedging is different. The taxation factor is strong in the first analysis, but weak in the 
second and moderate in the third. Yet it is important to bear in mind that hedgers in the second and third 
factor analyses are the firms that only hedge one type of exposure, while firms which hedge more than 
two types of exposure are excluded. In other words, hedgers in the first factor analysis hedge more 
actively and intensively than hedgers in the second and the third factor analyses. Therefore, the high 
explanatory power of the marginal tax rate in the all-type hedging suggests that firms which hedge more 
actively and intensively have greater variability in the tax rate than light hedgers. Factor analysis, however, 
does not provide information regarding the effect of each factor on the corporate hedging decisions. 
Therefore, a logistic regression approach is employed in the next section. 
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7.3 Hedging and Corporate Governance 
 
This section presents logistic regression results based on the factor analysis, augmenting these results 
with our corporate governance measures. The approach to using the factor analysis results is as follows. 
Since a set of variables loads heavily onto each factor, the variables within that set are highly correlated. 
This means that any one of those variables is needed for the logistic regression. So, we select the variable 
with the highest factor score for each factor across hedgers and non-hedgers to include in the logistic 
regression. This approach is similar in all respects to the method used by Joseph and Hewins (1991). The 
approach also has the advantage of including variables that are uncorrelated in the analysis, as this will 
provide more reliable results compared to including several variables that are highly correlated (at least 
for each set of hedgers and non-hedgers).26 We then augment the variables chosen from the factor analysis 
and construct interaction terms with the corporate governance measures. The results that follow are 
presented below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 In some cases, we have more than one variable per factor when we combine hedgers and non-hedgers for estimating the 
logistic regression. 
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7.3.1 US results for the logistic regression 
 
Table 7-4 first two columns report the logistic regression results for US firms that use all types of 
derivatives. Overall, the diagnostic tests show reasonably a good performance for both models. For 
example, the -2 log likelihood is 2357.690. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test is not statistically significant 
(p-value > 0.10), indicating the statistical goodness-of-fit of the model is good. The omnibus statistics are 
significant (p-value   0.01), suggesting that the coefficients of the logistic regressions besides the 
intercept are significant. Finally, our logistic regression performs better than a proportional chance model 
using a 1% level, with an overall percentage of 82.5% of cases correctly classified. Normality is, however, 
highly significant using the Shapiro-Wilks test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (p-value ≤ 0.01). Since 
the analysis uses the maximum likelihood method with a large sample, the estimates are still unbiased. 
 
Before proceeding with the interaction terms, we examine the effect of financial factors when corporate 
governance is modelled as an exogenous factor. The coefficient for the variable measuring the proportions 
of non-executive board members on the board, NED, is positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that the likelihood of corporate hedging in US firms increases as outside directors gain influence. A one 
per cent increase in the non-executive director ratio yields a significant increase of 2.9 per cent possibility 
of engaging hedging. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction that good governance 
motivates firms to hedge the market effectively to protect shareholders’ wealth. The CGI, a corporate 
governance index which is based on seven internal corporate governance characteristics, however, is 
statistically insignificant in the model. This makes our conclusion mixed. However, the insignificant main 
effect of CGI may be due to the interaction of CGI in the model. In an unreported regression result, we 
find that the estimated coefficient of CGI is positive and statistically significant at 5% level. 
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Table 7-4. Logistic regressions for firms that use all forms of derivatives compared with non-hedgers 
Country US   UK 
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Constant 
-22.2218a 
(5.7057) 
 
-14.3178a 
(2.9268) 
 
NED 
0.1866 a 
(0.0659) 
0.0286 0.0102 
(0.0142) 
0.0007 
CGI 
-0.2853 
(0.2578) 
-0.0437 1.3201b 
(0.6556) 
0.0863 
Separation 
  0.2517 
(0.2517) 
0.0178 
BoardSize 
  0.2506a 
(0.0649) 
-0.0164 
CompLinkTSR 
  1.0982a 
(0.2003) 
0.0921 
LogMV 
0.1591 
(0.2213) 
0.0244 1.5049a 
(0.4419) 
0.0984 
CGI × LogMV 
  -0.2742a 
(0.0972) 
-0.0180 
LogTA 
6.0594a 
(1.3374) 
0.9289 0.7035 a 
(0.1362) 
0.0460 
NED × LogTA 
-0.0455 a 
(-0.0455) 
-0.0070 
  
R&D 
49.8451a 
(20.7037) 
1.7619  
 
 
NED × R&D 
0.6486 a 
(0.2469) 
0.0994 
  
CGI × R&D 
1.9840 
(1.4364) 
0.3041 
  
FATA 
-1.7822 
(1.5390) 
-0.2732 1.6180c 
(0.9030) 
0.1058 
CGI × FATA 
0.3152 
(0.3361) 
0.0483 -0.5131 b 
(0.2257) 
-0.0335 
CURR 
-1.4042 a 
(0.5220) 
-0.2152 -0.2558 a 
(0.0592) 
-0.0167 
NED × CURR 
0.0151 
(0.0062) 
0.0023 
  
Z-Score 
-0.4138 a 
(0.0969) 
-0.0634 0.5168 
(0.3404) 
0.0338 
CGI × Z-Score 
0.0830 a 
(0.0200) 
0.01272 
  
NED × Z-Score  
 -0.0111 b 
(0.0055) 
-0.0007 
DebtMatu  
 -0.5378 c 
(0.2867) 
-0.0352 
CGI × DebtMatu  
 0.1589 b 
(0.0660) 
0.0104 
CAPEXTA 
-1.0234 
(1.1552) 
-0.1569 0.0546 c 
(0.0310) 
0.0036 
DY 
0.4918 a 
(0.1915) 
0.0754 
  
CGI × DY 
-0.0767 c 
(0.0429) 
-0.0117 
  
CONVERDEBT 
-0.7812 
(3.3162) 
-0.1198 
  
NED × CONVERDEBT 
0.0257 
(0.0352) 
0.0039 
  
CGI × CONVERDEBT 
-0.0767 
(0.3135) 
-0.0767 
  
ROA 
2.7389 a 
(0.7428) 
0.4199 -0.2806 a 
(0.1048) 
-0.0183 
NED × ROA  
 0.0027 c 
(0.0016) 
0.0002 
Separation × ROA  
 0.1527 b 
(0.0670) 
0.0100 
PRIVOL 
0.0842 
(0.0541) 
0.0129 -0.1969 a 
(0.0589) 
-0.0129 
NED × PRIVOL 
-0.0010 
(0.0006) 
-0.0002 
  
BoardSize × PRIVOL  
 0.0188 a 
(0.0059) 
0.0012 
Summary statistics     
Number of Observation 2970  1465  
Omnibus model test 1142.316a  485.078 a  
-2 Log likelihood 2357.690  821.568  
Cox &Snell R 0.319  0.282  
Nagelkerke R 0.461  0.478  
Hosmer &Lemeshow test 13.410  10.705  
Percentage correctly 82.5 a  88.5  
K-S test on studentized residuals 11.290a  12.205 a  
K-S test on standardized residuals 9.898a  10.702 a  
a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, respectively.  
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The board structure also influences other financial policies of a firm, and therefore jointly influences 
hedging policy. Coles et al. (2008) predict a positive relationship between R&D expenditure and the 
proportion of inside directors on the board, because inside directors have more firm-specific knowledge 
than outside directors. They argue that a high fraction of inside directors in R&D-intensive firms is helpful 
for selecting appropriate growth and investment strategies. To examine how board structure and growth 
opportunities factors jointly relate to corporate hedging in the US, we created a set of interaction variables. 
Interestingly, the regression finds a significant and positive relationship between hedging and the 
interaction term between R&D expenditure and the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. 
This result suggests that firms whose boards are more independent are more likely to hedge to protect 
available growth opportunities. This may be because, unlike insiders who have firm-specific knowledge, 
greater outside representation may have a high cost of acquiring information and may be less effective in 
monitoring firms with high growth potential. Therefore R&D intensive firms with a more independent 
board will be even more likely to execute hedging to protect their valuable investment opportunities. 
These results imply that the directors in US firms are actively involved in firms’ hedging decisions. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that, if outside directors monitor effectively, firms will hedge in the 
interests of the shareholders. Given the certain level of R&D spending, a one per cent increase in the non-
executive director ratio yields a significant increase of 9.9 percent possibility of engaging hedging. The 
interaction effect of CGI and R&D is marginally significant and positively correlated with hedging. 
 
We also include an interaction term defined as the proportion of non-executive directors and the variable 
measuring free cash flow held in the firm. We further include two interaction terms, defined as the 
proportion of non-executive directors and free cash flow, and the proportion of NED and leverage, to test 
the outsider influence on the agency costs incentive, but both interaction terms are statistically 
insignificant. The coefficient of the interaction term is significantly different from zero but is negative.  
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Turning our attention to the interaction effect of financial distress costs and corporate governance on 
hedging, we find several interesting results. Prior empirical work on corporate governance and hedging 
(e.g. Fauver & Naranjo, 2010; Lel, 2012) finds influence of financial distress and corporate governance 
on the use of derivatives, but provides mixed evidence for the joint effect on hedging. Our regression 
finds a significant joint effect of financial distress and corporate governance on hedging. Estimated 
coefficients of the interaction term NED×CURR and CGI×Z-score are both significantly positive. The 
results suggest that the effect of financial distress on the use of derivatives is stronger as a firm’s level of 
corporate governance increases. Firms with strong governance have a strong incentive to hedge in 
response to the decreased liquidity and cash holding and increased costs of financial distress. The positive 
marginal effects of both interaction terms indicate that the positive impact of corporate governance will 
strengthen with shareholder concern about increasing costs of financial distress. In addition, since MTR 
and ROA are dominated and positively related to Z-score, according to the factor analysis, the results also 
imply that firms with strong governance also hedge to reduce the variability of their post-tax cash flow, 
which in turn increases the value of the firm’s and shareholders’ wealth. Compared with prior empirical 
work which provides insight into hedging on firm value from a financial distress and/or an agency costs 
perspective, our empirical results provide new evidence from the tax and cash flow perspectives.  
 
The implications from the interaction of dividend policy and corporate governance are mixed. The main 
effect of dividend yields is positively associated with hedging, which suggests that firms that exhaust 
their liquidity by paying higher dividends are more likely to engage in hedging, consistent with prior 
literature (e.g. Bartram et al., 2009; Lel, 2012). In contrast, the coefficient of its interaction term with CGI 
is significantly negative. The plausible explanation is that strong internal corporate governance influences 
managerial incentives to hedge and reduces information asymmetry problems and monitoring problems. 
Firms with a high dividend yield hedge to reduce the variability of cash flow, but they may also hedge to 
eliminate the noise in the firm’s dividend stream if the level of information asymmetry is high (DeMarzo 
& Duffie, 1995). Strong governance reduces information asymmetry and reduces the cost of capital which, 
in turn, eases the need for corporate hedging. Thus, the effect of the payout policy on hedging will be less 
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positive if corporate governance is strong. This finding is different to Fauver and Naranjo’s (2010) 
findings that the interaction terms of derivative usage and agency costs and monitoring problem variables 
are negatively related to firm valuation. However, they use the entrenchment index and the monitoring 
index rather than the corporate governance index to measure the level of corporate governance. The 
absence of the interaction term of corporate governance in the derivative usage model may be another 
reason. The negative effect on the derivative may be driven by managers’ speculation and self-interest. 
 
The interaction term of non-executive director ratio (NED) and LogTA is significant and negative. LogTA 
is the dominant variable of size factor and is positively related to the credit rating variable. The result 
suggests that a high representation of non-executive directors on the board makes the size effect on 
hedging less positive. This is consistent with the implication from the negative interaction effect of 
CGI×DY that strong governance reduces information asymmetry and eases the need for hedging. Large 
firms and firms with good credit ratings are more transparent and have less information asymmetry.  
 
The estimated coefficient of ROA, the dominant variable of cash flow factor, is highly significant (p-value 
<0.1) and positive, suggesting that firms hedge to reduce the volatility of cash flow and costs of agency 
problems caused by excess cash flow. However, the regression does not find evidence that the impact of 
corporate governance has significant influence on the cash flow incentive for hedging. The combination 
of excess cash and weak shareholder rights protection does not significantly influence corporate hedging 
decisions. All the interaction between ROA and corporate governance measures entered at the beginning 
of the regressions are insignificant and withdrawn. This suggests that higher firm profitability can lead to 
a higher probability of hedging, but a firm’s level of corporate governance does not significantly change 
such an incentive for hedging. The possibility considered is that corporate governance does not 
significantly impact the cash holding (Bates et al., 2009), nor does the presence of excess cash change the 
relationship between governance and profitability (see Harford et al., 2008). 
 
The results for price volatility and corporate governance do not provide significant evidence for the effect 
of price volatility on hedging and the combination effect of price volatility and corporate governance on 
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corporate hedging. This implies that, controlling for the amount of stock-based compensation package 
for managers, managers in US firms do not have strong incentives to hedge to reduce the volatility of 
share price.  
 
 
7.3.2 UK results for the logistic regression  
 
Table 7-4 columns 3 and 4 report the regression results for firms in the UK. The results strongly support 
the hypothesis that strong corporate governance has a positive effect on corporate hedging. The dummy 
variable indicating whether the CEO’s compensation is linked to total shareholder return (LINKTSR) is 
significantly positive as predicted, with a relatively high marginal effect of 9.2% and the highest Wald 
statistic in the model. By aligning managers’ wealth portfolio with shareholders’ return in the firm, 
managers’ incentive to hedge increases. This becomes the most important incentive to hedging in the UK 
after controlling for corporate governance effects, implying that the managerial incentives play a very 
important role in making corporate hedging decisions. Consistent with our expectation, the interaction 
effect of the managerial incentive factor and corporate governance is positively correlated with hedging 
in the UK. 
  
CGI is statistically significant at 5% level and is positively associated with hedging. The coefficient of 
BoardSize is significantly negative, indicating that firms with a larger board are less likely to engage in 
hedging. The marginal effect is a decrease in the probability of hedging of 1.6%. This result is in line 
with the notion that larger boards tend to be more easily controlled by managers and be more costly for 
outsiders to monitor investment decisions, but have less variability on corporate performance (Boone et 
al., 2007; Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009; Jensen, 1993). If managers are influential in the firm, then the firms 
can face less monitoring. This means that managers will have more flexibility and freedom to decide on 
hedging and may in turn take on more risks. Because larger boards tend to make less extreme decisions 
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and have less variable corporate performance, the variability in cash flow is lower which, in turn, reduces 
hedging needs. 
 
Such an effect of powerful management on reducing the hedging incentive shrinks with outsiders’ 
influence and grows with managers’ influence on the board. The situation that the CEO is the main insider 
on the board may actually increase a CEO’s decision-making power on the board and weaken the 
monitoring efficiency of outside directors (Liu & Jiraporn, 2010) and board effectiveness (Adams et al., 
2005; Faleye, 2015). An increase in the proportion of non-executive directors on the board does not 
necessarily lead to an improvement in internal governance and shareholder protection, because changes 
in the number of non-executive directors may not have a large impact on the power of the CEO to 
influence decisions. It is, therefore, interesting to further test the effect of powerful managers and board 
size on corporate hedging behaviour.  
 
In an unreported alternative model, we include an interaction between the CEO-Chairman duality dummy 
variable (DUAL) and BoardSize. We find that the coefficient of DUAL and BoardSize is significantly 
negative, indicating that a powerful manager and a large board reduces incentives to engage in hedging. 
The estimated coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive, indicating that the effect is 
stronger in a situation where the CEO also chairs a large board. This finding supports our expectation that 
the negative effect of powerful managers on corporate hedging grows with managers’ influence on the 
board. We do not find similar evidence from the US sample, as BoardSize is statistically insignificant to 
US firms. Having said that, however, this is consistent with the argument of Coles et al. (2008) that 
smaller boards are not necessarily optimal for all firms. Thus, the effect of board size is not ‘one size fits 
all’. 
 
Note that PRIVOL is insignificant in the US but has a significant negative effect on hedging in the UK. 
This implies that UK firms with high stock price volatility are less likely to engage in hedging. The 
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marginal effect is a decrease in the probability by 1.3%. The possibility considered is the clientele effect. 
It appears that such a negative effect on hedging is stronger in firms with a larger board. 
 
The previous section finds a significant joint effect of financial distress factor and corporate governance 
on hedging decisions in US firms. The effect of financial distress on hedging is stronger as a firm’s level 
of corporate governance increases. Firms with strong governance have a strong incentive to hedge in 
response to the decreased liquidity and cash holding and increased costs of financial distress. We find 
consistent evidences in the UK. The likelihood of hedging is higher when the cost of financial distress is 
high and the board is more independent, with a relatively small marginal effect of 0.7%. Likewise, 
strongly governed firms are more likely to hedge market risk with longer debt maturity, with a slightly 
stronger marginal effect of 1.0%. 
 
We do not find evidence that the impact of corporate governance has significant influence on the cash 
holding incentive and investment factor for hedging. The combination of cash factor and shareholder 
rights protection does not significantly influence corporate hedging decisions. All the interactions of 
CASH and CAPEXTA with corporate governance measures entered at the beginning of the regressions are 
insignificant and withdrawn, but the coefficient of CAPEXTA is significantly positive. This suggests that 
higher investment intensity can lead to a higher probability of hedging, but a firm’s level of corporate 
governance does not significantly change such incentives to hedge. This is consistent with our findings 
in the US. 
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7.4 Corporate Governance and Currency Derivatives 
 
To shed light on the impact of corporate governance on explaining variations in use of currency 
derivatives in the US and the UK, we run a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is the 
currency hedging dummy instead of the general hedging dummy in the previous section. In this analysis, 
we include only firms that used FX rate derivatives. Our explanatory variables are based on the factor 
analytical results as before, but for those based on FX rate derivatives and non-hedgers (see Table 7-2). 
The first four columns in the Table 7-5 present the regression results for the US firms (Equation (22) and 
(23)), and the last four columns present the results for the UK firms (Equation (24) and (25)). 
 
Table 7-5 shows that the logistic regression provides a good fit to the data based on the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test (p-value > 0.100). The regression confirms that board independence promotes firms to 
hedge FX exposures. The separation of the responsibility of CEO and Chairman is significantly positive 
to FX hedging in the UK, but this effect is not significant in the US. A plausible explanation is that, 
historically, separation of the positions of CEO and Chairman is common corporate governance practice 
in UK firms, whereas CEO duality predominates in the US.  
 
For the US logistic regression, CGI and NED are positive and both highly significant at 1% level. The 
accounting variables are statistically significant after controlling for corporate governance. The Z-Score 
is insignificant. The significant results are consistent with the regression results in the previous chapter, 
providing further evidence that the size of a firm, agency problem, tax, cash flow and cash holdings are 
the important determinants for foreign exchange hedging. The regression finds that price volatility 
(PRIVOL) is positively associated with hedging. Since the volatility of stock returns increases with the 
volatility of foreign exchange rate movements (Bartov et al., 1996; Joseph et al., 2015), this can increase 
the need for hedging by firms. PRIVOL remains statistically significant and positive in Equation (23), 
which controls for the interaction effect of corporate governance and a firm’s financial characteristics. It 
is also noticeable that PRIVOL has the second largest Wald statistic amongst all independent variables, 
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indicating the high significance of the variable in the FX hedging model. A one per cent increase in price 
volatility will lead to a 0.4% increase of the possibility of FX hedging. In the Equation (24) and Equation 
(25), however, the PRIVOL are not significant, suggesting that the volatility of stock price does not affect 
the hedging policies in the UK firms. This finding therefor raises a further research question as to, 
compared to the US firms, whether or not the volatility of foreign exchange rate movements has smaller 
association with the volatility of stock prices in the UK markets. 
 
Consistent with the results in Section 7-3, Table 7-5 Equation (23) finds strong evidence for a corporate 
governance and financial distress effect on FX hedging. The main effects of Z-score and CURR are 
significantly negative, indicating that high liquidity and low financial distress costs are negatively related 
to FX hedging. The interactions with corporate governance variables, NED×CURR and CGI×Z-Score, are 
significantly positive at 1% level and 5% level respectively. The results suggest that good governance 
promotes firms to hedge foreign exchange rate exposure in response to the expected distress costs arising 
from high leverage and low liquidity. CURR, which dominates financial distress and the managerial 
incentive factor, is positively associated with STKComp in the factor analysis. Therefore the positive 
coefficient of CURR×CGI also implies a positive interaction effect of corporate governance and stock-
based compensation on FX rate hedging. This is consistent with the notion that derivatives are used for 
hedging purposes. Prior studies find that performance-based compensation may increase managers’ 
speculation and risk-taking incentive, reducing the intention of hedging (Guay, 1999; Rogers, 2002). 
Strong corporate governance and reporting transparency can increase internal monitoring and reduce 
information asymmetry, which in turn can reduce those problems caused by performance-based 
compensation. Supanvanij and Strauss (2006) find that when transparency of derivatives reporting is 
improved, managers who are paid larger stock compensation tend to hedge more. Our results suggest that 
managers who are paid larger stock compensation tend to engage more strongly in FX hedging.  
 
 
 
 
162 
 
Table 7-5. Logistic regressions for US and UK firms that use FX rate derivatives compared with non-hedgers 
Model Equation (22)  Equation (23) Equation (24) Equation (25) 
Variable Coefficient ME Coefficient ME  Coefficient ME Coefficient ME 
Constant 
-14.3562a 
(1.2228) 
 
-8.8701a 
(2.2907) 
    
 -22.2218a 
-5.7057 
  
-10.4738a 
  
(`.9084) 
NED 
0.0268 a 
(0.0102) 
0.0035 
-0.0304 
(0.0246) 
-0.0039  
0.1866 a 
0.0032 
0.0398 b 
0.0094 
-0.0659 (0.0185) 
CGI 
0.3049 
(0.0971) 
0.0402 
0.1497 
(0.1294) 
0.0191  
 
 
 
-0.2092 
-0.0495 
(0.2150) 
Separation      
1.8998 a 
(0.3852) 
0.2749 
2.7384 a 
(0.5319) 
-0.4108 
LINKTSR      
1.6223 a 
(0.2286) 
0.3216 
2.0772 a 
(0.2940) 
0.4462 
ADCI        
0.0166 b 
(0.0077) 
0.0039 
LogTA 
2.2150a 
(0.1899) 
0.2924 
2.2074 a 
(0.1933) 
0.2814  0.4566 0.0936 
0.2506a 
0.2064 a 
(0.1097) 
0.0725 
CASH 
3.5012 a 
(0.8707) 
0.4621 
-9.6157 
(10.2565) 
-1.2257    
0.2361 
(0.1504) 
0.0559 
NED × CASH   
0.1597 
(0.1212) 
0.0204    
-0.0044a 
-0.0010 
(0.0025) 
CAPEXTA 
-5.1039 b 
(2.1204) 
-0.6737 
19.5447 
(15.5703) 
2.4913    
-0.3460 a 
-0.0819 
(0.1814) 
NED × CAPEXTA 
 -0.3002 
(0.1870) 
-0.3002 
(0.1870) 
-0.0383    
-0.0044 c 
(0.0025) 
0.0017 
 
LEVTA 
 
 
 
  
-3.5930a 
(0.8863) 
-0.7370 
-4.0579 a 
(1.1046) 
-0.9608 
  
CURR 
 
 
-2.5325 a 
(0.9805) 
-0.3228      
 
NED × CURR 
 
 
0.0297 a 
(0.0114) 
0.0038      
 
Z-Score 
0.0216 
0.0029 
-0.1988 
(0.0942) 
-0.0253    
0.8118b 
(0.3907) 
0.1922 
(0.0148) 
CGI × Z-Score 
 
 
0.0468 b 
(0.0199) 
0.0060      
 
NED × Z-Score   
 
  
 
 
 
-0.0159 a 
(0.0062) 
-0.0038 
 
FATA   
 
  
-0.2984 a 
(0.1077) 
-0.0612 
-0.3869 a 
(0.1262) 
-0.0916 
 
STKComp 
 
      
0.4169 a 
(0.1539) 
0.0987 
 
CGI × STKComp 
 
      
-0.0847 a 
(0.0319) 
-0.0201 
 
ROA 
1.4958 c 
(0.8738) 
0.1974 
-4.7235 
(3.6161) 
-0.6021  
0.0695 b 
(0.0287) 
0.0142 
0.0550 c 
(0.0335) 
0.0130 
NED × ROA   
0.0751 c 
(0.0455) 
0.0096      
PRIVOL 
0.0305 
(0.0082) 
0.0040  0.0039      
Summary statistics     
Number of Observation 1289 1270 559 449 
Omnibus model test 277.142a 303.757 a 177.503 a 170.226 
-2 Log likelihood 1094.814 1058.471 551.580 443.908 
Cox &Snell R 0.193 0.213 0.272 0.316 
Nagelkerke R 0.295 0.323 0.373 0.426 
Hosmer &Lemeshow test 8.026 8.450 5.941 11.688 
Percentage correctly 80.8  80.4  75.3 78.4 
K-S test on studentized residuals 11.290a  12.205 a  
K-S test on standardized 
residuals 
9.898a  10.702 a  
a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, respectively.  
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By contrast, financial distress factor and its joint effect with board independence are shown to have a 
negative impact on hedging for the UK. This is surprising and makes the interpretation difficult, 
considering that the financial distress costs factor is shown to explain a large portion of the variance in 
the factor analysis. The possibility considered is that there are large variations in financial distress costs 
amongst both UK hedgers and non-hedgers that use FX rate derivatives. Because hedgers hedge their 
foreign exchange rate exposures, the ex-post costs of financial distress are reduced, resulting in a negative 
correlation between distress costs and FX hedging. 
 
Table 7-5 also shows a significant interaction effect between corporate governance and cash flow. 
NED×ROA is statistically significant at 10% level and is positively correlated with FX hedging in 
Equation (23). Since ROA is a profitability measure, the result is consistent with the notion that 
shareholders’ interests can be protected better with a more independent board of directors. When the 
board is more independent, US firms are more likely to engage in FX hedging to reduce the volatility of 
after-tax cash flow. The result also supports the taxation hypothesis for hedging, since ROA is also the 
dominant variable for cash flow and taxation factor and is positively associated with MTR. 
NED×CAPEXTA is marginally significant and has a negative effect on FX hedging. Because good 
corporate governance can help ameliorate agency costs, particularly when free cash flow is high, an 
overinvestment problem will become less influential on the use of currency derivatives when the level of 
governance is high. 
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7.5 Corporate Governance and Interest Rate Hedging 
 
Table 7-6 reports the impact of corporate governance when firms use interest rate derivatives. The first 
two columns present the results for the US firms and the third and fourth column present the results for 
the UK firms. The corporate governance index, CGI, remains positively associated with the use of interest 
rate derivatives and is statistically significant (p-value <0.1) in the US, but is insignificant in the UK. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient of the Separated CEO-Chairman dummy variable is significantly negative 
for both US and UK firms. So, firms run by powerful CEOs are more likely to engage in IR hedging. 
When the CEO chairs the board of the firm, price volatility is negatively related to interest rate hedging. 
When the positions of CEO and chairman of the board are separated, stock price volatility is positively 
associated with interest rate hedging. This suggests a positive influence of corporate governance on 
hedging to reduce the firm’s risk. 
 
The interaction between corporate governance variables and overinvestment factor appears to have 
important consequences for corporate hedging in the US. NED×FCF and Separation×FCF are both 
significant at 5% level and positively correlated with IR hedging. The marginal effect is 0.032 and 0.728, 
respectively. In contrast, the coefficient of interaction of CGI and FCF is significantly negative, with a 
relatively strong marginal effect of -0.267. This indicates that firms overseen by a more independent 
board tend to hedge their interest rate exposures to reduce the cost of overinvestment caused by a high 
level of free cash flows, whereas strong corporate governance may alleviate the agency problem of 
overinvestment and ease the need for hedging. At the same time, well governed firms are more likely to 
engage in IR hedging to reduce the variability of cash flow.  
 
Compared with US, cash flows factors and agency problem factors are insignificant in the UK. CAPEXTA 
is positive but insignificant in the UK after controlling for corporate governance variables. Note, however, 
that its interaction with corporate governance index, CGI, is significantly negative. Weakly governed UK 
firms with higher investment intensity are more likely to engage in IR hedging. This is the reverse of the 
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expectation, since strong governance should encourage hedging so that firms can fund profitable 
investment internally and avoid costly external financing. Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) find that IR 
derivatives are used to hedge to avoid costly external financing but also to speculate. Though this study 
identifies hedgers as those firms which clarify that they use derivatives to hedge rather than to speculate, 
it might be the case that managers also use derivatives for speculation. The negative sign of the interaction 
may be because managers in the weakly governed firms use IR derivatives for speculation while they 
may still report their purpose for hedging27. 
 
Results from the UK show a negative coefficient on leverage and a negative coefficient on its interaction 
with CGI, but a positive coefficient on its interaction with NED. This suggests that for firms overseen by 
a more independent board, the probability of engaging in IR hedging increases with the increase of 
expected costs of financial distress, whereas weakly governed firms with greater expected financial 
distress costs are less likely to engage in IR hedging. Results from the US are in line with the latter finding. 
Lel (2012) finds that firms with high distress costs are prevented from accessing derivatives for hedging 
because of their high credit and counter-party risks. This explanation is reasonable, since our results 
shows that economies of scale and high ratings have a strong positive influence on hedging. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 Géczy (2007) find that IR speculation is positively associated with weaker firm-level corporate governance. 
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Table 7-6. Logistic regressions for or US and UK firms that use FX rate derivatives 
compared with non-hedgers  
Country US  UK 
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Constant 
          -5.0597a 
(1.2347) 
 
-7.5712B 
(3.7627) 
 
NED 
-0.0036 
(0.0121) 
-0.0004 -0.1161 
(0.0142) 
-0.0136 
CGI 
0.1361 
(0.1392) 
0.0173 0.4968b 
(0.6435) 
0.0581 
Separation 
-2.1278 a 
(0.6058) 
-0.2387 -1.2877 
(0.6850) 
-0.1891 
BoardSize 
  -0.7684a 
(0.2129) 
-0.0900 
LINKTSR 
  0.6917 
(0.5033) 
0.0796 
ADCIndp 
 
 
-0.0227 a 
(0.0086) 
-0.0027 
LogTA 
0.8591a 
(0.1827) 
0.1094 1.6261 a 
(0.2918) 
0.1902 
RDTA  
 -0.1579 
(0.1476) 
-0.0185 
FATA 
-1.7822 a 
(1.5390) 
0.2149 0.2473c 
(0.1470) 
0.0289 
CGI × FATA  
  b 
 
 
CURR  
 -2.5732 b 
(1.1096) 
-0.3010 
NED × CURR 
  0.0528 a 
(0.0118) 
0.0062 
CGI × CURR  
 -0.4937 b 
(0.2283) 
-0.0578 
CASH  
 0.0237 
(0.0687) 
0.0028 
LEVTA 
2.4588 a 
(0.4538) 
0.3130 
  
CAPEXTA 
5.7498 a 
(1.7297) 
0.7319 0.1796  
(0.4042) 
0.0210 
NED × CAPEXTA  
 0.0098 
(0.0063) 
0.0011 
CGI × CAPEXTA  
 -0.1746 b 
(0.0931) 
-0.0204 
DY  
 -4.2179 c 
(2.3930) 
-0.4935 
CGI × DY 
 
 
 1.8794 a 
(0.6901) 
0.2199 
FCF 
-9.5869 
(8.1548) 
-1.2203 
  
NED × FCF 
0.2478 B 
(0.1177) 
0.0315 
  
CGI × FCF 
-2.0950 C 
(1.1162) 
-0.2667 
  
Separation × FCF 
5.7172 B 
(2.6716) 
0.7278 
  
ROA 
-9.7231b 
(4.3541) 
-1.2376 
  
CGI × ROA 
2.3030 b 
(0.9699) 
0.2931 
  
STKComp 
0.6574a 
(0.2535) 
0.0837 
  
NED × STKComp 
-0.0076 b 
(0.0032) 
-0.0010 
  
PRIVOL 
-0.0595 a 
(0.0130) 
-0.0076 -0.6213 b 
(0.2741) 
-0.0727 
Separation × PRIVOL 
0.0458 a 
(0.0172) 
0.0058 
  
BoardSize × PRIVOL  
 0.0596 b 
(0.0303) 
0.0062 
     
Summary statistics     
Number of Observation 1288  297  
Omnibus model test 261.053a  209.919 a  
-2 Log likelihood 1085.139  180.542  
Cox &Snell R 0.183  0.507  
Nagelkerke R 0.283  0.693  
Hosmer &Lemeshow test 6.614  8.886  
Percentage correctly 80.7a  88.9  
K-S test on studentized residuals 11.290a  12.205 a  
K-S test on standardized residuals 9.898a  10.702 a  
a ,b and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5- and 10-percent level, respectively.  
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7.6 Conclusion 
 
In summary, this chapter has utilised the factor analysis approach to distinguish the financial and 
corporate governance characteristics of US and UK firms that hedge and do not hedge. The factor analysis 
results show that the variables that show the most variability for hedgers do not always have the same 
variability for non-hedgers. So the effect on hedging or not hedging does not have a linear relationship 
with the variability of the firm, contrary to theoretical predictions. This result holds across both US and 
UK firms, although there is also strong variability in the relative importance of the variables across 
countries. In general, financial distress costs, tax factor and size factor explain the largest portion of 
variation in hedgers, whereas hedging substitutes factor, agency problem factor and growth opportunities 
factor have less explanatory power. We find that the factors motivating firms to use currency derivatives 
are not exactly the same as those which motivate them to use foreign exchange rate hedging and interest 
rate hedging. It appears that the factors that motivate firms to hedge currency risks arise from variability 
of cash flow, financial distress costs and economies of scale. Firms tend to hedge their foreign exchange 
rate exposure from operation to reduce the variability of cash flow, whereas, the important factors that 
motivate firms to hedge interest rates risk appear to be economies of scale and high distress cost. Interest 
rate hedgers emphasise the costs of financial distress more than the variability of cash flows, since interest 
rate hedging is largely associated with tailoring debt and the costs of debt financing. We also find that 
there are differences between the corporate hedging behaviour of US and UK firms. Regulations and 
country-level factors, such as tax codes, bankruptcy codes and culture, influence the hedging decisions 
of US and UK firms. The costs of financial distress have a positive influence on hedging decisions in the 
US. In the UK, the economies of scale factor has a strong positive influence on hedging. 
 
We use the factor analytical results to estimate our logistic regression. Our approach in choosing the 
variables enables us to estimate logistic regressions when the financial characteristics of the firms are not 
correlated. This leads to more reliable results. Logistic regression results suggest that corporate 
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governance mechanisms affect hedging decisions. The proxy variable for the independence of board is 
significant. Independent directors have a role in monitoring managers and protecting shareholders’ 
interests in the firm. The board structure also influences hedging decisions and a large board tends to be 
negatively associated with hedging. The probability of hedging increases with outsiders’ influence and 
shrinks with managers’ influence on the board.  
 
In addition, empirical results show that the interaction between corporate governance variables and 
financial characteristics have important consequences for corporate hedging. Firms with strong 
governance hedge to reduce the variability of cash flows and costs of financial distress. Compared with 
prior empirical work which provides hedging insights into firm value from a financial distress and/or 
agency costs perspective, our empirical results also provide new evidence from the tax and cash flows 
perspectives. The interaction effects of corporate governance with investment intensity and managerial 
incentives on hedging vary across different types of hedging and across countries.  
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CHAPTER 8  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Financial theories provide several theoretical explanations and rationales of corporate hedging with 
imperfect market. Though there is some evidence in support of theoretical predictions, the empirical 
results are overall controversial and mixed. The divergence between theory and practice leads to unclear 
guidance on the theoretical explanations or motives for the corporate hedging strategies of firms. In 
addition, the majority of empirical studies that focus on hedging practices focus on samples of firms from 
one country and provide limited cross-country comparisons for corporate hedging determinants within 
the same period. It is unclear whether the contradiction on the empirical evidence is due to the cross-
country differences or the changes of exposure management practices that occur over time. To date, very 
few (if any) empirical studies have examined and compared the determinants of hedging between 
countries with the use of large datasets covering several years. So far, the understanding of the corporate 
hedging behaviour of firms and correspondence between theory and practice remain incomplete. 
 
This study attempts to fill the gap by providing broad empirical evidence on the determinants of corporate 
hedging for US and UK non-financial firms. The study examined the financial characteristics that appear 
to predict the corporate hedging motives of US and UK firms. Additionally, the study utilised corporate 
governance proxies to examine the joint effect of financial characteristics and corporate governance on 
corporate hedging policies. A two-country study enables us to identify the differences in corporate 
hedging policies. Our findings and contributions are generalised in the following sections. 
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8.2 Financial Characteristics and Corporate Hedging 
 
This thesis investigates the financial and non-financial characteristics that appear to predict US and UK 
firms hedging decisions and compares the evidence from the two countries. We employ logistic regression 
to analyse the data from listed US and UK firms covering a ten year period (2002-2011). The two 
countries are chosen because both countries have a common law legal system, a market-based financial 
system as well as well-developed equity markets with good investor protection. This eases the concern 
that the mixed results across countries are due to US enjoying a large and stable financial market with 
strong investor protection. The use of large data set makes it possible to overcome small sample problems, 
which have troubled many comparative studies utilising survey responses data.   
 
Our evidence for US and UK firms is mostly consistent and strongly supports the hypotheses for hedging. 
Hedging theories hold across countries. Firms with greater growth opportunities have greater incentives 
to hedge to reduce the volatility of cash flows. Firms also hedge in response to the tax incentives, the 
increase of agency costs, and the costs of financial distress. Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Géczy et 
al., 1997; Lin et al., 2008), we find that US and UK firms with greater growth opportunities have greater 
incentives to hedge to reduce the volatility of cash flows and potential predation risks. We also find that 
the extremely high leverage and the extremely long debt maturity eliminate the motivation of hedging. 
Our evidence suggests that, when hedging is costly, the dynamics associated with the costs of hedging 
alters the optimal hedging policy of a firm. Furthermore, prior literature poses an empirical puzzle for the 
effect of firm size on hedging. While theories of hedging suggest smaller firms are more likely to hedge 
because of their higher riskiness, our empirical results show that large firms hedge more than small firms. 
Our findings that credit rating is positively related with hedging in the US provide a plausible explanation 
to the puzzle. The factor analysis results show that, in general, financial distress costs, tax factor and size 
factor explain the largest portion of variation in hedgers, whereas hedging substitutes factor, agency 
problem factor and growth opportunities factor have less explanatory power. 
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There are, however, significant country differences in the practices of hedging and the factors that 
incentivise firms. These differences are mainly driven by the differences on bankruptcy codes, corporate 
governance, and other institutional differences. For example, though the results from both countries 
suggest a positive relation between size and hedging, the corporate hedging decision is more sensitive to 
economies of scale in the US than UK. Additionally, it appears that US firms exhibit stronger motivation 
of hedging in response to the overinvestment costs, while UK firms exhibit stronger motivation of hedging 
in response to underinvestment costs. Our analysis also captures the effect of macroeconomic change on 
a firm’s hedging decision. We find that the economic downturns and the financial crisis significantly 
affect the likelihood of hedging.  
 
The study also examines the joint effect of financial characteristics and corporate governance on hedging 
decisions. It shows that the structure of the board influences hedging decisions and the size of the board 
tend to be negatively associated with hedging. The probability of hedging increases as the number of non-
executives grows. A powerful CEO-Chairman and a large board reduces the incentives to engage in 
hedging. In addition, corporate governance variables and financial characteristics have important 
consequences for corporate hedging. Firms with strong governance hedge to reduce the variability of cash 
flows and costs of financial distress. Compared with prior empirical work which examines the value of a 
firm and the value of hedging from financial distress and/or agency costs perspective, our empirical results 
provide new evidence from tax liabilities and cash flows perspectives. The interaction effects of corporate 
governance with investment intensity and managerial incentives vary across different types of hedging 
and across countries.  
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8.3 Contributions 
 
Our study makes the following major contributions to the literature. First, this study adds to the limited 
empirical research on the corporate hedging activities across different countries. By analysing the dataset 
of listed US and UK firms covering a ten year period, we find that there are significant country differences 
in the practice of corporate hedging and the factors that incentivise firms. These differences are driven by 
the differences in bankruptcy codes, corporate governance, and other institutional differences. These 
findings may provide a possible explanation why previous empirical studies focussing on different 
countries find controversial and mixed results. The contradiction on the empirical evidence may be due 
to the cross-country differences.  
 
Second, our study contributes to risk management literature by shedding light on the financial variables 
that give rise to the greatest variability in the financial performance of firms. The factor analysis results 
show that the variables with the most variability for hedgers do not always have the same variability for 
non-hedgers. So the effect on hedging or not hedging does not have a linear relationship with the 
variability of the firm, contrary to theoretical predictions. Additionally, different from previous empirical 
studies, we also used the factor analytical results to estimate our logistic regression. As discussed by 
Géczy et al. (1997) and Aretz and Bartram (2010), the traditional paradigm of using logit test has 
limitations. The endogeneity of variables measuring potential incentives for hedging is one of the 
empirical challenges and potential shortcomings, which may limit the conclusions drawn from existing 
hedging evidence. Though we recognise that it is almost impossible to eliminate all the endogeneity 
problems, using the factor analysis approach can alleviate the problems. The approach has the advantage 
of including variables that are uncorrelated in the analysis, as this will provide more reliable results 
compared to including several variables that are highly correlated. Our findings provide clearer guidance 
on the motives for the corporate hedging strategies of firms in the different countries. 
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Third, the study adds to the limited empirical evidence on the relationship between the manager-
shareholder agency problems and corporate hedging policies. Our evidence shows that both the US and 
UK firms hedge to reduce the agency costs arising from overinvestment problems. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study to find strong evidence for the overinvestment costs explanation for hedging in the 
UK. Most UK empirical studies examining agency costs hypothesis focus on the underinvestment 
explanation for hedging (e.g. Joseph and Hewins, 1997; Judge 2006; Panaretou, 2014). 
 
Purnanandam (2008), extending the financial distress hypothesis for hedging predicted by Smith and 
Stulz (1985), finds a non-monotonic relation between leverage and hedging with the data for the 1996-
1997 periods for the US firms. We extend this work and show that such a non-monotonic relation exists 
over time and outside the US. Lel (2012) finds that firms with high distress costs are prevented from 
accessing derivatives for FX hedging because of their high credit and counter-party risks. We extend the 
analysis of Lel (2012) by examining a broader arrays of financial characteristics and broader types of 
hedging with a larger sample. Our results find that the likelihood of hedging among firms below 
investment grade increases as the likelihood of bankruptcy decreases. 
 
Prior literature poses an empirical puzzle for the effect of firm size on hedging. While theories of hedging 
suggest smaller firms are more likely to hedge because of their higher riskiness, empirical results show 
that large firms hedge more than small firms. Our finding that credit rating is positively related with 
hedging in the US is consistent with the economies of scale and may be able to explain the puzzle. 
Additionally, the evidence also suggest that, when hedging is costly, the dynamics associated with the 
costs of hedging alters the optimal hedging policy of a firm. Firms have different hedging policies in 
response to the same hedging motivation. These results have theoretical and practical implications. 
 
The other contributing factor is the evidence for the taxation hypothesis. Aretz and Bartram (2010) 
suggest that the weak empirical evidence for the tax hypothesis may be because the tax incentives to 
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hedge is small compared to other hedging factors. Compared with prior empirical works, this research 
provides new evidence from the tax liabilities and cash flows perspectives. The results from the factor 
analyses show that tax liabilities explain a large portion of variation in US firms, while having much 
smaller explanatory power in the UK, which is consistent with Joseph’s (2000) prediction that tax 
measures for UK hedgers should have a lower degree of variability. Thus, the argument that the tax 
incentives to hedge is relatively small cannot completely explain the weak results regarding tax variables. 
The results from our research also suggest that firms place more emphasis on tax benefit from increased 
debt capacity by hedging than tax function convexity, consistent with the argument of Graham and Rogers 
(2002). Furthermore, we extend this work and show that the tax incentives to hedge are different in terms 
of different types of hedging. The tax function convexity affects firms’ incentives to hedge FX exposures, 
whereas the tax benefit on debt affects firms’ incentives to hedge interest rate exposure. This finding is 
in line with MacKay and Moeller’s (2007). Firms selectively hedge concave revenues but leave concave 
costs unhedged.  
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8.4 Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Derivatives provide firms with a way to reduce risks and an opportunity for risk-taking, thus complicating 
the task of overseeing financial activities within the firm (Bodnar et al, 1995). The 2008 financial crisis 
raised new concerns and debates about the use of financial derivatives. Among those debates, Bartram et 
al (2011) argue that, while most harm during this global economic downturn have been caused by those 
financial instruments held by financial firms, the use of derivatives at non-financial firms reduces both 
total risk and systemic risk, particularly with regard to reducing the risk of down markets. 
 
 
The outcomes and contributions of this study will benefit both investors and financial managers. The 
findings provide additional information to researchers who are interested in foreign exchange risk 
premium and stock return. The conclusions from this doctoral research will allow owners, shareholders 
and bondholders who have the ability to hold diversified portfolios of securities and other stakeholders to 
understand the logic of corporate hedging policies. The new understanding of corporate hedging will be 
helpful to financial managers when making risk management decisions and policy makers who regulate 
financial instruments. The study shows that the volatility of stock price significantly affects firms’ FX 
hedging policies in the US, but has no significant effect in the UK. It therefore raises a further question 
as to, compared to the US firms, whether or not the volatility of FX movements have smaller risk premium 
in the UK markets. In addition, our findings underscore the importance of incorporating industry-specific 
and country-level factors in cross-country studies 
 
Although the research is well designed, it still faces challenge with the research going on. Secondary 
empirical research is easier to carry through, but there are also shortcomings at the same time. Some 
hypotheses such as managerial risk aversion cannot be tested directly. Information for manager 
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remuneration packs of some companies may not be available. We used more than one applicable variable 
to test the hypotheses to minimise the negative impact caused by this challenge.  
 
There are some potential ways to extend our work. In our study, we do not investigate the effects of 
hedging on firm value (see Panaretou, 2014). Given the findings of significant influence of tax, leverage, 
agency costs and investment on hedging in the presence of costly market imperfections, corporate hedging 
should enhance value. It would be fruitful to examine the joint effect of corporate governance and hedging 
on firm value in the future (see Allayannis et al., 2012). 
 
As observed in Panaretou et al. (2014) and Lins et al. (2011), hedge accounting treatment and fair value 
reporting for derivatives impact on scope of corporate risk management. Further research may focus on 
the effect of change of derivatives reporting and hedge accounting for corporate financing and investment. 
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